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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts a comparative sociology of the labour law in Australia and Nigeria. 
It finds that there are fundamental similarities between the compulsory arbitration laws 
of both countries which cannot be adequately explained, simply, in terms of race, 
geography or stages of industrial development. The thesis outlines in considerable 
details two broad sociological perspectives on law, the autonomy model and the social 
product model, and uses the insights of these two approaches to explain the observed 
similarities.
The thesis shows that the 1904 Australian law was transplanted to Nigeria in the period 
1968-76. Further, it shows that although at first sight Australia in 1904 is very different 
from Nigeria in 1968, the respective social circumstances (particularly the social 
control traditions) were remarkably similar, thus allowing the borrowing of the 
Australian legislation by Nigeria. The few differences which the thesis identifies 
suggest that the borrowing was not a case of blind legal transplantation.
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1CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND
METHOD
1.1 A statement of the research problem
How is [new] legal policy possible? As soon as this question is asked the 
limited significance of the positivistic legal method is demonstrated... In calm 
periods of history, when a certain degree of equilibrium has been achieved in 
the relations between the social forces, it is usually simply a matter of formal 
modifications of the law, for which the positivistic technical method may be 
sufficient. But in times of sudden change, where the old disappears and the new 
craves recognition, a purely technical insight into the existing legal order is not 
sufficient. At the very moment when jurisprudential thought advances beyond 
existing law and wishes to develop new forms of law, it becomes dependent on 
the sociological method. For only the latter provides the foundations for the 
tasks [of understanding new] legal policy.
—  Hugo Sinzheimer, 1922 (quoted in Clark, 1983: 88)
In every country, North and South, workers, employers and governments have 
both common and divergent interests, ... The way such interests must be 
expressed and reconciled is the subject of industrial relations [and labour law]. 
It will of necessity vary from country to country. International comparison must 
bring out and explain the differences and similarities of national industrial 
relations systems [and laws].
—  Schregle, 1981 (quoted in Blanpain, 1987: 3)
In 1904 the Commonwealth of Australia instituted the most comprehensive 
compulsory arbitration legal system the world had ever known The ripples of the 
1890s industrial turmoil had not quite disappeared before this happened. That is to say 
the system was introduced against the background of an open social conflict. The 
system was radical, i.e unprecedented, in the sense which the statement by Sinzheimer 
quoted above implies. Henry Bourne Higgins, to whom Kahn-Freund (1977: 16) 
attributes the founding of this system^, has quite passionately affirmed these 
characteristics of the system in his work, A New Province for Law and Order (1922). 
The system represents a significant legal innovation at the federal level (Rawson, 1980: 
291; Brereton, 1989: 293). Given this background, it is submitted in this thesis that the
1 For a comparison of this system with the older but less comprehensive systems instituted by New 
Zealand in 1894, Western Australia in 1900 and New South Wales in 1901, see Mitchell and Stem
as
the principal Founding Father, without discounting the importance of Higgins. In any case, Kahn- 
Freund's attribution to the latter has been put to a good use - e.g, as a connecting point for the 
contributions of Merrifield (1980) and Portus (1980) to the In Memoriam: Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, edited 
by Gamillscheg, et al. (1980).
(1989: 112-123).
2 Most Australian scholars who are interested in this area would regard Charles Cameron Kingston
2emergence of this system would, as in Sinzheimer's statement, be dependent upon the 
sociological rather than positivistic legal method for a sufficient explanation.
Significantly, this system has contrasted sharply with the industrial relations systems in 
Britain and other industrialised nations and has provided materials for what Schregle 
(quoted above) indicates to be the necessary project of international comparison: 
identifying and explaining differences and similarities. For instance, with this contrast 
in mind, Kahn-Freund once suggested to the Congress of the International Sociological 
Association (at Liege, August 1953) that the compulsory arbitration system in Australia 
and New Zealand is "a phenomenon which ought to be of some interest to those who 
are inclined to explain social institutions with the help of 'national' or 'racial' 
characteristics" (see Kahn-Freund, 1954: 214). Although he did not elaborate and his 
meaning has remained obscure, his suggestion implies a broader sociological 
accounting for differences and similarities among national systems/laws by national 
and racial traits.
There have been attempts to address the contrast between the Australian system and the 
systems of other Western countries, using a sociological approach. One is Mote's 
(1916: 118-166) work on why compulsory arbitration law (in his view, a legislative 
taboo) had emerged and worked well in New Zealand and Australia and not in Britain 
and the United States. He suggests, in effect, that similar national characteristics have 
led to similar industrial legislation in the former and that the absence of these 
characteristics accounts for the different industrial legal regimes in the latter. He argues 
that New Zealand and Australia had a relatively small percentage of foreign-bom 
residents, low illiteracy, large surplus of land and liberal state aid to the colonists. 
These factors made the populations of the two countries contented and receptive to 
compulsory arbitration. Britain and the U.S on the other hand were not similarly 
placed, hence the different approach to compulsory arbitration. However, the fact that 
Canada, with national characteristics apparently similar to Australia and New Zealand,
3has industrial legislation different from the Australasian model (see Mitchell, 1990: 47- 
80) casts doubt on this explanation.
When Blain, et al (1987: 179) ask "why ... similarities and differences exist" in the 
industrial arbitration systems of Australia, Great Britain and the United States, they 
raise another expectation that the sociological explanation suggested by Kahn-Freund 
would be demonstrated. But they left the question unanswered, after merely 
demonstrating that the countries "have developed clearly diverging industrial relations 
practices". Nonetheless there is a significant point in their work: the differences 
between the industrial laws and practices of Australia on the one hand and of Britain 
and the U. S. on the other exist in spite of a common cultural tradition and language.
In an earlier attempt, situating the Australia system in a wider comparative context of 
the approaches to compulsory arbitration in Canada, Great Britain, Jamaica and the 
U.S, Loewenberg, et al (1976: 174) point to the varying stages of industrial 
development, differing populations, and unique experiences of and attitudes to strikes 
to account for the differences especially between Australia on the one hand and the 
other four countries on the other. Why the factors of being "political democracies ... 
[and] ... part of the English-speaking world having a history of ties with Great Britain" 
did not orient all the five countries towards similar systems is not explained. So, the 
question whether national characteristics account for the occurrence of compulsory 
arbitration in Australasia as suggested by Kahn-Freund remains unanswered.
It is all the more sociologically puzzling if compulsory arbitration systems, similar, for 
instance, to that of Australia, occur in other countries with little or no similar national 
or racial characteristics. Apparently unknown to many a scholar of labour law in the 
Western world, this has in fact happened with Nigeria introducing and elaborating 
since 1968 a compulsory industrial arbitration scheme fundamentally similar to that of 
Australia. Interestingly, the contribution of Givry (1978) on the voluntary and 
compulsory arbitration systems world-wide to the International Encyclopedia of
4Comparative Law makes no mention of Nigeria among the numerous examples from 
the developing world. Similarly, Rawson's (1980: 291) assertion that "the ... Australian 
... legal innovation of the turn of the century, compulsory industrial arbitration, has on 
the whole found ... no true imitators" suggests a lack of awareness of the Nigerian case.
Addressing the 1986 National Convention of the Industrial Relations Society of 
Australia at Adelaide, Professor Benjamin Aaron alluded to the debate about the 
"compulsoriness" of the Australian system and, then, said: In any event, what is certain 
is that the Australian arbitration scheme is unique, there is no other in the world quite 
like it" (Aaron, 1986: 149). This statement also suggests a lack of awareness of the 
Nigerian case. Further, the reactions of other scholars in Australia and Geneva with 
whom I have discussed my research since 1988 tend to confirm the view that the 
Nigerian compulsory arbitration law is little known in those places. Obviously the 
Nigerian system has not been examined by Western scholars specifically in relation to 
the Australian system.
Be that as it may, this thesis conceptualises the observed fundamental similarities 
(along with any sociologically significant differences) between the Australian and 
Nigerian arbitration systems as unexplainable by national or racial similarities. Further 
the thesis perceives that it is by locating the phenomenon in broader sociological 
perspectives that a more valid explanation can be advanced. Both constitute the 
research problem for the thesis. Considering the perspectives in terms of the 
"autonomy" versus "social product" debate which I reconstruct from the law and 
society literature, I arrive at the following research question to guide the thesis: in the 
light of the debate as to whether law has some independent existence or is a mere 
product of society, how do we account for the differences and similarities between the 
labour laws of Australia and Nigeria? The concern is to give the discourses about 
differences and similarities among laws across national boundaries a more explicit 
sociological focus than has hitherto been the case.
5Put in general terms, the thesis attempts a comparative sociology of the labour law in 
Australia and Nigeria. The attempt is an engagement with the macrosociological 
tradition, using the legal framework of the collective labour relations in both countries 
to highlight the broad questions about the law-society relations in general and the social 
foundation of differences and similarities among laws across national boundaries in 
particular. Thus, although the research upon which the thesis is based is conceived 
along the axis of the conceptual interplay between jurisprudence and sociology, the 
emphasis rests more with the sociological than with the formalist legal orientation. It 
should be noted, however, that this emphasis does not re-enact what Hopkins (1978a: 
266) has described as a "predominantly one way" traffic from sociology to law. In other 
words the approach is not merely to apply sociological theories and techniques "to law 
as an object of inquiry", but to explain what are fundamentally sociological problems 
through the study of law. Thus, apart from drawing on literature from both disciplines, 
the thesis highlights, inter alia, how labour law serves as an index of the sociological 
character of the Australian and Nigerian political economies, especially in their 
formative years.
In the remainder of this chapter I shall specify the theoretical background against which 
the research problem is conceived and the reason(s) for choosing labour law and the 
two countries. Further I shall undertake a conceptual clarification of the aspect of the 
labour law upon which the research is focused and outline the strategies for the 
collection and analysis of the materials used in the thesis. Although the thesis does not 
assume general knowledge about the history and development of the sociology of law 
and about the methodologies in the field, one is constrained by space to adopt a 'sketch' 
format in the specifications that follow.
1.2 Theoretical background of the research problem
There is no gainsaying the importance and ubiquity of the presence of law in society 
(Friedman, 1977: 2). Indeed the philosophers in the era of the Sophists and Socrates 
equated legal ontology with social ontology in so far as the application of and
6obedience to law were taken as the twin facets of the foundation or character of social 
existence. Thus the Athenians held the view (projected through Socrates in Plato's 
Crito) that "a City without law is not a City ... [For, an Athenian citizen] owes his birth 
and education, and his very existence as a civilized human being to the Laws" (Allen, 
1980: 85-88).
In contemporary times it is equally recognised that "relatively few areas of social life 
can be fully understood in all their complexity without some apprehension of their legal 
aspects" (Schur, 1968: 4). Put differently, "law ... has become a metaphor for ordered 
social life" (Campbell and Wiles, 1979: ix) or, as Chambliss and Seidman (1982: 8) 
have observed, law has to be implicated by the organised political community "in all 
attempts to solve social problems". In contemporary literature, this important and 
ubiquitous presence of law in the organisation of social life on an increasing scale has 
been nicely captured by one concept, namely, 'the juridification of social spheres'. This 
concept conveys a progressivist view of the expansion of law through judicial, 
legislative, and administrative measures (see Teubner, 1987).
Significantly, the growth of law has meant not only 'the enormous quantitative growth 
of norms and standards' or 'the proliferation of law', but also the increasing use of law 
by the polity (state) "as a means of control to constitutionalise the economy" (Teubner 
and Firenze, 1987: 12). One illustration is Winkler's (1975: 103) location of the formal 
origins of the British Industry Act 1975 in "the Labour Party's attempt to revise its 
strategy for the State control of private enterprise into a form appropriate to the British 
economy of the 1970’s, that is to an economic structure now characterised by high 
levels of concentration in virtually all sectors". In the process of being so used in the 
interpenetration of the polity and the economy law increasingly assumes the character 
of a "regulatory law" (Nonet and Selznick, 1978: 89). Also, the process has led to more, 
not less law in society.
7The reality of law as a constitutive element of social organisation has been recognised 
in long-running intellectual debates among philosophers, lawyers and social scientists 
alike. These debates involve diverse conceptions of law, e.g: a divine or superstitious 
command (a stoic view represented by Cicero); a rational ordering of things - divine or 
natural (Aquinas); a utilitarian regulation by the government (Bentham); the command 
of the sovereign (Austin); a collective product of the 'general will' (Rousseau); an 
external symbol of social solidarity (Dürkheim); an instrument of domination over the 
society by the ruling class (Marx); a bourgeois form of social regulation (Pashukanis); 
a product of reconciliation or compromise between conflicting claims and demands 
(Pound); and the crystallisation of the interest of the dominant group in society 
(Quinney).
These representations contain or are formulated with different sets of assumptions 
about the nature of the relationship between law and society. This relationship 
remained largely unexplored, intellectually, until about the 16th century when a 
"humanist movement" developed within the study of law to challenge the dominant 
exegetical method (i.e. the dogmatic-normative science of law) which had closed legal 
studies off from "specific reference to the historical and social circumstances of [the] 
origins and application" of legal rules (Stewart, 1981: 112).
The humanist movement assumed an historical and proto-sociological orientations
a
when it was renewed in the early 19th century by Fredrick Otto Von SavignyA In the 
later part of the 19th century, Henry Maine introduced the dimension of comparative 
history into the movement^. Soon the movement was beset with the inability to bring 
the study of law vis-a-vis the dynamics of society out of 'exegesis' and was trapped into 
crude historicism where "the historical account itself [i.e the description of connections 
in the history of law] ... was taken as the norm of correct law" (Schnadelbach, 1984:
3 This German jurist and scholar is regarded, generally, as the founder of the school of historical 
jurisprudence. His "On the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence", 1814 is said to have 
set the programme for this school.
4 See his Ancient Law. 1861.
839). Arguably this was the state of the art of intellectual discourse on law at the time 
when, or in reaction to which, Dürkheim proposed a sociology of law^ in his 
introductory lecture of 1887^. In that lecture he "aptly raised the problems of the 
relations between forms of solidarity and kinds of law" (see Gurvitch, 1947: 92).
Translated as "What is the relation between law and social order?", the problems which 
Dürkheim had raised have since constituted what Gibbs (1966: 315) terms "the original 
paramount question" upon which was built "the grand tradition in the sociology of 
law". This question has remained a fascinating subject, even though it has been 
addressed on differing scales at different periods in the subsequent development of 
sociological and legal discourses on law. For instance, after the programmatic 
approaches to the study of law in society by Emile Dürkheim, Karl Marx, and Max 
Weber, sociologists vacated the field for lawyers (Hopkins, 1975: 609), like Eugene 
Ehrlich and Roscoe Pound on the one hand, and on the other, Oliver Holmes, Karl 
Llewellyn, Karl Olivecrona and Jerome Frank whose intellectual activities on the 
subject gave rise to the schools of sociological jurisprudence and legal realism, 
respectively.
When the sociologists returned to the subject in the 1960s they shifted their focus from 
the tradition of the programmatic discourses to the micro-level analysis of the details of 
such issues as the law in action and the structure of the legal profession (Gibbs, 1966: 
315; Hopkins, 1975: 610). Perhaps, this shift reflects the response of the sociologists at 
the time to the positivist expectation to be relevant (see Grace and Wilkinson, 1978: 7; 
Becker, 1990: 11). After the early 1970s, however, sociologists began to return to the 
macroscopic level with the attempt to synthesize theoretical inquiries with empirical 
and historical research (see Roshier and Teff, 1980: 6-13; and Hunt, 1981: 48-49 for 
brief statements on the British and American experiences respectively).
 ^ Stewart (1981) indicates that this was specially to get away from the study of law by exegesis. F e ^  
g ood summary of the-mteraetion be tween jurisprudence and sociology-,-see Timasheff (1974).
°  Dürkheim (1887): "Cours de Science Social: Lecon d'Ouverture", in Internationale de I'Enseignement, 
15.
9The changes in the character of the discourses as indicated above correspond to what 
Tomasic (1983 and 1985) has described as the three phases in the development of the 
sociology of law: (1) the 'European phase', lasting up to 1930s, during which the 
founding fathers of the sociology of law were concerned with charting the field of the 
discipline; (2) the 'American phase', beginning with the works of the Legal Realists and 
Pound's sociological jurisprudence and peaking during the 1960s; and (3) the 
'International phase', starting from the 1970s with the efforts to replace the "narrow 
provincialism" or empiricism of the previous decade with a synthesis of theory and 
historical research (Tomasic, 1985: 6-7).
The contemporary phase (i.e the international phase) has witnessed more attention to 
the relationship between law and society than the preceding two phases. This 
phenomenon is alluded to in the observation made by Chambliss and Seidmnan (1982: 
ix):
the field of study now known as "law and society" mushroomed in the 
last ten years. Theoretical and empirical developments have been so 
rapid that where once we suffered from a paucity of good studies we 
now have an embarrassment of riches.
The reasons for the attention burgeoning in this way may not be known fully, but they 
are not unconnected with the rising influence of Marxism in sociology and the 
immense flowering of interest in the classical sociologists in general during this phase 
(see Rhea, 1981; Byrant and Becker, 1990).
For the purposes of this research, what is of utmost significance in all this work is, to 
use the words of Hunt (1981: 51), "the successive engagement between rival 
dichotomous conceptions" of the nature of the law-society relation. There, for instance, 
is the divine/convention or nature/custom dichotomy. Among the early (especially the 
Greek) philosophers the verdict was in favour of the "supra-human" (God or Nature) 
genesis of law, thus founding the "natural law" paradigm which postulates that there is 
a "higher law" serving as a universal normative model for positive (man-made) laws.
10
There is also the mirror/engineer dichotomy. As aptly summarised by Friedman (1964:
19), "the controversy between those who believe that law should essentially follow
[and] not lead ... and those who believe that law should be a determined agent in the
creation of new norms, is one of the recurrent themes in the history of legal thought".
The proponents of the "mirror" argument maintain, essentially, that law is a decisive
reflection of its society (see Dürkheim, 1893, 1968; Dicey, 1905; Duguit, 1912 & 1913;
Friedman, 1964). The "engineer" argument, on the other hand, sees law as a
technological force for conserving, liberalising, and creating social change (Jenkins,
1980: 214). This view echoes Timasheffs summary of Petrazycki's assertion:
law molds the motives conducive to human action, coordinates the very 
actions and thus creates social order ... Thus, for. instance, the civil law 
of liberal society has greatly developed thrift, the spirit of enterprise and 
love for work; whereas the different types of constitutional law have 
differently molded the political mentality of the corresponding nations 
(quoted in Podgorecki, 1974: 218-219).
It is this view, articulated by Pound (1943) as the "social engineering" function of law, 
that inheres in the Soviet "modernising experiment" in central Asia in the 1920s 
(Massell, 1968), the Allied Occupation "directed socio-political change" in Japan in the 
1940s (Oppler, 1976) or the "sanitisation" of the Papua New Guinea economic ventures 
through licensing laws by Australia in the 1950s and 1960s (Burman, et. al, 1979), and 
also informed the founding of the "Law and Development" movement by the 
International Legal Centre in New York between the late 1960s and early 1970s to 
export the American legal model for the "modernisation" of the Third World (Trubeck, 
1972; Trubek and Galanter, 1974; Merryman, 1977).
These instances of the "engineer" view, while possibly unrepresentative, show that 
there was a widespread belief in law as an instrument of change and control in the 
situations of colonial subjugation and post-colonial social reconstruction (Omaji, 
1986). Usually this involved the superimposition of ready-made legal systems, in most 
cases, oblivious to the likelihood that any attempt to force a form of law on a social 
environment uncongenial to it may miscarry with damaging results. Britain
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superimposed the English law and notion of justice on its colonies^; the Soviet Union 
came on their "civilising' mission to Turkey in the 1920s with their own legal codes; 
when the Ethiopian Emperor invited Rene David in 1960 to draft a new civil code for 
Ethiopia as part of the drive for development and modernisation, Rene convinced him 
to adopt a ready-made legal system on the grounds that "Ethiopia cannot wait 300 to 
500 years to construct in an empirical fashion [a new] system of law" (David, 1963: 
188); etc. More significantly, these instances constitute a statement of an assumption 
about the independence and transplantability of law, an assumption that will be shown 
to be crucial to the research problem of this thesis.
Another dichotomous conception of the law-society relation is the consensus/conflict 
argument. On the one hand, law is portrayed as an embodiment of the consensual 
values, spirit or public will of the society. On the other hand, law is seen as a product of 
group or class struggles, the form, content and application of the law being determined 
by compromise, domination or the coercive force of the state. In tracing the origins and 
developments of this consensus/conflict dichotomy, McDonald (1976: 26-137) 
identifies the works of Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Dürkheim, Spencer, Parsons, etc 
with the consensus view, and those of Beccaria, William Godwin, Robert Owen, Marx, 
Bonger, Quinney, etc with the conflict view.
Some concern has been expressed in the literature regarding the effect of dichotomous 
thinking on the sociological study of law. Hunt (1981: 52) points out that there is "[a] 
general deficiency inherent in the dichotomous conceptions of law" which is the 
tendency to produce an 'either-or' effect, capable of resulting in unstable analyses. 
More or less restating this point, Tomasic (1985: 101) regards the dichotomous 
conceptions as "a depressing tendency", because they have "made for extremely 
unstable and often merely polemical explanations of law-making". Both scholars
 ^Kalu’s (1988: 79) note regarding the experience of Nigeria is graphic: "There is an apparent consensus 
of opinion that it is as a result of the superimposition of an alien system of law and justice on our 
indigenous concepts that incalculable difficulties have arisen in the administration of justice in this 
country. Demonstrably, [groups in Nigeria] had their independent system of arbitration ... before the 
British accosted them with the baggage full of legal and cultural assortments".
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suggest that dichotomous conceptions are theoretically unproductive, or even 
counterproductive. This may be the case if, in conceptualising the origin of law­
making, the effort is concentrated on adjudicating between the competing conceptions 
(see Hopkins, 1978b: 6-8) or if there is "the addition of a moral dimension" [see 
Tomasic's (op.cit: 102) comment on Hagan (1980)]. However, the position in this thesis 
is that dichotomous thinking can be a fruitful strategy for addressing the sociological 
foundation of legal innovation, insofar as each side of the dichotomies is not defined as 
irreconcilable with the other.
There is one pertinent contention which this thesis would raise with the existing 
discourses on law-society relations: their terms (e.g "consensus" versus "conflict") are 
not broad enough and are, therefore, incapable of yielding theoretical frameworks that 
can facilitate cross-national comparative investigation of law-society relations. In 
context, the lack of broader conceptualisation is a reflection of more basic syndromes, 
two of which will be mentioned here. First, is the inadequate effort to provide a 
synthesis of literature in the field of the sociology of law as a whole (Abel, 1980). 
Second, there is a hesitancy to return to the macrosociological tradition, which tradition 
is historical and comparative. The latter syndrome has been dubbed "developmental 
agnosticism" and "the retreat of the sociologists into the present" (see Mennell, 1990: 
54). Needless to say, both syndromes underscore the inadequate theoretical base in the 
sociological study of law (see Tomasic, 1980: 15; 1985: 1). The second syndrome falls 
short of what Berger and Kellner (1981: 15-16) conceive to be the calling of the 
sociologist:
the sociological perspective is comprehensive and comparative ... And 
this means that sociologists must retain some ability for cross-cultural, 
global comparisons, in historical depth as well as in contemporary 
terms. Put simply, the calling of sociologist is by its very nature a 
cosmopolitan one.
The general concern of this thesis is to attempt a contribution, albeit a modest one, 
towards the filling of this gap. It is largely for this purpose that I adopt the approach of 
reconstructing the major dichotomous conceptions into broader models which are, as
13
mentioned before, the autonomy (i.e independence) and heteronomy (i.e social product) 
models of the law-society relation. Chapters two and three of the thesis present each of 
these reconstructed categories respectively. After comparing and contrasting the 
Australian and Nigerian labour laws in chapters four and five, these theoretical models 
are used in chapter six to explain the observed differences and similarities between the 
labour laws of the two countries. In the Iasi chapter of the thesis, the relative strengths 
of the two models as sociological explanatory constructs vis-a-vis the observed cross­
national differences and similarities in laws are discussed.
1.3 The choice of labour law and the two countries
From the initial stages of the development of my research problem I was quite disposed 
to choose any field of law as an empirical focus of investigation. Although I had 
researched in the area of criminal law for a master's degree thesis, my research 
interests had broadened out, ranging from theoretical issues like "law and social 
change", through law reform, adoption laws, foreign exchange law, the judiciary, to 
industrial development law. Thus, when it became clear that labour law could well be 
the research focus of this thesis, there was not much difficulty coming to terms with 
that direction.
Soon I realised that labour law is one of the least researched fields of law in the 
sociology of law. For instance, surprised that there had been "no attempt to examine 
systematically the implications of [theory and methodological debates in sociology] for 
the study and development of labour law", Clark (1983: 81) embarked on analysing the 
German writings of Kahn-Freund with a view to developing "hypotheses concerning 
the sociology of labour law". Further, out of the 996 titles^ listed in Tomasic's (1985: 
139-267) trend report on the major concerns of legal sociologists only an insignificant 
proportion (0.8%) have some identifiable bearing on labour law. Without suggesting 
that this report has listed all the titles in the sociology of law, it is reasonable to argue
 ^This figure includes 988 plus 8 second entries (229a, 319a, 731a, 759a, 837a, 900a, 908a, and 980a).
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that the proportion (8 out of 996) is by itself a commentary on the neglect of labour law 
in sociological research.
My feeling at this realisation bordered on surprise and exasperation, quite akin to the
feeling conveyed by a statement attributed to a one time Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philipines, Jose Parades:
When one takes into consideration the plethora of law tomes in our book 
market, it is sometimes exasperating - nay, mystifying - to fail to find 
authoritative writings on labour legislations(sic). The dearth of such 
writings is anomalous, since knowledge of the laws governing labour- 
management relations is indispensable to men of affairs in a country 
aspiring to economic advancement (quoted in Martin, 1970: iii).
If the words "authoritative", "men of affairs" and "economic" in this quote were
"sociological", "intellectuals" and "theoretical", respectively, I would say Parades
articulated my feeling about two decades before I came to it. The neglect is gross
considering, as Simitis (1987: 113-114) has observed, that "labour law constitutes the
classic paradigm for juridification ... [- a concept which] expresses the displacement of
the 'contemplative state' by the 'activist' state and thus marks the path from the
undisputed priority of contractual agreements to a 'law-driven' society".
I take the view that sociology neglects this branch of law at a high cost, given the 
dynamics of political economy which the juridification of labour relations encapsulates. 
Rather than being put off by the observed neglect, I felt challenged to consider this 
branch of law. Thus, having come to the doorstep of labour law more or less 
fortuitously, my exasperation at the sociologists' neglect opened the door, and the social 
processes which I found reified by this law presented a research challenge. Needless to 
say, a member of "the Holy Trinity of the sociologists' pantheon", Karl Marx (the 
others being Dürkheim and Weber - see Mennell, 1990: 54), had found the analysis of 
the British labour legislation up to the 19th century equally rewarding. This is borne 
out by his drawing on this analysis in laying the foundation for what has come down as 
the Marxian theory of society (see chapter 15 of his Capital, vol.l). It goes without 
saying, therefore, that there is weight in the observation that labour law
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is of special interest, not merely by reason of its obvious importance in 
many problems of industrial relations, but also because of the lessons 
which it has to teach about the place of law in all our lives and about the 
interplay between law and the social forces which go into its making 
(Wedderburn, 1965: 7).
Choosing two countries whose labour laws are to be examined for the purpose of this 
thesis is a result of my interest in comparative macrosociology. Holt and Turner (1970: 
6) observe that comparative method came into use in the social sciences "because 
scholars were interested in developing and testing theories that would be applicable 
beyond the boundaries of a single society"; but my interest does not contemplate such 
an ambitious project. The interest is basically to use broader categories of the debates 
on the law-society relation in a cross-national context.
Using the occurrence of significant and sustained^ legal innovation in the settlement of 
industrial disputes as the main consideration for choosing the countries, I observed 
from the relevant literature that Australia and Nigeria are classic cases. In my 
judgement, the introduction and maintenance by law of compulsory arbitration in the 
industrial relations of both countries constitutes what Chambliss (1986: 27) would 
describe as "critical events, ... important turning points" in the political economies of 
the countries "about which we should be concerned to develop adequate sociological 
[explanation]". Together with the secondary reasons of convenience and accessibility, 
this factor made Australia and Nigeria the obvious choice for me.
1.4 Research Design
1.4.1 Conceptual clarification and comparative schema
Labour law is a wide field, covering individual contracts of employment, wage 
fixation, health and safety, factory conditions, workers' compensation, trade unionism, 
industrial dispute resolution, etc. Obviously it is impracticable to examine the entire 
field in research of this nature; hence, the need to delineate a specific aspect of the law
9 This delimiter is crucial because it excludes from my consideration shortlived legal innovations like 
the British Industrial Relations Act 1971 which made collective agreements legally binding for the first 
time in contemporary history of industrial relations in Britain and was repealed by the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act 1974.
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for study. It should be evident by now that I chose the aspect relating to the resolution 
of industrial disputes in Australia and Nigeria, namely: the compulsory arbitration 
system.
In both countries the system has had a major impact as a result of the operation of the 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, now the Industrial Relations Act 
1988 and the Nigerian "Trade Disputes Act [1968-76]". With regard to Australia for 
instance, the system is seen to have become "a multi-armed miscellany which reaches 
into nearly every nook and cranny of industrial relations" (Justice Ludeke, 1984: 20). 
The potential of this system to impact upon the wider society had been aptly 
highlighted by Geoffrey Sawer. Referring to the achievements of the 2nd 
Commonwealth Parliament of Australia which passed the law, Sawer (1956: 40) 
observes:
the passing of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, establishing a 
system of compulsory judicial arbitration of industrial disputes... was to 
have a profound effect on the social structure, because of the 
encouragement it gave to trade union development on a national scale; 
on the economic structure, because of its consequences for wages and 
hours fixation; and on politics, because of periodical party crises caused 
by attempts to alter the system.
This observation is an expanded version of the ILO's (1930: 607) observation that 
industrial arbitration "has played a highly important part in Australia and is a question 
of first importance both in industrial and in political circles".
Thus, even on face value, the Australian system with its intertwining with the political 
economy provides an attractive sociological research focus. Finding a similar system in 
Nigeria - a country unrelated to Australia by race or geography - makes the research 
more attractive.
There have been some questions whether the Australian and Nigerian arbitration 
systems are in fact compulsory schemes. For instance, in joining issue with the "critics" 
of the Australian arbitration system, Dabscheck (1986: 166) asserts rather confidently 
that "Australia does not have a compulsory arbitration system". His argument in
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support of this assertion appears underdeveloped and less than convincing. Nonetheless 
it underlines the need to establish from the outset the true character of the systems 
being studied here.
It is significant that Australia ratified the ILO basic Conventions relating to voluntary 
organisation of labour - the Freedom of Association Convention and Protection of the 
Right to Organise No. 87, 1948 and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention No. 98, 1949 - in 1973, about 25 years after they were adopted. Although 
not every member State which has delayed ratifying these Conventions can be said to 
have collective labour relations incompatible with ILO voluntary standards, this was 
probably the reason in the case of Australia. For example, prior to 1973 matters of 
interpretation were held to have obstructed the ratification of these Conventions (see 
Bailey, 1969: 590).
Essentially, these Conventions prescribe for the workers and employers the right to 
associate/organise, draw up their constitutions and rules, elect their representatives, etc, 
in full freedom and also provide that the public authorities refrain from any 
interference which would restrict this right or impede its lawful exercise. The ILO 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations^ had 
implied in their Report to the 43rd Session of the International Labour Conference in 
1959 that Australia was in breach of this right. The breach relates to the fact that in 
Australia unions must satisfy certain legal requirements, especially on matters internal 
to the unions, in order to secure registration. Some legislation also prohibit the 
registration of union rules which are contrary to the provisions of an award.
Australia's response to this implied breach was that application for union registration 
was voluntary, unregistered associations can exist and defend the interest of their 
members, and that it was only to prevent a multiplicity of organisations for bargaining
This Committee was established by the ILO in 1927 to carry out a technical examination of the 
annual Reports of the member States to the ILO to determine whether the law and practice of the 
countries concerned satisfy the requirements of the ratified Conventions.
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purposes that some official measures have been put in place (see Department of Labour 
and National Service, 1969: 79-80, 88). Yet, there has been a debate in the House of 
Representatives on the compatibility of section 142 of the 1904 Act, relating to the 
registration of trade unions, with Article 2 of the ILO Convention No. 87 (Hansard 
[Representativeds], 1973 vol. 83: 1809-1812).
The climate of opinion which favoured the ratification of Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 
among others, it is alleged by Landau (1987), was fostered by the Whitlam Labor 
Government's general approach to human rights, but the submission of the Minister of 
Labour to the Parliament on April 12, 1973 seems to point up the need for "a 
favourable international image of Australia as a forward-looking country" as a major 
concern at the time (see Landau, 1987: 677). In any case, as at June 1987, the 
Commonwealth had not ratified other relevant Conventions like the Labour Relations 
(Public Service) Convention No. 151, 1978, and the Collective Bargaining Convention 
No. 154, 1981, the former because she was not in compliance with article 4 of the 
Convention which requires adequate protection against acts of anti-union 
discrimination in respect of public employees and the latter because of "interpretative 
difficulties in relation to Article 6" which requires the ratifying Members to promote 
collective bargaining and to progressively extend it to cover all negotiations between 
employers and workers (including their organisations) (see Department of Industrial 
Relations, 1987). These reasons suggest that these Conventions are patently antithetical 
to the laws of collective labour relations in Australia and it can be argued that this 
antithesis has occurred precisely because the relevant Australian laws embody 
compulsory schemes as will be shown in chapters four and five.
In the case of Nigeria the official stance since 1955, observable from official 
pronouncements, has been that of commitment to the ideals of voluntarism as espoused 
by the ILO. The first Prime Minister of Nigeria, in reacting to the politicisation of wage 
increases by regional governments in 1955 pronounced thus: "Government re-affirms 
its confidence in the effectiveness of voluntary negotiation and collective bargaining
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for the determination of wages" (quoted in Fashoyin, 1980: 97). In the same year 
Nigeria’s Minister for Labour submitted to the ILO Conference that Nigeria has 
followed "the voluntary principles which are so important an element in industrial 
relations in the United Kingdom" (ELO Ministerial Conference, 1955: 53). This 
submission was reiterated at the 1957 ILO Conference when an adviser to the Nigerian 
Government stated: "the Governments of the Federation have given and will continue 
to give practical support to the ideals and aspirations of the [ELO]. Our labour policies 
have for more than 20 years been based on the standards established by the [ILO]" 
(International Labour Conference, 1957: 112).
Before Nigerian independence in 1960 Britain accepted the obligations of the relevant 
ILO Conventions (including Nos 87 and 98) on behalf of Nigeria which was, within the 
meaning of Article 35 of the ILO Constitution, a non-metropolitan territory of the 
United Kingdom. At independence, Nigeria ratified these Conventions. In 1975, more 
than half a decade after the government had introduced compulsory arbitration, the then 
Federal Commissioner for Labour released a New National Labour Policy - the policy 
of guided democracy in labour matters - which expressed "continued support of the 
principles and objectives of the [ILO] ...[but] subject to the over-riding interests of the 
Government and people of Nigeria". And, writing 14 years later, Damachi (1989: 9) 
affirms that "the Nigerian labour law derives most of its provisions from the tenets of 
the [ELO]". All this can raise doubt about the compulsoriness of the Nigerian arbitration 
system.
The claims of some scholars regarding the "origin" of the Nigerian labour law tend to 
increase the doubt about the existence of compulsory arbitration in Nigeria. Emiola 
(1982: 3) says "Nigerian labour law rests largely on the British model", a model built 
on the principle of voluntarism. In her work dealing with adjudication as a mode of 
resolving industrial disputes in Nigeria, Audi (1985: 27) asserts: "the idea of court and 
tribunal in Nigeria is borrowed from Britain". And, Uvieghara (1985: 39) declares 
without qualifications: "Nigerian labour laws and industrial relations are a legacy of
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Nigeria's colonial past... Nigerian labour legislations(sic) are all modelled on English 
labour statutes".
While these claims suggest that the Nigerian labour law does not contain compulsory 
arbitration, these self-same scholars have acknowledged in other parts of their works 
that Nigeria has departed from voluntarism (see Emiola on pp.222-232; Uvieghara on 
p. 143). Audi's assertion is particularly intriguing as earlier in her work (p. 14) she had 
acknowledged that Nigeria established its National Industrial Court in 1976, two years 
after Britain had abolished her own industrial relations Court in 1974. Evidently, these 
scholars have written under the shadow of the governmental claim about Nigeria's 
commitment to voluntarism.
Interestingly, however, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations has not ceased since 1970 to remind the Nigerian 
government that the main elements in its labour law (e.g trade unions decree, labour 
code, trade disputes decree) are not compatible with the ideals of voluntarism. For 
instance the system of arbitration, in the Committee's view, "is equivalent in practice to 
an indirect prohibition of the right to strike, restricting the opportunities available to 
workers' organisations for furthering and defending the interests of their members and 
the right to formulate their programmes" - one of the points which "have been the 
subject of comments for many years" (Committee of Experts, 1987). In 1989, the 
Committee also observed that "for several years its comments have been concerned 
with numerous discrepancies between the national legislation and the Convention on a 
number of matters" one of which is "the restrictions on the right to strike which may 
result from the imposition of compulsory arbitration" (emphasis, mine). No further 
evidence is needed to advance the position that the Nigerian system of arbitration, like 
the Australian system, has elements of compulsion. The details of this compulsion will 
be elaborated in chapters four and five.
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There is yet another conceptual issue to be clarified. Starting with a sociological 
assumption that Australia and Nigeria have different political economies, past and 
present, the expectation is that their compulsory arbitration laws would be different. 
This expectation raises the question of their comparability. For, as Smelser (1976: 33) 
argues,
when it comes to a comparative analysis of discrete historical events 
[like] a legislative act, a governmental decree, ... these are most difficult 
to compare directly because they derive their meaning and significance 
from [their contexts]... Only when a common socio-cultural context can 
be reasonably assumed is the direct comparative analysis of specific 
historical events possible.
Common socio-cultural context could not be assumed, a priori, for the two countries. 
Moreover, the adoption of compulsory arbitration as an instrument of state regulation 
of industrial relations in the two countries is separated by about sixty-four years, the 
Australian (Commonwealth) law coming into being in 1904 and the Nigerian law in 
1968; hence, the issue of how to go about validly comparing the two systems.
It became clear from comparative methodological literature that cultural (e.g linguistic) 
and chronological difficulties can be quite inhibitive if the comparison is focused on 
the practice of the systems. However, the research problem of this study is directed not 
at the practice but the conceptual frameworks of the systems. In such a situation it is 
sufficient to establish culturally-neutral equivalent measures or elements for the objects 
of comparison through the method of definition. The pertinence of this approach is 
supported by Smelser's (1976: 77) submission that "a definition proclaims phenomena 
as identical to one another with respect to the central defining characteristic or 
characteristics, however they may differ in other respects", thus rendering them 
comparable to one another. This approach in isolating the comparative schema for the 
compulsory arbitration laws of the two countries is applied in what follows.
Arbitration as a way of resolving disputes is an ancient method. King Solomon in the 
Bible arbitrated between two women, although not according to law but rather ex aequo 
et bono (i.e from equity and conscience), deciding according to what was fair and
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reasonable in the circumstances (see Melbourne Seminar, 1983: 3). Also, according to 
mythology, Venus, Juno and Pallas Athene agreed to allow Paris to decide their dispute 
over which of them was the most beautiful (see Nolan, 1979: 2-4). These two incidents 
identify one essential characteristic of arbitration: the involvement of a third party.
By the second half of the 19th century, arbitration had become a widely used method of 
settling labour disputes. In locating the origin of industrial arbitration in Britain during 
this period, Fisher (1986: 20f) states that it was in the course of the struggle between 
"those who wished to encourage the development of competitive capitalism by 
restricting the interventions of the state and those who wished to use the apparatus of 
the state in the spirit of protective paternalism (i.e the artificers, labourers and their 
parliamentary spokesmen)" that "the concept and practice of industrial arbitration first 
began to be defined". In Europe and North America, the second half of the 19th century 
was also a period in which arbitration became a popular means of settling industrial 
disputes H.
With the exceptions of the British Cotton Arbitration Act 1800 and Combination Act 
1800, and the Canadian (Nova Scotia) Mines Arbitration Act 1888, the arbitration 
schemes during this period were largely voluntary not compulsory. In fact, the 
aforementioned exceptions had their peculiar limitations either in terms of industry 
coverage, scope of matters, or institutional operations which made them partial rather 
than full compulsory arbitration schemes. Nonetheless all the schemes shared in the 
characteristic of being a third party intervention in the settlement of industrial disputes.
In contrast to these schemes, however, the Australian and Nigerian arbitration schemes 
which are comparatively examined in this thesis are full compulsory schemes. They are 
not restricted to particular industries; they do not discriminate between major and 
minor disputes or between essential and non-essential disputes. More important, they
* 1 For more historical details on arbitration, along with conciliation, in Europe, America, and 
Australasia see Peters (ed. 1902); Mote (1916).
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bind the parties with regulations and decisions which are not of the parties' own 
choosing, i.e the "arbitration does not depend on the consent of both sides and the 
award is binding on them, whether they accept or reject it" (Kahn-Freund, 1977: 
116) . In terms of the process and the outcome, Givry's (1978: 13) description is apt:
"once the point of impasse is reached, resort to the arbitrator is mandatory, i.e ... it can 
be set in motion ex officio or at the request of either party... [and] once arbitration is 
introduced, the arbitrator's award has a binding character ... in the sense that it produces 
a contractual relations between organizations on both sides or it may directly become a 
compulsory part of individual contracts of employment".
Macintyre and Mitchell (1989: 7) outline the essential elements which characterize the 
Australian scheme thus: state tribunals with compulsory powers to settle disputes, with 
powers to enforce the decisions, bans and limitations upon direct action by the parties 
to disputes, and the registration and regulation of trade unions. I established in a 
preliminary investigation that these elements are also present in the Nigerian system. In 
the light of the general descriptions of compulsory arbitration, I have identified specific 
abstract equivalent measures with which to compare the Australian and Nigerian 
systems, namely: the philosophy (i.e the central purpose, essence or function and the 
means to this purpose); the structure (i.e the institutional framework, consisting of the 
tribunals and the parties); the process (i.e the activation of the schemes); and the 
products (i.e the outcomes of the scheme). As indicated earlier, the comparison of the 
two laws, using these measures, is undertaken in chapters four and five of the thesis.
1.4.2 Methods of data collection and analysis
Two sets of data have been used to identify the differences and similarities in the laws 
and to undertake the proposed explanation for these differences and similarities. One
^  In the first edition o f this work, Kahn-Freund broke this characteristic down into three of the four 
elements generally attributed to compulsory arbitration (the parties must use the procedure; the 
procedure may be invoked without the consent o f the parties; and the award is binding with or without 
acceptance); the fourth being the prohibition of direct action during the use o f the procedure.
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set consists mainly of the statutes; the other consists of legislative debates^, scholarly 
works, and personal discussions in Australia, Nigeria and ILO Headquarters (Geneva) 
with some specialists on the laws. Both sets of data are largely documentary and 
historical.
Archives and libraries were the main sources for the primary and secondary materials 
acquired in Australia, Nigeria and Geneva. The possibility of stumbling upon materials 
that could establish a relevant Britain-Australia-Nigeria nexus with regard to the 
similarities between the Australian and Nigerian labour laws led the researcher to the 
British Library and the Public Records Office, both in London. And, to secure 
interviews with those specialists identified after reading some of their works or through 
recommendation by my advisory committee, an advance notice in form of a letter was 
sent to them, setting out the broad focus of my research.
The data collected in the course of the archive/library searches and interviews are 
qualitative and were analysed by an interpretive method (see Smelser, 1976: 49; 
Haralambos and Holbom, 1990: 698-781; and Williams, 1990: 33 for the place of this 
method within the paradigms for generating sociological knowledge). Needless to say, 
in the words of Berger and Kellner (1981: 33), as I interpreted the materials "the entire 
discipline [sociology] (or, rather, that segment of it that is theoretically relevant to this 
research material) [was] invisibly present in my own mind - a silent partner in the 
situation, as it were".
Only the legislative debates on the Australian law were available to the researcher. The official 
secrecy laws and the unwritten 'tight-lip' policy under military regimes made the much needed primary 
information about the Nigerian law inaccessible during my "data-collection" visit to Nigeria.
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CHAPTER TWO: AUTONOMY MODEL OF LAW AND SOCIETY
2.1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to construct an explanatory autonomy model for the research 
question of this study. The model will be based on the arguments about the 
independence of law from society, and provide variables to guide an autonomy 
explanation of the differences and similarities between the compulsory arbitration laws 
of Australia and Nigeria. I have delineated, from the law and society literature, two 
variants in this model, namely the absolute autonomy and the relative autonomy 
arguments.
These arguments will be highlighted in the review of the major works upon which the 
attempt to construct the model in this chapter has drawn. These works include those of 
Herbert Spencer, Max Weber, George Gurvitch, and Alan Watson for the absolute 
autonomy argument and those of Louis Althusser, and Isaac Balbus for the relative 
autonomy argument. For the purpose of this study, these works are considered to 
represent significant currents of the sociological and legal scholarship on the autonomy 
aspect of the law and society debate. Since the works do not directly address my 
research question, the chapter will conclude by drawing their respective insights 
together into an autonomy framework for the purpose of explaining similarities and 
differencies in the laws of different countries.
2.2 Absolute autonomy argument
The absolute autonomy argument maintains that the source of law is "supra-human". A 
major component of this argument is the view that natural law, however derived, is the 
quintessence of all legal orders, and that man-made laws are an "imperfect 
simulacrum" of this natural ideal (Lord Lloyd, 1972: 75). The man-made laws which 
are created with a high degree of formality, i.e. free from the intrusions of, and
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intermixtures with, non-juristic elements, approximate the natural ideal and have 
independence from the social and economic conditions of its home nation.
A law that yields to these descriptions is independent of differences between peoples, 
states and times and is transplantable. It is an autonomous law, deriving its validity 
from its own values. Of direct relevance is the point that made-made (i.e. positive) laws 
seek to participate in, or approximate to, the character of this higher normative order 
and thereby become inherently independent of their societies. Out of the works which 
will be reviewed on the model, those of Spencer, Weber, Gurvitch and Watson closely 
address these issues.
2.2.1 Spencer and the absolute autonomy argument
Herbert Spencer is, perhaps, the first sociologist to raise the view in which law is 
presented as independent of human society. Spencer (1882, Vol.II: 605) identifies four 
major sources of law, two of which are outside the domain of living social processes. In 
his words,
along with development of the ghost-theory, there arises the practice of 
appealing to ghosts, and to the gods evolved from ghosts, for direction 
in special cases, in addition to the general directions embodied in 
customs. There come methods by which the will of the ancestor, ... or 
the derived deity, is sought; and the reply given ... originates in some 
cases a precedent, from which there results a law added to the body of 
laws the dead have transmitted.
He refers to the practices of a wide spectrum of peoples to illustrate this point. For 
example, the "Veddahs", "ancient Egyptians", "ancient Peruvians", etc, lived by the 
injunctions of the "spirits of their ancestors". And, the "Hebrews", "Tongan natives" 
"Todas of the Indian hills", "ancient Greeks", etc, had as their principal laws, the 
"divine commands" or "supernatural directions".
Spencer shows a mastery of the traditions through which the knowledge of these 
practices have come down. With attention to one such tradition, he acknowledges the 
"supra-human" source of law. "Not forgetting the tradition that by an ancient Cretan
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king, a body of laws was brought down from the mountain where Jupiter was said to be 
buried", he says, "we pass to the genesis of laws from special divine commands..." (p. 
607). And, "originating in this manner, law acquires stability", Spencer argues. In 
addition, "the unchangeableness of law, due to its sacred origin, greatly conduces to 
social order...".
Spencer's contribution significantly reflects the various conceptualisations and 
characterisations of the "supra-human" source of law in philosophical literature which 
should be summarised for further illumination. In this literature, the central question - 
especially starting from the early Greek speculation on law - is whether law exists by 
nature or convention. Most philosophical writings on this question argue in favour of 
nature or what Spencer has presented as "supra-human". By this, they not only locate 
the source of law outside the realm of social processes, but also lay the foundation for 
an approach in which "natural law" is seen as the quintessence of all legal orders and 
"man-made" laws, viewed as an "imperfect simulacrum" of the natural ideal (Lord 
Lloyd, 1972: 75).
As to what constitutes this "nature", the views expressed in these writings amount to 
diverse traditions, ranging from the classical through the Christian, 
empiricist/rationalist to the idealist traditions. The classical tradition * maintains that it 
is the "animated nature". For the Christian tradition^, this nature is the personal God 
who is the creator, provider and ruler of human beings and the world.
The works within the empiricist and/or rationalist tradition, like those of Thomas 
Hobbes, John Locke, J. J. Rousseau and Montesquieu, maintain that the nature from 
which law emanates is either the "primitive instinct" of self-preservation or logical 
reason, or liberty unspoiled by civilisation or human reason concerned exclusively with
* This comprises the works of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the stoics on the side of the Greeks; and 
Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, Gaius, Ulpianus, Marcianus and Justinian (the Emperor) on the side of the 
Romans.
2 Here we are looking at the works of the Church Fathers like St. Paul and St. Augustine, and the 
medieval theologians like Thomas Acquinas and Hugo Grotius.
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the preservation of one's own being. Lastly, the idealist tradition^ simply maintains that 
this nature is an autonomous reason and will.
At the base of these diverse traditions, a common concern can be discerned, namely:
"to find the permanent element, the ground of being, the core of reality, the fixed
essence or substance which may be called the nature of being, a nature which operates
as a standard in the midst of a changing, pluralistic and contingent world" (Eterovich,
1972: 22). This raises the concern of both finding what this essence is and defining the
character of the law which it produces. Consequently, the question narrows down to
whether there is anything that is valid everywhere and always, any law 
that is independent of the difference between peoples, states and times, 
and therefore authoritative for all. [As nature survives all changes], it is 
now asked whether there is also, determined by this unchanging nature, 
a law that is exalted above all changes and all differences (Windelband, 
1901:73).
Having taken the position that there is, in general terms, the essence of things (i.e.
nature) which remains ever the same, the response of the philosophers to this specific
question is predictable. As argued by Hutchins (1963), "the principles of social
organisation can be derived from [this nature], a nature that is insusceptible to change,
that is the same the world over, and that, in consequence, suggests the general legal
ideas that should govern the developing world community". Like other contributors to
this argument, Hutchin draws support for his argument from the oft-quoted statement in
Cicero's "De Re Publica" (54 BC) which maintains that
There is in fact a true law - namely, right reason - which is in 
accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and 
eternal... It will not lay down one rule at Rome and another at Athens, 
nor will it be one rule today and another tomorrow. But there will be one 
law, eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times upon all people 
(quoted in Lord Lloyd, 1972: 92).
This true law, then, is the law of nature whose essence, as Lloyd and Freeman have 
written, "may be said to lie in the constant assertion that there are objective moral 
principles which depend upon the nature of the universe and which can be discovered 
by reason" (quoted in Kaye, 1987). The significance of this true law has been
3 The works of Immanuel Kant and Johann Fitche stand out in this tradition.
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highlighted in Ellul's (1969: 30) argument that in the efforts to construct a legal system 
(i.e. to put in place a man-made law), "man is guided by ... principles which are 
undoubtedly common to all men ... (And that) these principles alone are capable of 
explaining the ... similarities". He exemplifies this position with a study, Collado 
Legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum, which details the fundamental similarity between 
the Hebrew law of the 5th century B.C. and the Roman law of the 2nd century A.D., 
maintaining that "no social identity can explain this similarity". It was, perhaps, a result 
of "faithful observance of the 'essence' of [or true] law".
Thus, when Spencer speaks of a "supra-human" source of law, this concept extends to 
such origins as deity, nature or principles of an unchanging character which have been 
elaborated in the writings of philosophers.
2.2.2 Weber and the absolute autonomy argument
Another major contribution to the absolute autonomy argument comes from Weber 
(1922). As will become clear later in this review, this contribution reflects more of his 
views on universalistic laws (the code systems) than on particularistic laws. Further, it 
is noted here that the characterisation of Weber's contribution as falling within absolute 
autonomy argument is different in one respect from those of scholars like Paul Walton 
and Alan Hunt. Although both of them agree that Weber’s position is a contribution to 
an autonomy model of law and society, they put this contribution into a relative 
autonomy category. Walton (1976: 12) merely attributes to Weber the view that "law is 
to be seen as relatively independent of a given social system". He does this in the 
context of agreeing with the degree of independence which Weber appears to have 
attached to law, even though he would not go as far as adopting the opposite "crude 
view" that law is merely a reflection of material reality".
Hunt (1978: 118) is more definite on the view that the autonomy which Weber attaches 
to law "is ... relative rather than absolute". He summarises Weber's position on this 
issue to be that "law ... constitutes a sphere of autonomous social reality which, while
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influenced in its development by economic forces, in turn also influences the economic 
(and indeed other) processes within the society". It is interesting that the portions of 
Weber's work which Hunt cites to highlight this point are the same portions that have 
created the impression for my characterisation of Weber's contribution as an absolute 
autonomy argument.
There is no doubt that Walton's and, in particular, Hunt's analyses of Weber's sociology 
of law in general, leading to their characterisations of his contribution as a relative 
argument, are highly insightful and profitable. Besides, it would appear consistent with 
the sociological general stance on the contingency of social phenomena that Weber (the 
sociologist) should be relativistic. In fact it is arguable that certain historical 
illustrations which Weber used to demonstrate the development of law strongly suggest 
not only a relative autonomy argument as Walton and Hunt have picked out, but also a 
social product model. However, his typology of the rational and irrational laws which 
forms the foundation of his developmental model of law, and to which these 
illustrations are largely incidental, amounts to an absolute autonomy argument. The 
constraint of space allows only an outline of Weber's exposition here.
Whether or not Weber has attempted to develop a systematic sociology of law - 
depending on whose view is considered, e.g Hunt (1978: 93) says he has^ and 
Rheinstein (1954: xlvii) says he has not - it can be observed that the relationship 
between law and society forms a major part of the core of his sociological enterprise, 
viz: to understand what has made the West unique in its adoption of the capitalist social 
order. As will be seen, since he finds the key to the uniqueness of the West in 
"rationality", Weber follows the rationalist tradition in his analysis of the relationship 
between law and society.
4 Hunt cites Talcott Parsons' suggestion that "the core of Weber's substantive sociology lies ... in his 
sociology of law", apparently, in support of his affirmative view.
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Weber's election to deal, in his analysis, principally with the 'internal' modes of legal 
thought suggests a positivist orientation. This is reflected in his conception of law as an 
order which "is externally guaranteed by the probability that coercion (physical or 
psychological), to bring about conformity or avenge violation, will be applied by a staff 
of people holding themselves specially ready for that purpose". This is "an 
unashamedly positivistic definition of law", but Hunt (1978: 104) who makes this 
statement says, "it is not sufficient grounds for labelling him a 'legal positivist'" as 
Martin Albrow has done. Yet, this conception reinforces Weber's concern for the 
internal characteristics of law - a concern which, more than any other criteria, seems to 
have set apart scholars in the school of analytical jurisprudence as legal positivists.
In my view, Weber might avoid the label of positivism not simply because his 
definition of law can be defended as a "neutral starting point, one that remains 
acceptable to jurists and sociologists alike" (Hunt, 1978: 104), but rather because of his 
recognition, quite contrary the legal positivistic stance, of the influence of natural law 
upon positive laws. This is indicated in his definition of natural law as "the sum total of 
all those norms which are valid independently of, and superior to, any positive law and 
which owe their dignity not to arbitrary enactment but, on the contrary, provide the 
very legitimation for the binding force of positive law" (Rheinstein, 1954: 287f) 
(emphasis, mine).
Like Spencer, Weber acknowledges that there was a time when legal rules were "not 
conceived as the products, or as even the possible subject matter, of human enactment. 
Their' legitimacy' rather rested upon the absolute sacredness of certain usages ..." (Ibid: 
76). Where the rules emerged through explicit imposition, he continues, it was "through 
a new charismatic revelation [- the primeval revolutionary element -] which 
undermines the stability of tradition and is the parent of all types of legal 'enactment'". 
Further, he acknowledges the influence of natural law dogmas upon contemporary law­
making and law-finding; and that some of these dogmas "survived the economic 
conditions of the time of their origin and have come to constitute an independent factor
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in legal development" (Ibid: 296). In this analysis, a strong link is established between 
natural law and autonomous development of law.
The acknowledgement of this link dovetails into the position at which he had arrived in 
a doctoral dissertation he submitted in 1889, entitled: "Geschitche der
Handelsgesselschaften im Mittelalter" (On the History of the Companies in the Middle 
Ages). From the stand-point of refusing "to see law as any mere reflection of the 
material interests of the capitalist class" or "avoiding Marx’s economic determinism" 
(Albrow, 1975), he posed the following question for the dissertation: "How and in what 
formations and developments did certain modem commercial forms, especially 
partnership firm, come about?" (quoted in Brand, 1982: 95).
His conclusions in the dissertation clearly imply the notion that law is autonomous 
from any economic base or expression of Folk consciousness, contrary to the views in 
Marx and the romantic-metaphysical approach of the Historical School of 
Jurisprudence regarding the question of the emergence of legal n o rm s t. In a 
comparative reference to the developments in England and Germany, Weber says:" 
generally it appears ... that the development of the legal structure of organisations has 
by no means been predominantly determined by the economic factors" (Rheinstein, 
1954: 176). As I have indicated above, the link of this autonomy of law with natural 
law keeps his approach out of the camp of the legal positivists as much as these other 
theoretical camps.
However, Weber's formalist notions of law-making and law-finding have kept him 
close to positivism. He expounds these two activities in terms of the substantive/formal 
and irrational/rational axes. Law-making and law-finding are substantively irrational if 
they are "influenced by concrete factors of the particular case as evaluated upon an 
ethical, emotional, or political basis rather than general norms". They are "formally 
irrational" if the means applied in them "cannot be controlled by the intellect, for 
instance when recourse is had to oracles or substitutes thereof'. The converses of
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substantive and formal "irrationality" are substantive and formal "rationality"; one 
involves the guidance of clearly conceived and articulated general principles which 
accord predominance to ethical, utilitarian and other expediential rules; the other 
involves the guidance of definitely fixed legal concepts in the form of highly abstract 
rules without consideration for extrinsic (non-juristic) factors (see Ibid: 61-64; and, for 
a tabular representation of this typology and its relation to Weber's developmental 
model of law, see Hunt, 1978: 104-109).
Weber's formalist notions of law-making and law-finding seem to come together
concretely in his characterisation of the French Civil Code. According to him, "the
Code is completely free from the intrusion of, and intermixture with, nonjuristic
elements and all didactic, as well as all merely ethical admonitions; casuistry, too, is
completely absent" (Rheinstein, 1954: 285). Invariably, he conceives this Code as a
product of rational legislation, as against the Anglo-Saxon law which is a product of
juristic practice and the Roman ius civile (common law) which is a product of
theoretical-literary juristic doctrine. The Code's
characteristics are expressions of a particular kind of rationalism, 
namely the sovereign conviction that here for the first time was being 
created a purely rational law, in accordance with Bentham's ideal, free 
from all historical "prejudices" and deriving its substantive content 
exclusively from sublimated common sense in association with the 
particular raison d'etat of the great nation that owes its power to genius 
rather than to legitimacy (Ibid: 286).
He also sees in "its imitations all over Western and Southern Europe" the strength of 
the universal appeal of the Code's "extraordinary measure of lucidity as well as a 
precise intelligibility in its provisions". The fact that the imitations are possible because 
of "the abstract total structure of the [Code] and the axiomatic nature of [its] many 
provisions", as opposed to parallel development of social conditions, underlines the 
tenuousness, if not the absence, of any relationship between the Code and its original 
society.
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Whereas Weber's absolute autonomy position on law-society relations involving code 
systems should be obvious from the foregoing, his treatment of some other laws require 
that some caution be noted; and this is one area where Walton’s and Hunt's attribution 
of a relative autonomy view to Weber finds apparent support. For instance, on the 
commercial law, which he regards as "one of the most important instances of modem 
specialisation", Weber adopts an analytical approach/inference that seemingly assumes 
a social product view as will be shown in what follows.
In the course of a rather sketchy, if not substantially empty, review of the history of the 
German Commercial Code, Weber asserts: "commercial law, then, inasmuch as its 
application is personally delimited, is a class law rather than a status-group law" (Ibid: 
302). In another instance, he presents as one of two "causes ... responsible for the 
emergence of ... particularistic laws", "the occupational differentiation and the 
increasing attention which commercial and industrial pressure groups have obtained for 
themselves" (Ibid: 303). Put differently, "as our brief sketch has shown", he says, "... 
the great differences in the line of development [perhaps, between universalistic and 
particularistic laws] have been essentially influenced ... by the diversity of political 
power relationships" (Ibid: 304).
On the face of assertions such as these, it might appear that Weber is far from being 
consistent in his position on the source and nature of law. Considered together with his 
description of the differences in the structure of domination which "squares with the 
view that they are the outcome of material power struggles between contending 
classes", it is arguable that "indeed Weber undermined his own 'autonomy' argument" 
(Walton's, 1976: 13-14). It is nonetheless correct to observe that Weber sees as 
anomalous the development of modem law which incorporates "substantive rationality" 
- like considerations of economic advantage, justice, morality, welfare and public good. 
At best, it is an expediency.
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For the most part, Weber appears to regard law in its highest form (e.g the code system) 
as totally autonomous, but recognises that in practice particularistic laws are influenced 
by social factors. His emphasis on the autonomous development of law can be readily 
discerned from his claim that
the general development of law and procedure may be viewed as 
passing through the following stages: first, charismatic legal revelation 
through "law prophets"; second, empirical creation and finding of law 
by legal honoratiores, i.e, law creation through cautelary jurisprudence 
and adherence to precedent; third, imposition of law by secular or 
theocratic powers; fourth and finally, systematic elaboration of law and 
professionalised administration of justice by persons who have received 
their legal training in a learned and formally logical manner (Rheinstein, 
1954: 303).
It is hard to see substantive interface between law and society in any of these stages. 
The historical examples in which he appears to be demonstrating the relation between 
particular political forms and the corresponding legal development largely illuminate 
the rationalisation process through which law acquires logical rationality and not the 
emergence of new legal rules per se. Weber's preoccupation with the internal processes 
of law with a view to determining the ideal type of legal rationality, or his "view of law 
as indexing a historical movement towards increasing rationality" (Grace and 
Wilkinson, 1978: 61), tends to overshadow his quest for the social basis of 
particularistic legal order. Further, this preoccupation has kept alive, rather than 
dispelled, the spectre of legal positivism over his contribution to the law-society 
relation in general.
2.2.3 Gurvitch and the absolute autonomy argument
In some significant respects, Gurvitch has made a contribution to the absolute 
autonomy argument - a contribution which looks like a logical extension of those of 
Spencer and Weber. Like Weber, some ambivalence can be observed in his position on 
whether law is autonomous or a product of society. In this section it is his discourses on 
the natural law vis-a-vis the character of the positive law that are seen to be relevant to 
the absolute autonomy argument. These discourses appear to reinforce the
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understanding which comes from the approaches of Spencer and Weber. His attempt to 
define natural law provides a good window into his contribution.
In his view, the term "natural law" may be used to designate, among other things, "the 
invariant rules of law in contrast with the changing; [the] autonomous law deriving its 
validity from its own inherent values". Being "independent of convention, legislation or 
other institutional devices", this law provides "the ideal source ... and the criterion for 
testing the positive law emanating from this ideal" (Gurvitch, 1930: 284).
He notes the diverse conceptualisations of "natural law" in the philosophical writings of 
the stoics, Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, Locke, Rousseau, etc. to underline 
the point that the terms "nature" and "natural" which qualify the law "have proved 
confusingly protean". Part of the reason for this diversity, he observes, lies in the 
attempts by the philosophers to come to grips with the confrontation between the "ideal 
norms" and the "deviations of reality", and the jurisprudential antimonies that flow 
from it.
Quite significantly, Gurvitch makes a point which bears closely on the question of the
factor of the natural-law conception in understanding differences and similarities
between laws of two or more countries. He says:
One of the characteristic features of natural law has been its striving 
after unity and universality, as opposed to the particularism of the 
systems of positive law. With few exceptions the partisans of natural 
law have thrown their emphasis on the cosmopolitan element inherent 
in all law, stressing the common meeting point of the various systems of 
national law (Gurvitch, 1930: 285).
Although the emphasis of these 'partisans' is "a reaction against the traditional 
tendency to place major emphasis on the multiplicity of the sources of positive law", as 
Gurvitch has observed, this characteristic re-echoes what has previously been shown to 
be the central concern of the natural law traditions, viz., to derive "the fixed essence of 
things which operates as a standard in the midst of a changing, pluralistic and 
contingent world". By implication, wherever this standard is uniformly observed there
37
will be similarity in the legal rules which embody the standard; in a converse situation, 
there will be diversity.
In a later work, entitled Sociology of Law (1947), Gurvitch develops further the
significance of natural law for social organisation - mainly, in terms of the way in
which it serves as the basis for positive legal systems in "inclusive societies". His
definition of law in this work alludes to this interaction between the two spheres:
law represents an attempt to realize in a given social environment the 
idea of justice (that is, a preliminary and essentially variable 
reconciliation of conflicting spiritual values embodied in a social 
structure), through multilateral imperative-attributive regulation based 
on a determined link between claims and duties; this regulation derives 
its validity from the normative facts which give a social guarantee of its 
effectiveness and can in certain cases execute its requirements by 
precise and external constraint, but does not necessarily presuppose it 
(Gurvitch, 1947: 47).
As can be seen from this definition, the characteristic feature of law for Gurvitch is 
"justice". It is clear that this justice is a product of some equilibrium between spiritual 
values and not as McDonald (1979: 40) has interpreted between social values. The 
significance of correctly noting the kind of values as spiritual is that it not only locates 
the definition as straddling between "naturalism" and positivism of some sort (bearing 
in mind the characterisation of regulation as "imperative-attributive" - Petrazhitsky's 
coinage), but it also locates the "soul" of law in the supra-human sphere of existence.
In the discussion of Gurvitch's notion of social law, Swedberg (1982:40) 
acknowledges that for Gurvitch, "justice is directly connected to the spiritual realm. It 
is founded on normative facts, i.e., on the extratemporal values which are partly 
realized in empirical reality". He goes further to note that in Gurvitch's analysis these 
normative facts "constitute the primary sources of the law and can be apprehended 
directly through intuition".
Admittedly, the task which Gurvitch set for his sociology of law is formidable and 
cannot simply be reduced to one argument. For instance, he distinguishes between
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kinds of law, frameworks of law and systems of law and seeks to determine the 
functional relationship between them and the various forms of social reality (i.e., 
solidarity and sociality). He uses the criterion of the degree of mysticism and 
rationalism as developed by Weber to establish seven types of inclusive societies and 
their repercussions on systems of law, implying that positive laws are not independent 
of society. He also utilises Durkheim's characterisation or "jural typology of backward 
society" to extend his analysis to poly-segmentary societies whose legal systems have a 
magical-religious basis.
He ends up producing what he calls "systematic sociology (or microsociology) of law", 
"differential sociology of law" and "genetic sociology of law", each relating one of the 
three segments of his jural typology to different levels of social reality. Perhaps, 
because of the encyclopaedic character of this approach, McDonald (1979: 24) has 
urged the view that Gurvitch's work "is associated with no recognisable school".
Be that as it may, Gurvitch's relevance to the absolute autonomy argument, as far as 
can be observed here, derives from his emphasis that any law, although emanating from 
the sociality of'active groups', "can [ideally] affirm itself and be valid independently of 
all organisation" of the groups (Gurvitch, 1947: 159). This independence is made 
possible, probably, because the content of the sociality from where the law emanates is 
spiritual. In addition, despite the view urged by McDonald, a positivistic slant can be 
observed in Gurvitch's theoretical framework and this inclines his work towards 
autonomy argument. Petrazhitsky, who taught Gurvitch, was noted for attempting "to 
give idealism a firm scientific-positivistic basis" (see Swedberg, 1982: 45-46). Such 
attempt lies at the foundation of the autonomy model from which, as it appears, 
Gurvitch could not escape.
2.2.4 Watson and the absolute autonomy argument
Another profitable contribution to the absolute autonomy argument, also made within 
the positivist framework, is that of Alan (William Alexander Jardine) Watson. A legal
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scholar, Watson expresses an unwavering belief in the transplantability of law - a belief 
predicated (positivistically) on a deeper conviction that law has no organic link with the 
society in which it operates. He does this in a manner that puts him "in flat opposition 
to most sociologists of law, and indeed to most current theorists of law" [of social 
product persuasion] (Friedman, 1979). Indeed Watson (1977b: 130) holds the view 
(and declares this rather belligerently) that "none of the theories of the development of 
law or the relationship between law and society are (sic) acceptable", except his own.
The relevant starting point for Watson (1974: 3) is a concern for Comparative Law: 
Should this branch of law be regarded as an academic activity worthy of pursuit in its 
own right and with its own proper boundaries? In examining this question, he adopts a 
theoretical path which invariably leads him to an argument for the "autonomy" of law.
He takes the view that Comparative Law is a worthy academic activity and that its 
proper province is the "study of the relationship of one legal system and its rules with 
another". He further contends that the nature of this relationship, including the reasons 
for similarities and differences, "is discoverable only by a study of the history of the 
systems or of the rules ...".
Following on this conception of Comparative Law, Watson embarks on an extensive 
investigation of the legal systems of continental and western Europe. Apparently, he 
derives his "problematic" from a puzzle identified by Vingradoff (1961:11). This 
puzzle was expressed as follows:
Within the whole range of history there is no more momentous and 
puzzling problem than that connected with the fate of Roman Law after 
the downfall of the Roman State. How is it that a system set to meet 
certain conditions not only survived those conditions, but has retained 
its vitality even to the present day, when political and social 
surroundings are entirely altered? ... How did it come about that the 
Germans, instead of working out their legal system in accordance with 
their national precedents, and with the requirements of their own 
country, broke away from their historical jurisprudence to submit to the 
yoke of bygone doctrine of a foreign empire? (quoted in Watson, 1985: 
66f).
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It would seem that Watson sees in this statement an agenda of two items consisting of a
full scale study of (1) legal survival/development, and (2) the reasons for the
development of similar laws in different social, economic and political contexts. In
support of the latter, he finds a strong statement in Milsom's (1969: ix) work:
Societies largely invent their constitutions, their political and 
administrative systems, even in these days their economies; but their 
private law is nearly always taken from others. ... The common law, 
governing daily relationships in various modem societies, has developed 
without a break from its beginnings in a society utterly different from 
any of them (emphasis, mine) (quoted in Watson, 1974: 8).
Watson attempts to produce, in line with this statement, "conclusions [that] will be 
useful tools for everyone interested in law and society, whether as legal historians, 
sociologists of law, anthropologists or law reformers". This attempt is then channelled 
towards his overall goal "to further understanding of the relationship between law and 
society in which it operates, and of the vital role played by legal transplants in legal 
growth" (Watson, 1985: ix; x).
One major conclusion which he derives from his investigation is formulated as follows: 
"usually legal rules are not peculiarly devised for the particular society in which they 
now operate" (Watson, 1974: 96). This conclusion is based largely upon his 
observation that "in the Western world borrowing (with adaptation) has been the usual 
way of legal development" (Watson, 1974:7). He regards it as "perhaps the strangest" 
of all paradoxes of law, that:
on the one hand, a people's law can be regarded as being special to it, 
indeed a sign of that people's identity, and it is in fact remarkable how 
different in important detail even two closely related systems might be; 
on the other hand, legal transplants - the moving of a rule or a system of 
law from one country to another, or from one people to another - have 
been common since the earliest recorded history (Watson, 1974: 21).
In the light of this conclusion, Watson considers as inadequate, and in fact false, any 
"fundamental assumption of rationality in legal development or of a response 
determined by [social] circumstances" (Watson, 1977: 4). He is here referring to those 
writers whom he regards as being "fascinated by the relationship between law and
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society" and having "in common the firm belief that legal development is very much a
rational response to existing [societal] c i r c u ms t a n c e s , On  the contrary, he asserts,
there need not be anything like an exact correlation between the 
political, social and economic needs and desires of the members of a 
society as a whole or of its ruling elite on the one hand and the legal 
rules actually existing in the society on the other (Watson, 1977b: 84).
He later reiterates this position in the following words: "to a large extent law possesses 
a life and vitality of its own; that is, no close, natural or inevitable relationship exists 
between law, legal structures, institutions and rules on the one hand and the needs and 
desires and political economy of the ruling elite or of the members of the particular 
society on the other hand" (Watson, 1978: 314-315).
It should be mentioned that Watson draws on the development and spread of Roman 
and English law in societies with different social, political, economic and cultural 
systems in arriving at the conclusion that "the direct link between a society and its law 
is tenuous" and that "law is largely autonomous and not shaped by societal needs; law 
evolves from the legal tradition" (Watson, 1985: 117; 119). Thus he argues that in the 
development of the law of delict in the French Code Civil, for instance, "no particular 
political intention determined the drafter's choice, only the impact of earlier legal 
writing" (Watson, 1988: 35).
It should also be observed that throughout the relevant works of Watson, significant 
explanatory value is placed on legal history, the subject-matter of which is legal 
tradition (or legal system). In his Legal Transplants, 1974, for instance, Watson sets out 
to explain the changes that occurred in the Roman law in Egypt. These changes were 
mainly in the law of persons and contract where marriages occurred between brothers 
and sisters; slaves seem to have been treated as capable of owning property; direct 
representation and agency in contract performances operated, etc - contrary to what 
was allowed under the Roman law in Italy (see pp. 31-35). For Watson, these changes
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occurred "as a result of contact with other legal systems" and because "in Egypt Roman 
traditions of law were not so strong". There is no extra-legal explanation.
He equally maintains in The Making of the Civil Law that "the basic differences 
between civil law and common law systems are explained in terms of the legal 
traditions themselves" (i.e. legal history), not social economic or political history 
(Watson, 1981: viii). In reviewing this work, Stein (1982: 360) observes, approvingly, 
that Watson "has provided, with panache and erudition, a necessary corrective to the 
prevalent tendency to explain legal differences by reference to non-legal factors". Even 
where societal factors appear decisive in the emergence of certain legal phenomena, 
Watson remains inclined to this view on the fundamentality of legal traditions. For 
instance, with respect to the types of contract in the early Roman law, he says: "though 
economic or social reasons demanded the introduction of each type, it was the legal 
tradition that determined the nature, structure, and chronology of every contract" 
(Watson, 1985: 5).
Thus it is no surprise that Watson has "a strong disparagement of social, economic or 
political forces or anything outside 'purely legal history"’ (Lawson, 1975). This follows 
from his stance against sociology. In particular, "sociology of law" for him, provides 
the least help in understanding legal change and the relationship between legal rules 
and the society in which they operate. Further, he declares that the focus of "all 
scholarly research on law in society" (as undertaken by traditional sociologists of law 
and legal anthropologists) "is inappropriate, inexact, or inefficient" (Watson, 1983).
In his determination to provide a purely legal understanding on the relationship 
between law and society, Watson deliberately eschews the insights of the social 
sciences. Hence, in his Roman Private Law around 200 B.C. (1971), he chooses to 
write a purely "analytical work"*\ Similarly, his discussion in the Legal Transplants
 ^ See a review of this book by Birks (1972) for a statement on the unsatisfactory result of Watson's 
"straight analytical approach".
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(1974) is pitched at the level of technical details of law and excludes society in order to 
avoid dabbling into sociology (see Seidman, 1975; Diamond, 1980).
Further, his definition of the process of legislation appears fundamentally apolitical. 
For Watson, the reason why the body charged with the responsibility of keeping law 
up to date usually fails in this role is because it is bogged down with "other functions 
especially of a political nature" or the "pressure of business" (see Watson, 1974: 115- 
117). This implies, then, that legislative Taw reform’ is not a function "of a political 
nature".
On the whole, Watson's position comes squarely within a legal positivist orientation: 
"the distinguishing and sole necessary feature" which he attributes to law betrays this 
stance. For him, law is distinguished by "the availability of an institutionalised process 
[to resolve] actual or potential disputes ... with the specific object of inhibiting further 
unregulated conflict" (Watson, 1977b: i). Like Weber's conception of law, this is a 
semi-Austinian view. Indeed, in this same work Watson acknowledges his intellectual 
debt to positivists (see Watson, 1977b: 46).
Not surprisingly, the essence of law, in Watson's view, is order - rather than freedom, 
justice or morality - which does "not inevitably reflect the political, social and 
economic needs and desires of the society as a whole or its ruling elite" (Oberdiek, 
1981). Legal rules, in the sense that he refers to the Roman law as being organised into 
"self-contained", "self-referential" blocks, "are isolated from any historical context and 
can be discussed without regard to their original purpose or even their practical 
applicability" (Stein, 1982). They can be moved anywhere.
Despite this absolute autonomy stance, Watson slips into social product model time and 
again. For, although he has disparaged societal factors totally from the outset, he 
explains certain aspects of his subjects in terms of these same factors. Thus he 
describes the reception of the Roman law in Scotland in terms of the political relation
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of Scotland with England before and after the War of Independence of the early 14th 
century^. This, for him, is an example of "how much legal relationships and transplants 
may owe to the non-legal historic-political factors"; but he then quickly dismisses it as 
"sheer chance".
He lays the cause of the legislature's inertia (in their law reform role) at the doorsteps of 
the "pressure from business". He even proposes that "law like technology is very much 
the fruit of human experience" - it can be invented by a few people or nations. And, in 
explaining the phenomenon of legal change, he writes that "society has its input, which 
may be vigorously expressed or be tacit but demonstrated by obvious needs..." 
(Watson, 1985: 117).
Many of these assertions are similar to those which a scholar with a social scientific 
perspective would make. However, and in this lies the interesting point about Watson, 
at almost every point where he encounters these societal factors, he seems to handle or 
dismiss them without careful analysis. Ultimately, it comes down to the view that 
Watson only "flirted with sociology of law"; he never proceeded with it (see Abel, 
1982: 787). Or, as Adams (1979: 122) puts it, he "attempts to make a sociological 
thesis without using a sociologist's methodology". Where a sociologist's object is to 
develop and/or apply theoretical apparatuses for the understanding of society (and not 
events qua events), Watson's technique "is to analyze particular legal events and facts" 
(Watson, 1985: 1) and, this, in total disregard for social factors. As will be shown later, 
nonetheless, his analysis of the mechanics of legal transplant provides some of the 
crucial factors for an autonomy explanatory answer to the research question of this 
study. These factors are: (a) there must be raised a question of major law reform (a 
matter internal to law) in the country borrowing the law; (b) there must be, in the 
borrowing country, an instinct to first look at solutions in other jurisdictions before 
considering the internal resources - the presumption in respect of this factor is that a
6 This point has been raised, subtly but cogently, by Kahn-Freund in his review of Watson's Legal 
Transplant.
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body set up to suggest law reforms begins normally not by trying to think its way 
through to its own solution based on local conditions and character but by examining 
external solutions; (c) the law which is being borrowed must be regarded with enough 
respect (whether or not it in fact meets the needs of the borrowing country is 
immaterial); and (d) the law must be accessible in language and materials to the 
borrowing country (Watson, 1974: 91-93).
Thus, in all the contributions reviewed in the foregoing sub-sections - whether it be 
Spencer's perceived unchangeableness of sacred laws, the philosophical conception of 
natural law as universal and as the quintessence of all legal orders, W'eber's formalistic 
appreciation of law (e.g. the French Civil Code) as free from all socio-historical 
prejudices, Gurvitch's point on the search for the cosmopolitan element in national laws 
or Watson's legal transplantability - there is a strong suggestion that law (natural or 
positive) possesses some measure of absolute independence from society.
2.3 Relative autonomy argument
The relative autonomy argument acknowledges some independence for law. Through 
the process of abstraction, law extinguishes the memory of its social origins or defines 
them out of existence. It then assumes formality, generality and autonomy. The 
autonomy is only from the preferences of the social actors and not from the social 
system or the mode of production; hence it is relative. This is, however, enough to 
make the law mobile and/or able to reproduce itself in countries with similar or 
different social structures.
2.3.1 Althusser and the relative autonomy argument
Although Althusser never singled out law for analysis in its own right, the notion of 
relative autonomy of law has, more likely than not, gained currency among social 
scientists (especially those of Marxist bent) as a result of his sustained efforts to 
operationalise Marx's conception of the social totality^. As may be noted, contrary to
 ^See his For Marx (1969); Reading Capital (1970) and Lenin and Philosophy (1971).
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Proudhon's consideration of economic relations together with an ideological system (or 
limbs of the social system) "as so many social phases", i.e, "so many separate societies, 
following one upon the other", Marx had argued that these "production relations ... 
form a whole" (see The Poverty of Philosophy, 1847). In Grundrisse (1858), Marx 
further maintained that this whole is an "articulated-hierarchy".
It is this totality - articulated-hierarchy - that Althusser (1970: 97) presents as a
unity of a structured whole containing what can be called levels or 
instances which are distinct and 'relatively autonomous’ and co-exist 
within this complex structural unity, articulated with one another 
according to specific determinations, fixed in the last instance by the 
level or instance of the economy.
This "articulation in the whole", Althusser argues, precludes the reduction of the 
"relative independence" view of the levels "to the positive affirmation of an 
independence in vacuo, [or] even to the mere negation of a dependence in itself" 
(Althusser, op. cit: 100). In his "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (1970), he 
elaborates on this articulation in terms of the respective "effectivity" of the "levels" or 
"instances".
According to Althusser, the 'social whole’ is constituted by "the infrastructure, or 
economic base (the 'unity' of the productive force and the relations of production) and 
the superstructure, which itself contains two 'levels' ...: the politico-legal (law and the 
State) and ideology (the different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political, etc.)". 
This entity engenders a dialectic in which "the 'floors' of the superstructure are clearly 
endowed with different indices of effectivity". And, this effectivity, ultimately, yields 
to the "determination in the last instance" by the economic base. In other words, "if 
they [i.e. the floors] are determinant in their own (as yet undefined) ways, this is true 
only insofar as they are determined by the base".
In this elaboration, there is uncertainty as regards the link between the base and the 
floors. This is all the more so as the effectivity of the 'floors' in terms of "a 'relative
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autonomy’ of the superstructure with respect to the base” and "a 'reciprocal action' of 
the superstructure on the base" remain "as yet undefined".
As an attempt to overcome the spectre of "economic determinism" hanging over
Marxist theory, Althusser's formulation has not emerged with much clarity. Engels
(1890) appears more accessible in his assertion that:
The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the 
superstructure - [politics, law, ideology] - also exercise their influence 
upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases determine 
their form in particular. There is an interaction of all these elements in 
which, ... the economic movement is finally bound to assert itself 
(quoted in Cain and Hunt, 1979: 56).
It is, however, arguable that Althusser's formulation marks the beginning of the 
contributions from social sciences to the "relative autonomy" argument in the law and 
society debate.
Despite the lack of clarity, Althusser's formulation marks, in the words of Hindess and 
Hirst (1977: 5), a "retreat from the consequences of economism" when Marxists were, 
allegedly, forced "to recognise a complex field of social relations inadequately 
comprehended by the classic Marxist theories of the economy and politics" (Hirst, 
1979: 1). Soon after the publication of Althusser’s work, Poulantzas (1973: 255) came 
to apply the concept of "relative autonomy", along with "unity of power", to the 
analysis of the capitalist type of stated The concept had quickly become firmly 
established in social scientific discourse.
2.3.2 Balbus and the relative autonomy argument
Although Balbus (1978) embarks upon a project different (arguably, in form but not in 
essence) from Althusser's, his work is probably the most handy illustration of an 
extended application, to law, of the relative autonomy argument.
 ^ See Gulalp (1987) for a summary of the development of the concept of "relative autonomy" vis-a-vis 
capitalist power relations.
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The problem which Balbus addresses in his Essay is "why a specifically legal form of 
the exchange of people is inextricably intertwined with a specifically capitalist form of 
the exchange of products" (p.74). Put simply, why is the legal form homologous to the 
commodity form?
By tackling this problem, he expects "to outline the essentials of a Marxist theory of 
law" which
entails a simultaneous rejection of both an instrumentalist or 
reductionist approach which denies that the legal order possesses any 
autonomy from the demands imposed on it by the actors of the capitalist 
society in which it is embedded, and a formalist approach which asserts 
an absolute, unqualified autonomy of the legal order from this society 
(PP73-74).
In other words, it will be a Marxist theory of the "relative autonomy" of law which 
transcends the object captured by intrumentalist-formalist debate.
Here, I will not take issue with Balbus' reduction of the "legal theory" debate of "at 
least two hundred years" to a "Marx vs. Weber" affair, except to say that the debate has 
certainly more participants than Marx, Weber and their "followers". That is to say, if 
Balbus means that "intrumentalism" (of the Marxist type) and "formalism" (of the 
Weberian type) exhaustively cover all the nuances of this debate, I cannot agree.
It is instructive also to note the deficiencies of those two approaches which Balbus 
points out. On the one hand, the instrumentalist approach "fails even to pose the 
problem of the specific form of the law and the way in which this form articulates with 
the overall requirements of the capitalist system" (p.74). On the other, even though the 
formalist approach does specify the form of law, it precludes its ability "to 
conceptualise the relationship between the legal form and the specifically capitalist 
whole" by treating "this form as a closed, autonomous system whose development is to 
be understood exclusively in terms of its own 'internal dynamics'" (ibid).
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It is from this position that Balbus begins to draw the parallel between "the logic of the 
commodity form" and "the logic of the legal form" and relate both to the relative 
autonomy of law. Whereas he could readily lift the "logic of commodity form" from the 
first chapter of Marx's Capital Volume 1, he has had to reconstruct the "logic of the 
legal form" from Marx's fragmentary treatments of law in about five works. In the end 
though, he is able to demonstrate that in a capitalist order law assumes the form of "the 
universal political equivalent" by representing qualitatively distinct (different?) 
individuals as equal citizens. This parallels the process in which money (in relation to 
qualitatively different commodities, made equal) assumes the form of "the universal 
economic equivalent".
More importantly, law, in this form, extinguishes "the memory of different interests 
and social origins", i.e. it "defines distinctions of interest and origin out of political 
existence". By and large, law assumes formality, generality and autonomy. This, then, 
leads to 'legitimation' in which law's "claims or pledges [of equality, for instance] are 
valued in the first place” and to 'fetishism' in which "individuals attribute subjectivity 
to the Law and conceive themselves as its objects or creations".
In this guise, Balbus concludes, law acquires the guarantee to exist, function and/or
develop "autonomously from the preferences of social actors ... [but not] from the
system in which these social actors participate". In other words,
the autonomy of the law from the preferences of even the most powerful 
social actors (the members of the capitalist class) is not an obstacle to, 
but rather a prerequisite for the capacity of the law to contribute to the 
reproduction of the overall conditions that make capitalism possible, and 
thus its capacity to serve the interests of capital as a class.
This conclusion re-echoes Unger's (1976: 80) view, without its "naturalist" flavour,
that
insofar as human law seeks to participate in the character of the higher 
normative order, it too must be represented as relatively autonomous 
from the desires of human sovereigns and from the customs of particular 
societies. ... Its rules ought to have a measure of critical independence 
from politics and custom.
50
More significantly, it is my view that this conclusion essentially restates Althusser's 
arguments to the effect that the conception of a relative autonomy of law does not 
amount to the "negation of a dependence in itself". The primacy and influence of the 
modes of production are not called into question in the conclusion. Suppose we turn 
Althusser's arguments into an abstract proposition: "the dependence of each 'level' 
within the set of articulations of a capitalist society produces and establishes a mode of 
relative independence of that level as its necessary result"^. Most probably, Balbus' 
analysis of the link between law and capitalist order would occur to those familiar with 
it as a concrete application of this proposition. It may well be argued that the extinction 
of the law's own social origin, as demonstrated by Balbus, is a condition for, or product 
of, the effectivity, this floor of the superstructure, as in Althusser's formulation.
2.4 Implications of the model for the study
The absolute and relative autonomy arguments of this model seem to converge on the 
conception of law as sui generis. In one argument, the essence of law is identified with 
the "nature" or "form" which is universal and "self-existent"; in the other, law is shown 
to exhibit some independent existence which it acquires in the course of the 
development of its internal dynamics. In further support of this latter argument one 
might add Engels' (1873, 1977: 365) apt description of the process in which law 
acquires some independence:
With further social development, law develops into a more or less 
comprehensive legal system. The more intricate this legal system 
becomes, the more is its mode of expression removed from that in which 
the usual economic conditions of the life of society are expressed. It 
appears as an independent element which derives the justification for its 
existence and the substantiation for its further development not from the 
economic relations but from its own inner foundations ... (emphasis, 
mine).
Both arguments suggest that the explanation for the differences among national laws 
lies in (1) "the negation of the essence of law" and (2) the different degrees of 
autonomous legal development. The differences among laws, arising from the negation
9 Most of the concepts in this formulation are taken from Reading Capital, 1969 p. 100.
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of the essence of law occur when, in some but not in other nations, "laws lose their 
relationship with justice and are made to fit immediate social expediency. [The laws are 
bent] to favour the power of the strong who, in turn, justifies his position by endowing 
the juridical system with new criteria of law" (Ellul, 1969: 31-33). In Weberian 
formalism differences occur when there is a differential predominance of "substantive 
rationality" in legal development. In both cases, the law ceases to be autonomous and 
develops organic links with the peculiar conditions of its nation. The differences which 
arise from the extinction of the social origins of law are contingent upon the nature of 
the mode of production within which the legal development takes place. This implies, 
as Balbus' contribution suggests, that the character of law in say the capitalist mode of 
production would be different from the character of law in other modes like the 
communal and feudal modes.
The point being thus far is this: the autonomy arguments as outlined in the preceding 
sections acknowledge that the positive law may be socially conditioned. When this 
happens, such a law would be different from the law which approximates the natural 
ideal. Further, laws which are constructed in different modes of production would show 
differencies among themselves.
Regarding the similarities among national laws, the explanations respectively suggested 
by both arguments of the autonomy model are: (1) concomitant observance of the 
principles of nature which are common to all peoples or the principles of formal 
rationality in law-making; and (2) the existence of a similar mode of production in the 
nations being compared. Significantly, both arguments also suggest that law has a life 
of its own and is amenable to move around in the same form or substance. In other 
words, law is "a brooding omnipotence in the sky" and, ipso facto, transplantable. The 
issue of the transplantability has emerged most clearly in Watson's contribution which, 
as can be seen from the review in this chapter, is predicated on the conception of law as 
independent from the society.
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2.5 An autonomy explanatory framework for differences and similarities in 
national laws
This section outlines in more clearly defined propositional terms the factors or insights 
which the foregoing discussion throws up for the explanation of differences and 
similarities in national laws. On the one hand, the laws of two countries might differ:
(a) as a result of differential deviation from the universal principles of nature or 
formal rationality (i.e one or both countries may bend their laws away from 
"natural" ideals to fit different social expediencies) - [it should be noted that this 
explanation resorts to, indeed give primacy to, social factors in explaining 
differencies. Put in another way, the natural law argument by itself cannot 
explain differencies; it must be supplemented by the social product explanation 
to be discussed in chapter three]; qt
(b) if the laws arise in different modes of production.
On the converse side these laws might be similar:
(a) if they all conform to the natural principles; 21
(b) if they are bent away from these principles (i.e concomitant deviation) but 
are made by their countries, independently, to fit similar social expediences - 
[here again, it is social factors to be discussed later which are critical in 
explaining the similarity]; qt
(c) if the law of one country approximates the true law (i.e the natural ideals) 
and the other country copies it; 2 1
(d) if one of the countries bends its own law and the other copies this "deviant" 
law.
The main use of this framework is that it sensitizes us to specific aspects of the law- 
society relations not all of which may be applicable to the explanation of the 
differences and similarities between the compulsory arbitration laws of Australia and 
Nigeria. But, the propositions provide sufficient leads for the collection, analysis, and 
interpretation of the relevant materials upon which the proposed explanation in this 
thesis will be based.
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It is noted that the key concepts in this framework would require some 
operationalisation. For instance the universal principles of nature which the Australian 
and Nigerian laws either conform to or deviate from would need to be concretely 
determined. Similarly the social expediencies which may be associated with such 
conformity or deviation must be isolated. Further, with regard to imitation or borrowing 
as an explanatory factor, the Australian law (given that it is the one being imitated or 
borrowed) must be shown to have taken a life of its own (i.e. having no link to any 
particular society) in a manner suggested by the two arguments of the autonomy model. 
This operationalisation will be undertaken in chapter six where the framework is to be
used.
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CHAPTER THREE: SOCIAL PRODUCT MODEL OF LAW AND SOCIETY
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter an attempt is made to construct, from the law and society literature, a 
social product model as an alternative explanatory framework to the autonomy model. 
Unlike the autonomy model conception of law as an entity independent of the society 
or social formation, this model conceives law as emanating organically from society. 
The arguments about the nature of the social fabric from which law emerges as a 
product have been diversely articulated in the literature.
For the purpose of this study, these arguments have been divided or categorised into 
two, namely, the consensus and the conflict arguments. In developing these arguments 
to give effect to the construction of the model, I have used the works of Herbert 
Spencer, Emile Dürkheim, Edward Ross and William Sumner for the consensus 
argument, and of Karl Marx, Andrew Hopkins, Otto Kahn-Freund and Richard 
Quinney for the conflict argument. These scholars have addressed significant 
theoretical themes on the law-society relations. With the exception of the particular 
work of Hopkins which I have selected for review, the works of these scholars draw on 
the experiences of similar and different countries to illustrate the themes. Hopkins' 
focus on an Australian law within the context of its political economy provides a 
useful insight into some of the Australian materials which will needed for my 
subsequent analysis.
From the review of these works, the explanatory factors which the arguments raise for 
the research question of this study will be drawn together in the last section of this 
chapter.
3.2 Consensus argument
In general sociology, the foundation of the consensus model of society was firmly laid 
by the works of Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and Emile Dürkheim. Upon this
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foundation, later generations of scholars, like Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton, Kai 
Erikson, Neil Smelser, Davis and Moore, etc, came to build
In both sets of works, the picture of society conveyed is, generally, one in which 
"consensual order and stability are the natural state of social systems" (O’Malley, 
1983:3-4). For instance, while analysing the cause of, and the solution to, the social 
crisis of his time, Comte forcefully suggests that consensus lies at the base of every 
genuine social order. He says:
the great political and moral crisis that societies are now undergoing is 
shown by a rigid analysis to arise out of intellectual anarchy. While 
stability in fundamental maxims is the first condition of genuine social
order, we are suffering under an utter disagreement ....  Till a certain
number of general ideas can be acknowledged as a rallying-point of
social doctrine, the nations will remain in a revolutionary state..... ITlor
the causes of disorder will have been arrested bv the mere fact of the 
agreement. It is in this direction that those must look who desire a 
natural and regular, a normal state of society (Comte, 1853) (emphasis, 
mine).
Although Comte's writings generally represent a reaction to a specific social crisis of 
his time, his general principle of agreement-normality equation, as exemplified in the 
above quotation, features prominently in most of the consensual approaches to society.
Regarding the relationship between law and society, the picture painted by the 
consensus argument suggests a position which views law as essentially embodying 
and/or emanating from generally accepted social values. As Chambliss, (1969: 8) has 
observed,
the crux of this position is that legal norms are an expression of those 
societal values which transcend the immediate interests of individuals or 
groups. Legal norms are seen as emerging through the dynamics of 
cultural processes as a solution to certain needs grid requirements which 
are essential for maintaining the fabric of society* 2.
A detailed articulation of this position is presented in the following review.
* See Cuff and Payne (1979: 34-53) for summaries of their works.
2 This view reflects the structural functionalism of the Durkheimian type. It is necessary to note this 
distinction because at certain levels of analysis the works of Marx and neo-marxists like Althusser may 
qualify as "structural functionalist" in their assumptions.
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3.2.1 Spencer and the consensus argument
In chapter two the contribution of Spencer to the autonomy model has been reviewed. 
In this chapter, the other parts of his work, the Principles of Sociology, 1882, which 
articulate a social-product consensus position on law will be reviewed. In the chapter 
devoted to "Laws" in Volume II of this work, Spencer identifies consensus as one of 
four major sources of laws; the other three, being the special injunctions of deceased 
leaders, the commands of deities and the commands of living leaders.
In communicating the idea of this consensus, Spencer uses a number of concepts. There 
is the "aggregate opinion", the "aggregate feeling", the "prevailing sentiments and 
ideas" and the "public desire". In each or all of these, "we have the germ of law which 
eventually becomes recognised as expressing the public will", i.e "the formulated will 
of the majority".
This law, according to Spencer, derives its "obligation from the consensus of individual 
interests", though, itself, "impersonally-derived"; it conduces to social welfare" or 
"provides directly for social order"; it precedes any kind of law "initiated by political 
authority"; and it has "equality as [its] essential principle". The "consensus of 
individual interests" remains the "primitive source of the law". And, even when 
"entirely subordinated [by other sources, i t] ... never ceases to exist".
Spencer notes that his analysis
is tantamount to saying that the impersonally-derived law which revives 
as personally-derived law declines, and which gives expression to the 
consensus of individual interests, becomes in its final form, simply an 
applied system of ethics - or rather, of that part of ethics which concerns 
men's just relations with one another and with the community.
There is no rigourous analysis of the concepts which Spencer has used to represent the 
images of consensual foundation of law in his work. For instance, the connection 
between "individual interests" and "public desire" should have been clarified, as should 
the distinction between law and a system of ethics. Nonetheless, he has said enough to 
indicate the theoretical position of law as a product of some form of social agreement.
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3.2.2 Dürkheim and the consensus argument
To appreciate Durkheim's contribution to the consensus position on law, some 
reflection on his intellectual orientation may be necessary. Dürkheim, from the 
beginning of his career, took sociology "seriously as his vocation"; and "the 
development and autonomy of sociology remained his salient preoccupation" 
(Tiryakian, 1981). His pioneering contribution to the emergence of the sociology of law 
as a discipline is, in my judgment, unrivalled.
Out of the eleven names on Gurvitch's (1947) list of the founders of the sociology of 
law, only Dürkheim had his original training in sociology. And, as Gurvitch (1947: 83) 
observed, "aside from the two principal works in which he takes up legal questions, ... 
all his works, as well as the important notes in the Annee Sociologique ..., contributed 
to the clarification of this field [of the sociology of law]". This journal - Annee 
Sociologique (12 volumes from 1898 to 1912) - which was run by Dürkheim himself, 
contained a special section devoted to "'the analysis of works where law of a society or 
social type is studied in its entirety’ and ... in such a way as to reveal principles of social 
organisation and collective thinking" (Lukes and Scull, 1983: If).
Dürkheim (1900) presents the centrality of the study of law to his sociological 
enterprise in these words:
Instead of treating sociology in genere, we have always concerned 
ourselves systematically with a clearly delimited order of facts: save for 
necessary excursions into fields adjacent to those which we are 
exploring, we have always been occupied only with legal or moral rules 
studied in terms of their genesis and development (quoted in Lukes and 
Scull, 1983: 2).
As to why law came to be central in his sociology, Cotterrell's (1977: 248) submission 
seems cogent. He argues, "law is important for [Dürkheim] because it indicates in 
observable form a morality operative at the level of the whole society and sufficiently 
central to the society's existence to be reflected in definite, communicable, codified
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rules". This is a fair restatement of Durkheim's (1893, 1960: 64-65) own assertion that,
as a moral phenomenon, social solidarity by itself,
does not lend itself to exact observation nor indeed to measurement. To 
proceed to [the measurement and comparison of the degree to which 
the solidarity contributes to the integration of society], we must 
substitute for this internal fact which escapes us, an external index 
which symbolises it, and study the former in the light of the latter. This 
visible symbol is the law.
Dürkheim argues that to study social solidarity in this way (i.e. sociologically), it is
necessary to discover some identifiable characteristics which are capable of varying as
the species of solidarity varies. He finds such a characteristic in the sanctions which
attach to the laws through which the moral codes of the conscience collective are
expressed; hence, his focus upon the repressive and restitutive laws. Dürkheim further
reiterates the significance of law in these words:
Social life, especially where it exists durably, tends inevitably to assume 
a definite form and to organise itself, and law is nothing else than this 
very organisation... We can thus be certain of finding reflected in the 
law all the essential varieties of social solidarity (op.cit).
With such theoretical conviction and commitment as shown in the foregoing, it is 
probably not surprising that Durkheim's name has come to dominate sociological 
discussion of the consensus argument about law and society.
Dürkheim begins with a conception of social order in terms of "the totality of beliefs 
and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society". According to him, 
these beliefs and sentiments
form a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it the 
collective or common conscience... [I]t has specific characteristics which 
make it a distinct reality. It is in effect, independent of the particular 
conditions in which individuals are placed. Moreover, it does not change 
with each generation, but on the contrary, it connects successive 
generations with one another (Dürkheim, 1893, 1947: 79-80 - translated 
by George Simpson).
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The technical concept which he uses to convey this collective reality in his sociology is 
"social fact"^. This "thing"^, in his view, provides the foundation from which all 
normative systems (including law) emerge; and the "thing" is in turn indexed by these 
systems. As it would appear, Dürkheim singles out law as epitomizing this indexation. 
In the words of Grace and Wilkinson (1978: 48), law, for Dürkheim, is "the 
paradigmatic instance of a social fact".
In his first major work - The Division of Labour in Society (1893) - Dürkheim puts 
forward what Lukes and Scull (1983: 1) have termed "three bold and striking 
hypotheses about law". This work "became overnight a landmark of sociological 
writing and has remained a standard reference work ever since its publication as a 
doctoral dissertation in 1893 - which I suspect is an unmatched record of longevity in 
sociology" (Tiryakian, 1981: 116).
On the source of law, Dürkheim is forthright in this first work. For him, law is 
derivative from and expressive of a society's social solidarity ("a wholly moral 
phenomenon"). This social solidarity - more technically, conscience collective - is the 
moral-political consensus or, as indicated before, the totality of beliefs and sentiments 
common to average citizens of the same society.
The solidarity varies from the mechanical one of the simple society to the organic one 
of the complex society. The former "is all-embracing and furnishes a comprehensive 
moral code" (Cotterrell, 1977: 242). And, corresponding to it is the penal law 
(supported by repressive sanctions). The repressive law aims at hurting the offender 
through his fortune, his honour, his life, his liberty, or to deprive him of some object 
whose possession he enjoys.
3 See his The Rules of Sociological Method (1938).
4 As Giddens (1989: 692) has observed, "Durkheim’s famous first principle is: 'study social facts as 
things'".
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By contrast, organic solidarity 'expresses a positive union, a co-operation which 
derives, in essentials, from the division of labour'. It "consists in increasing complexity, 
differentiated institutions and individual specialisation, resulting in the interdependence 
of very large numbers of individuals in single societies" (Clarke, 1976: 246). 
Corresponding to it is the restitutive law which "is not expiatory but comes down to a 
mere restoration of the status quo ante". The damages awarded against the offender 
"have no penal character: they are simply the means of putting back the clock so as to 
restore the past as far as possible to its normal state" (Dürkheim, 1893).
Durkheim's approach in this major work - the Division of Labour - leaves little doubt as 
to his strong view on the connectedness of law to consensual social order. His review 
of Gaston Richard's "Essai sur l'Origine de l'Idee de Droit" (1893) reinforces the 
understanding that his position on the relationship between law and society is 
unequivocally consensual. In that review he inveighs against the empiricists and 
apriorists who
studied the idea of law in the abstract, detaching it from the 
circumstances which had determined its formation and development. 
They did not see that it was the act of living in society which led men to 
define their juridical relations, to fix 'what all may require from each 
and what each may expect from all' (quoted in Lukes and Scull, 1983: 
147).
Also, although he approves of Richard's "notion of law" which comprises the ideas of 
arbitration, of guarantee, of offence and of debt (reparation and punishment), Dürkheim 
implies some deficiency in Richard's analysis, basically on the ground that the ideas are 
not located in the "idea of solidarity". He then argues that, to allow for a better analysis, 
Richard's problem should be reformulated thus: "What are the social influences which 
gave rise to the idea of the law and in terms of which it has evolved historically?" He 
maintains that the "notion of the law" is not only impressed by but also derived from 
the "idea of solidarity".
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On the evidence, it is probably correct to argue as Hunt (1978: 69) has done that 
"Dürkheim posits a mirror image relationship between law and social solidarity". The 
complexities in social relations which Dürkheim appears to have overlooked, or 
perhaps sacrificed to enable him maintain his position, will not be discussed here. It 
suffices for our immediate purpose to note that his approach is a strong consensual 
perspective within a social product model of law and society.
3.2.3 Ross/Sumner and the consensus argument
To a lesser extent, some of the other sociologists who have adopted the consensual 
view of society and addressed the law-society relations in their works arrive at 
conclusions very much in line with those of Spencer and Dürkheim. In respect of the 
source of law, the works of Edward W. Ross and William G. Sumner appear worthy of 
note, although they need not attract more than a brief review here~*.
It is generally held that it was Ross who introduced the concept of social control into 
sociology. This concept came to him in 1894 while "he sat in an alcove in the Stanford 
Library during the Christmas recess". His preoccupation was to determine the means 
through which society disciplines its members. After setting down thirty four of such 
means, he "stumbled on to a great social secret". In excitement, he wrote to Lester 
Ward, whom he regarded as his Master, the following words: "I am more than ever 
convinced that I have got hold of ... a thread which will enable us to unravel many 
tangles in the development of culture. I find Social Control a key that unlocks many 
doors ..." (Ross, 1901, 1969: xvi).
In contradistinction to the other means, Ross finds in "social control" an intended and 
purposeful societal domination "which fulfils a function in the life of society". As with 
Dürkheim, law appears to Ross as "the most specialised and highly finished engine" of
 ^Even though works of Parsons, Merton and Bredemeier command attention in their own right, they are 
not considered here because they focus mainly on the "function", and not the "source", aspect of law in 
society.
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this domination over individual members. Thus he argues that "the making of law is 
ever the first care of a new community".
Ross comes even closer to Dürkheim over the link which he established between law 
and society. He is of the view that changes in laws (in his words, "a bewildering series 
of metamorphoses in laws") are expressions of "the life of a given society" or, in 
Unger's (1976: 47) words, "the innermost secrets of the manner in which [society] 
holds men together". Invariably, therefore, Ross has no difficulty concluding that "the 
search for The spirit of laws', which since the days of Montesquieu has engrossed many 
of the highest minds shows that the legal code is connected with the institutions and 
needs of society
In a manner similar to Ross, Sumner argues that there is a close link between law and 
society. His contribution in this regard begins with his Folkways (1906). In that work, 
he shows how folkways transform into mores. After practising certain folkways (i.e 
habits and customs) for an extended time, people acquire the conviction that these mass 
phenomena are indispensable to the welfare of society. "It is with the addition of this 
welfare-element", he says, "that folkways become mores".
More significantly, he argues that "it is out of mores that institutions [including law] 
develop". Referring, specifically, to parliamentary activities, he asserts that "acts of 
legislation come out of the mores... Legislation ... has to seek standing ground on the 
existing mores and it soon becomes apparent that legislation, to be strong, must be 
consistent with the mores". Put differently, "law... is a sort of crystallization or 
precipitation of mores".
Thus, in a collaborative work with Albert G. Keller, Sumner (1927: 666) could advise 
that the growth of law from customs (or mores) "should never be lost sight of by one 
who would understand its nature and evolution". He then quotes, with approval, 
Carter's statement that
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Law begins as the product of the automatic action of society ... [law] is 
the fruit of the myriads of concurring judgements of all the members of 
society pronounced after a study of the consequences of conduct 
touching what conduct should be followed and what should be avoided.
Against this background one can understand the observation by Akers and Hawkins
(1975: 44) that "the classic statement of the consensus explanation of law as a
reflection of widely and deeply held societal norms is found in Sumner".
3.3 Conflict argument
Although through a different route, the conflict argument also comes down on the side 
of the social product model of law and society. At the core of this argument is the view 
that conflict (and not consensus) of interests is the engine of society and, more 
significantly, is the determinant of the nature of law.
Around this core, however, three theoretical perspectives are discernible: the Marxist, 
the pluralist, and the power-elite perspectives. It might be argued that the pluralist 
perspective which postulates 'harmonisation of interests or majority rule’ should belong 
to the consensus argument. This appears to be the position of Tomasic (1980: 28; also, 
see Hopkins, 1978b: 5). Chambliss and Seidman (1982: 140) have gone as far as to 
regard "pluralist theory" as an "offspring" from the consensus perspective. However, 
considering its main concepts like "reconciliation" "compromise", "conflicting claims", 
and "diverse interests", I take the view that the assumptions of the pluralist perspective 
are more akin to the conflict paradigm.
Akers and Hawkins (1975: 47) appear to share in the understanding that these three
perspectives belong to one paradigm when they observe that, apart from the contention
of the "marxian model of class domination", there is the unresolved issue which is not
whether the law is most often the outcome of group conflict; rather it is 
whether the nature of that conflict is better described as the 
overwhelming and enduring dominance of a "power elite" or as the 
"pluralistic" conflict of many different groups with varying amounts of
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power, which are successful on certain issues and not influential on 
others, and none of which is all-powerful (emphasis, mine).
It is therefore defensible to consider the pluralist perspective, along with the other two, 
in a conflict argument framework. The key postulates of these perspectives on the 
relationship between law and society will be brought into clear focus in the following 
review of the works of Marx, Hopkins, Kahn-Freund and Quinney.
3.3.1 Marxist perspective and the conflict argument
It is perhaps trite knowledge that Karl Marx himself never lived to fully develop a 
coherent theory of law^. Most of what has passed as "marxist perspective" has been 
derived, in the form of abstractions and/or extrapolations, from Marx's allusions to law 
in his general works. In my view, it is probably an over-statement for Renner (1949: 
56) to assert that Marx undertook, in Capital, "a comprehensive exposition of the 
functions fulfilled by the legal institutions at every stage of the economic process" - as 
this carries an overtone of a complete or systematic theory of law and economy.
Mills (1962: 41) is closer to the reality when he observes that "the work of Marx as he 
left it when he died in 1883 is not very neat and nowhere does he summarize his ideas 
in a complete and systematic way". Not even the State upon which Marx seems to have 
dwelt considerably can be said to have received a systematic theorising. For, as 
Miliband (1969: 7) observes, "Marx himself ... never attempted a systematic study of 
the state [even though] references to the state in different types of society constantly 
recur in almost all of his writings". And, on Marx's treatment of law, Beime's (1975) 
observation seems just. He says: "Marx's analysis of law was always secondary to that 
of the State and the class struggle, and the scattered nature of his references to law 
testifies to this ...". On the whole, his attention to law remained "tangential to a
6 There is no suggestion here that Marx had such project in mind. In fact, there is no specific mention of 
law in the project set out in his Preface to A Critique of Political Economy, namely, "to examine the 
system of bourgeois economics in the following order: capital, landed property, wage labour, state, 
foreign trade, world market".
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predominant focus on the general mode of social organisation and the material 
circumstances in which men are placed" (Collins, 1982: 9).
Be that as it may, whatever qualifies as the Marxist perspective on the relationship 
between law and society appears to be inherent in and elaborated by the works of Marx 
himself. For, although "no theory of law as such is constructed by Marx, indeed no 
concept (theoretical definition) of law is developed, directions for such an elaboration" 
seem to be strongly suggested in his treatment (Cain and Hunt, 1979: xiii)^. The review 
here concentrates on Marx's analysis of law in relation to the economic base of society.
3.3.1(a) Marx's contribution
Apparently Marx's first encounter with law as a subject did not strike a happy chord. 
Not only did he find learning the law an unrewarding and unsatisfying task, compared 
to Philosophy, he also expressed views on law which were "likely to arouse storms if 
made into a system". The form of this expression was anything but "conciliatory and 
agreeable"
His irritation centred on what he perceived as "an obstacle to grasping the truth". An 
instance of this was "the unscientific form of mathematical dogmatism, in which the 
[authors on law argue] hither and thither, going round and round the subject dealt with, 
without the latter taking shape as something living and developing in a many-sided 
way". This was communicated in his letter to his father in 1837 (see MECW 1, 11-19).
Further on, in this letter, there are some indications that Marx's quarrel was mainly with 
the abstractness with which law was discussed. For him, law exemplified "the concrete 
expression of living world of ideas" and, therefore, must be studied in its historical 
development, whereas the prevailing approach was what he was pleased to call "the
 ^For this part of our review, Marx and Engels on Law , 1979, by Cain and Hunt provides a valuable 
resource. As Tushnet (1980) duly observed, these authors "have expended enormous effort in 
discovering and collecting the fugitive writings of Marx and Engels that deal with law".
 ^ See "Letter from Heinrich Marx to Karl Marx". 28.12.1836, MECW 1,665.
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metaphysics of law, i.e., basic principles, reflections, definitions of concepts divorced 
from all actual law ...".
The direction of Marx's conception of the relationship between law and society is
clearly foreshadowed by these comments. At the very least, law, in his view, would not
be "a brooding omnipotence in the sky". Soon we find an explicit statement on this in 
his classic formulation:
My investigation led me to the result that legal relations as well as forms 
of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called 
general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in 
the material conditions of life, the sum total of which ... combines under 
the name 'civil society’ [whose] anatomy is to be sought in political 
economy. ... The general result at which I arrived ... can be briefly
formulated as follows: In the social production of their life, men enter
into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their 
will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of 
development of their material productive forces. ... The sum total of 
these relations ... constitute^] the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to 
which correspond definite forms of social consciousness (Marx, 1859, 
1977: 503).
This formulation incorporates some fundamental issues that have preoccupied many a 
writer in contemporary general sociology and, more especially, in the sociology of law, 
in particular. For writers in general sociology, this statement, together with the one 
dealing with the conflict between "the material productive forces" and the "relations of 
production" (the latter, not quoted here), "gives a schematic outline of the structure of 
society and the mechanisms of social change" (Hindess, 1987: 12f).
For writers in the sociology of law, three issues stand out. First, the statement 
forcefully attributes materiality to the origin of law or legal relations. Second, the 
building analogy of base/superstructure which it introduces, in effect separates law and 
economy into different spheres of life. And third, it seems to impose a specific kind of 
relationship upon law and economy, with the former deriving its existence from the 
latter.
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Out of these three issues, the third one which suggests that Marx conceives law 
(superstructure) as an expression or reflection of its economic substratum (base) has 
attracted the most attention. In essence, whether it amounts to determinism, that is, by 
importing a unidirectional causality in which law is a necessary consequence of the 
economic structure, has remained the focus of a long-standing controversy with(in) the 
marxist theory of law. However, in the terms that Marx has employed here, it can be 
argued that law is intended "to be explained and understood as a product of changes in 
the economic base" (Cain and Hunt, 1979: 49). Yet, this law-society relation can be 
interpreted either in instrumentalist, functionalist or class politics marxist terms (see 
Brereton, 1989: 300-309 for a good relevant summary).
In Capital, Vol. 1, the nature of the relationship between law and society is presented
as arising in the context of commodity exchange; and this is brought out much clearly
in Pashukanis' (1978: 63) interpretation:
Marx reveals that the fundamental condition of existence of the legal 
form is rooted in the very economic organisation of society. In other 
words, the existence of the legal form is contingent upon the integration 
of the different products of labour according to the principle of 
economic exchange. In so doing, he exposes the deep interconnection 
between the legal form and the commodity form.
In the exchange-context, commodity-owners are said to enter into "juridical relations" 
(i.e mutual recognition in each other of the rights of private proprietors). Though a 
relation between two wills, it "is but the reflex of the real economic relation between 
the two" which determines "the subject-matter comprised in each such juridical act". 
Again, the social-product nature of law is suggested.
Marx, in Volume III of this work, hints at the process in which this social-product 
nature develops. He says:
It is ... clear that here as always it is in the interest of the ruling section 
of society to sanction the existing order as law and to legally establish 
its limits given through usage and tradition. Apart from all else, this, by 
the way, comes about of itself as soon as the constant reproduction of 
the basis of the existing order and its fundamental relations assumes a 
regulated and orderly form in the course of time. ... [A mode of
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production] entrenches itself as custom and tradition and is finally 
sanctioned as an explicit law (Marx, 1867, 1986: 793).
This process is re-echoed by Engels when he says that
at a certain, very primitive stage of the development of society, the need 
arises to bring under a common rule the daily recurring acts of 
production, distribution and exchange of products, to see to it that the 
individual subordinates himself to the common conditions of production 
and exchange. This rule, which at first is custom, soon becomes law... 
With further social development, law develops into a more or less 
comprehensive legal system (quoted in Cain and Hunt, 1979: 55).
Apart from reiterating that law is a product of evolving economic forces, Marx has 
introduced a class dimension by presenting law as a tool used by the ruling class to 
perpetuate their domination over the society. Informed by this perspective, Karl Marx 
puts the proposition to the bourgeoisie of his day that: "your jurisprudence is but the 
will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction 
are determined by the economic conditions of existence of your class"; or, as in the 
German Ideology, (1970: 106), that: "the expression of this will, which is determined 
by their common interests, is law".
Marx finds concrete illustrations for his theoretical formulation in the British Statutes 
of Labourers of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries and the Factory legislation of 
the nineteenth century. Marx argues that the Statutes of Labourers - especially 
vagrancy laws, the first being the 23 Edward III, 1349 - arose from the economic 
conditions created by
the great plague that decimated the people, so that, as a Tory writer says, 
"The difficulty of getting men to work on reasonable terms (i.e., at a 
price that left their employers a reasonable quantity of surplus-labour) 
grew to such a height as to be quite intolerable" (Marx, 1867, 1986: 
258).
A major consequence of these conditions is stated rather graphically by Dobb (1963: 
33):
The result of this increased pressure was not only to exhaust the goose 
that laid golden eggs for the castle, but to provoke, from sheer 
desperation, a movement of illegal emigration from the manors: a
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desertion en masse on the part of the producers, which was destined to 
drain the system of its essential life-blood and to provoke the series of 
crises in which feudal economy was to find itself engulfed in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
These conditions, engendered by the Black Death (as the plague was called), 
empowered the surviving but scarce labour to bargain for higher returns to the 
"detriment" of their employers' surplus-value margins: "the poor demanded such high 
wages as to threaten industry and wealth". The legislative response was predictable: "In 
an attempt to salvage the system of feudal formation from collapsing, various laws 
were promulgated whose contents reflected the prevailing social relations" (Omaji, 
1984: 133). Chambliss' analysis of the Law of Vagrancy (1964) provides one specific 
sociological treatment of these laws.
Turning to the Factory legislation - the history, details and results of which Marx is 
inclined to give "so large a space" - Marx is equally firm in locating its source in the 
developments on the economic front. The context was "the limits of the working-day" 
which had become a conflicting issue as the economy moved into the capitalist 
production stage.
"Capital", says Marx, "is dead labour that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living 
labour, and lives more, the more labour it sucks" (Marx, 1986: 224). Having bought the 
labour-power, capital insists on getting "the greatest possible benefit out of the use- 
value of [its] commodity". To the capitalist (i.e. "capital personified and endowed with 
consciousness and a will") this requires that the labourer remain at his disposal all day 
long - for 24 hours!
Against this tendency, the voice of the labourer rises. Labour argues that the quest of 
the capitalist would amount to "spoliation" rather than "use" of labour-power. Hence 
Labour's disposition:
I will, like a sensible saving owner, husband my sole wealth, labour- 
power, and abstain from all foolish waste of it. I will each day spend, set 
in motion, put into action only as much of it as is compatible with its
70
normal duration, and healthy development. By an unlimited extension of 
the working-day, you may in one day use up a quantity of labour-power 
than I can restore in three (Ibid: 224-225).
In these circumstances, the stage is set for a show-down. In Marx’s words,
There is here, therefore, an antimony, right against right, both equally 
bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force 
decides. Hence is it that in the history of capitalist production, the 
determination of what is a working-day, presents itself as the result of a 
struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of 
capitalists, and collective labour, i.e., the working-class (Ibid: 225).
In the desire to "curb the passion of capital for a limitless draining of labour-power" or, 
in a sense, its blind eagerness towards system-suicide, the State intervened with 
factory laws (between 1833 and 1864) to forcibly limit the working-day. Thus Marx 
conceives the English Factory legislation as "the negative expression of the greed for 
surplus-labour"^. Stating this position in a more sweeping generalisation, Marx 
maintains that
Factory legislation, that first conscious and methodical reaction of 
society against the spontaneously developed form of the process of 
production, is, as we have seen, just as much the necessary product of 
modem industry as cotton yam, self-actors, and the electric telegraph 
(Marx, op.cit: 451).
He is, however, careful to locate each of the Factory Acts (i.e. of 1833; 1844; 1850 and 
1860) within its immediate societal conjunctures (see Marx, op.cit: 264 - 286).
When read closely, the presentation of these concrete illustrations by Marx appears to 
lack the sharpness of his original formulations, regarding the base/superstructure 
relationship between law and society and the dominant-class character of legislation. 
For instance, the assertion that factory legislation is a reaction of society against a 
process of production appears to be a far cry from the seeming definiteness with which 
he had formulated the relationship between ideological forms (e.g. law) and their 
economic base.
9 The expression is "negative" when compared with the Reglement Organique of the Danubian provinces 
- the code of corvee, proclaimed in 1831 by the Russian General Kisseleff - which approvingly legalised 
"the hunting after [more] days of corvee" (more surplus-labour) by the Boyard.
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Further, Marx expresses the view that the Factory Act of 1850 was "a compromise 
between masters and men” which was given the force of law by "the seal of 
Parliament". On a different occasion, he portrays the Factory legislation, generally, as a 
victory of the working class: "it was the first time that in broad daylight the political 
economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class" 
(quoted in Cain and Hunt, op.cit: xi).
As would be expected, this perceived "shift" (dual orientation?) has led to much 
controversy over Marx's actual position. However the purpose here is not to address 
this controversy which arises both from the original formulation^ and the subsequent 
shift. Suffice it that it remains evident from the foregoing review that, for Marx, law 
has organic links with society and, generally, that law is a product of the interests of the 
ruling class.
3.3.2 Pluralist perspective and the conflict argument
Unlike the views in marxist perspective, the pluralist perspective emphasises "interest 
group proliferation, diversity, differentiation and overlapping", thus challenging the 
primacy and exclusiveness of class interests in policy determination (Matthews, 1983: 
124). With each group capable of successfully exerting its power at certain times and 
on certain issues, the perspective highlights "the numerous foci of decision-making and 
the countervailing forces * * which hinder a great concentration of power in any single 
location" (Head, 1983: 8).
Consequently the proponents of this perspective not only advance a plurality of 
variables in explaining social phenomena, they also, like the American legal realists, 
have "a horror of any view which [propounds] a single major causal factor" (Hunt,
I® For instance, Hindess (1987: 14) points out that "Marx does not clearly define the connections 
between the three parts of society which he refers to with the words 'on which arises’ and 'to which 
corresponds"’.
11 For a discussion of "countervailing forces", see Galbraith's American Capitalism: the Concept of 
Countervailing Power, 1952; chs. 9 and 10.
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1978: 43). For instance, rather than explaining state policy in terms of a single causal or
class priority, they would represent it as
the outcome of the balance of economic forces in the group struggle; the 
state passively registers the views of the dominant group (or coalition of 
interests) on particular issues. The state is thus available as an 
instrument for carrying out the policies of the majority of voters or a 
majority coalition of interests; or it simply reflects the compromises 
arising from the conflict of group forces in the economy and society 
(Head, 1983b).
Even where it is conceded that the state has some independence on the basis of its 
functions of pursuing general or national interest against the inevitably narrow and 
selfish interests of organised groups, and defending the basic institutions and values of 
the system, the importance of the mediation of electoral politics in the state-society 
relations is still underlined. It should be noted in passing that some scholars, e.g. 
Brereton (1989: 296), characterise this conceptualisation of the state as one of the 
"caricatures of pluralism" and "an unfair representation".
With regard to law, this perspective locates its source in "an interplay of a variety of 
interests with different groups being successful at different times or else with 
compromise occurring between various interest groups" (Tomasic, 1980: 28). 
Apparently, the implied plurality derives from the view that the political system in 
which the success or failure of these groups is decided "is open to a wide range of 
interests that no single group's interest prevails across a spectrum of significant issues, 
and that the system is therefore democratic and responsive to shifts in public opinion" 
(Head (1983b: 26).
3.3.2(a) Hopkins' contribution
Hopkins' CRIME LAW & BUSINESS: The Sociological Sources of Australian 
Monopoly Law (1978b) provides a concrete illustration of this perspective on law and 
society. "Intended as a sociological study” Hopkins orients this work to a
1 Unless otherwise indicated, this and other quotations in this section are taken from Hopkins' 1978b 
work.
73
sociological tradition on law and society - that which deals with the value-consensus 
versus interest-conflict debate on the sources of law.
After some review of this debate, Hopkins adopts a theoretical proposition (that is, 
"most legislation can be seen at the time of enactment to represent certain group 
interests") which "assumes neither conflict nor consensus". The chosen units of 
analysis are the "three landmark antitrust Acts of Parliament since Federation - the 
Australian Industries Preservation Act of 1906, the Trade Practices Act of 1965 and the 
Trade Practices Act of 1974". Of these units, the central issue considered is the role of 
interests and values in the creation of these laws.
On the passage of the Act of 1906, Hopkins considers "response of a democratic 
parliament to the public concern about the growth of monopoly in Australia" as an 
inadequate explanation. He contends that attention must be paid to the "political 
groupings" and the prevailing/dominant interests in the Parliament at the time. The 
groupings include the free traders, the protectionists and the Labor Party, while the 
dominant interest was the protection of local industries. Prompted by McKay's (then 
Australia's largest manufacturer of harvesters) representations which highlighted the 
threat from overseas industry (in particular, the American International Harvester trust), 
the protectionists and the Labor Party decided to act to protect native industry in 
Australia.
In formulating the law to give effect to this decision, the American Sherman Act 1890 
was taken as the model. Although the Australian law "was never itself intended to 
promote competition", the American Act upon which it was modelled "gave expression 
to a philosophy of competition". More curiously, some sections of the former (e.g. 
section 10 of the 1905 Bill) indicate some evidence of direct copying from the latter. 
An explanation for this apparent "legal transplant" (to use Watson's phraseology) would 
have made this aspect of Hopkins’ work quite akin to a major concern of my study; but 
it is not pursued by him.
For my immediate purpose, though, the conclusions he draws from the analysis of the 
advent of this law are significant. Apart from being "a result of political compromise" 
between Business (manufacturing) and Labour interests, the Act was "an expression of 
[the] dominant protectionist philosophy rather than of any serious concern to strike at 
the anti-competitive practices of rings and trusts in Australia". Was "protectionism" a 
dominant philosophy because it was "a value shared by large sections of the electorate 
as well as by a majority of members of Parliament"? Maybe. Nonetheless, Hopkins 
concludes "the dominance of this value is a vital explanatory factor" (see pp. 18-29).
When the 1965 Act was initiated and passed, different explanatory factors had 
emerged. From the late 1950s, official evidence - generated through the Tariff Board 
investigations, and the judicial and Royal Commission inquiries - had shown the 
existence of price fixing and other restrictive trade practices, indicating a non­
competitive situation. Garfield Barwick, who was appointed Attorney-General in 1958 
and upon whom it devolved to introduce government legislative proposals into the 
Parliament, had "shown himself an enthusiastic and even doctrinaire believer in the 
virtue of maximum competition in a private enterprise system". Further, inflation 
(believed to result at least in part from a lack of competition) had become "perhaps the 
greatest challenge to management in Australia".
It is in the context of these forces that the Trade Practices Act 1965 was proposed by 
the Government, opposed (generally, speaking) by business, supported by "farmers", 
labour organisations, local government associations and the press, modified by 
Government, and passed by the Parliament. From Hopkins' presentation, it can be 
observed that this context was more complex than the one in which the 1906 Act 
emerged.
It is, however, arguable that, as a product of a political process, the 1965 Act is similar 
in some formal sense to that of 1906. As with the earlier Act, the 1965 Act "did
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represent a compromise", although this time around between "the competing values 
espoused by the Government" and not between competing interests (p. 68). Similarly, 
the 1965 Act was contingent on an identifiable "explanatory factor" - different from 
that of 1906 Act - namely, the dominant value of competition.
The 1974 Act, which Hopkins also discusses, is no less a product of competing forces 
of some sort, balanced or reconciled in a political process. For although "the new 
[Labor] Government felt no need to make concessions to the needs and interests of 
business and was free to adopt an uncompromising philosophy of consumer protection" 
(p. 87), it soon discovered that there was no perfect correspondence between the 
interests of labour (i.e its traditional constituency) and those of consumers which it now 
decided to champion in order "to expand its electoral base" (p. 93).
Obviously "consumer-protection had become a dominant social value" and the 
Government must have perceived it as such before seizing on it "as a new vantage 
point". There should be no surprise, therefore, that, in addition to strengthening the 
restrictive trade practices provisions of the previous Acts (i.e. those of 1965 and 1971), 
the Government incorporated in the new legislation "a number of quite new explicitly 
consumer protection provisions" (p. 88).
To do this, however, the Government needed to reconcile the labour-related and 
electoral forces, among which a potential conflict was seen to exist. In what appears to 
be a political feat, the Government reduced the agents of these forces (i.e workers and 
voters) to a new category, i.e. the consumers; and directed its policies of health, 
education and welfare to them in their new form. Thus, apart from becoming a 
dominant value, consumer-protection provided for the Government a concept by which 
to unite labour interests and an electorally significant interest. In the 1974 Act, both 
forces found expression.
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In drawing some comparative conclusions on the three landmark Acts, Hopkins notes 
specifically that "the 1906 and 1974 enactments ... were the product of the dominant 
concerns of the day - producer-protection in the first case and consumer-protection in 
the second". These "concerns" had electoral anchors. The argument that the concern 
upon which the 1965 Act was founded had no "electoral considerations" may explain 
its exclusion from this conclusion by Hopkins. However, it is significant that the Act 
was seen as a product - even if a "freely floating" one - of "autonomously operating 
Liberal Party values" (p. 110).
On the whole, then, Hopkins' work shows clearly that the antitrust laws of Australia
have firm links with the social conditions of their times. The complex nature of these
links is well documented in the work, as can be observed in Hopkins'
concentration not only on the way particular interests were affected by 
legislative proposals but also on how the various parties sought to justify 
the interests by reference to apparently altruistic and more universalistic 
values shared by legislators and the electorate. The author captures 
nicely the ebb and flow of consumerist interest and intra-capitalist and 
worker-consumer conflicts (Levi, 1984).
More relevantly (for this section of the review), these conditions are articulated in 
pluralistic terms. If in doubt, there is further evidence in Hopkins' (1980) critical 
commentary on Elites in Australia (1979) by Higley and others. There, he refers to this 
same work to exemplify "the point... that particular elites are successful only on certain 
occasions, and under certain circumstances". In the Trade Practices legislation of 1971 
(under a Liberal-National Party coalition Government) and 1974 (under a Labor 
Government), "representations made by union leaders were heeded"; those of business 
leaders were not. "The important question, then," says Hopkins, "is under what 
circumstances are the particular elites successful in their efforts to influence 
governments". Patently, this is a pluralistic formulation, the use of the concept of 
"elites" notwithstanding.
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Hopkin's study with Parnell, "Why Coal Mine Safety Regulations in Australia are not 
Enforced" (1984) is yet another work of his that bears the imprint of pluralism. He here 
argues that "the first coal mines regulation Act in N.S.W. was passed in 1862 in 
response to union pressure": and that the subsequent revisions were "in part a response 
to perceived public pressure" (emphases, mine). As can be seen, the pressures for the 
creation of, and changes in, this law did not emanate from a single location.
The strength of Hopkins' pluralistic articulation of the social conditions under which 
the antitrust laws emerged in Australia is not at issue here. The point is that his main 
work (i.e. the monopoly law work) which has been reviewed here clearly illustrates a 
pluralist perspective in which law is viewed as a product of the interplay of a variety of 
social interests. It nevertheless can be observed, in the words of Levi (1984), that "quite 
apart from the clarity of its writing, this book is a marked improvement over reified ex 
post facto functionalist 'explanations' (whether consensus or Marxisant) and over 
theories that depict legislation as the result of naked power struggles unmediated by 
some appeals to some broader justificatory ideology".
3.3.2(b) Kahn-Freund's contribution
Another source of illustration for the pluralist perspective and, more generally, the 
social product model of law and society is the contribution of Kahn-Freund, a scholar 
of towering stature in legal circles^. Kahn-Freund employs a "pluralist perspective" in 
most of his analyses of law. This can be detected not only in his definition of law 
(especially, labour law) and its function, but also in his account of the sources of law 
and legal development in general.
With respect to industrial relations, for instance, he maintains that the purpose of labour 
legislation is to regulate and/or mitigate the dependency of the employee. This view is
^  He is referred to as "one of the pillars of English legal and academic life"; "a polymathic scholar, the 
most distinguished legal academic in [Britain] in this century"; a founder of the academic study of 
Industrial Law and "one of Britain's most distinguished comparatists of the post-war era"; etc. (Fridman, 
1979; Griffith, 1979; Butler, 1987).
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elaborated in his Labour and the Law (1977) where he states that "labour law is chiefly 
concerned with this elementary phenomenon of social power". In a more profound 
postulation, he says:
The main object of labour law has always been, and I venture to say will 
always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of 
bargaining power which is inherent and must be inherent in the 
employment relationship. Most of what we call protective legislation; ... 
and indeed most labour legislation altogether must be seen in this 
context. It is an attempt to infuse law into a relation of command and 
subordination (p.6).
In Labour Relations: Heritage and Adjustment (1979) he illustrates how the character 
of this law ("a particular kind of legal intervention") in Britain and North America is 
largely determined by the traditions of trade union "direct democracy" and "job 
control".
Kahn-Freund's idea of law as "a technique for the regulation [or balancing] of social 
power" is pluralistic in orientation. In industrial relations, and in other spheres of social 
life where legislation is required, he presents the State as a neutral instrument: the State 
is above the conflict of the sectional interest groups; so, for example, industrial conflict 
is a distributional conflict between management and labour, not a class conflict 
between capital and labour. In such situations, the intervention of the State occurs 
mainly to guarantee "order, peace and efficiency" (see Lewis, 1983). However, this 
view tends to overlook other ideological, legitimating and coercive functions of law 
which can, and do, determine which law is put in place (whether home grown or 
borrowed) and the character which this law ultimately assumes.
With respect to Kahn-Freund's general position on the relationship between law and 
society, his assertions in his "On the Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law" (1974) 
seem to set the framework. In this work, his concern is with "comparative law as a tool 
for law reform", especially in relation to "the problem of transplantation". He translates 
this concern into two questions, namely: "what are the uses and what are the misuses of 
foreign models in the process of law making?"; and "what conditions must be fulfilled 
in order to make it desirable or even to make it possible for those who prepare new
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legislation to avail themselves of rules and institutions developed in foreign 
countries?". As observed earlier, it is in his answers to these questions that one finds 
the core of his social product approach. The answers warrant a close scrutiny.
Drawing upon Montesquieu's opinion that "only in most exceptional cases [could] 
institutions of one country serve those of another at a ll"^, Kahn-Freund develops the 
argument that law is linked "so closely to its environment that it could hardly ever 
change its habitat" (or be transplanted). He contends that even though most of the 
environmental factors identified by Montesquieu (geography, economy, culture, etc), 
which make law a society-specific phenomenon, have decreased in importance over the 
years, the political factor has gained strength in linking law and society.
Put differently, while "the process of economic, social, cultural assimilation or
integration" which implies the flattening out of diversity may have reduced the
"society-specificity" of law, the concomitant differentiation of the political base of law
does not allow for the transplantability of law. The "flattening out of diversity" is
taking place and can potentially make transplantation easier, he says, but this is not
happening on a universal scale. Thus he constructs a potential defence for
Montesquieu's "theory of environmental obstacles to legal transplantation":
Yes, we can hear [Montesquieu] say, there may be something in your 
point [of universal flattening of diversity] if you look at Europe - 
Western or Eastern, capitalist or communist - at North America or 
Australia, at Japan or parts of Latin America. But have you forgotten 
India, have you forgotten China and South East Asia, or Africa or the 
Islamic Middle East? Your economic and social and cultural integration, 
... covers only a minority of the inhabitants of this globe, and not the 
subsistence peasants, say in India or Pakistan, and in large parts of 
Africa.
This implies that even if the "flattening out" in, say, the West allows legal 
transplantation among its countries, it does not allow transplantation from there to other 
regions which remain different. For example, it will be difficult, or perhaps impossible, 
to transplant law from Australia (in the West) to Nigeria (in Africa).
14 See The Spirit of Laws Book 1. Ch. 3
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In his own illustration Kahn-Freund points to "the gulf between the communist and the 
non-communist world, and that between dictatorships and democracies in the capitalist 
world". He also points to the difference between presidential and parliamentary types 
of democracies which "impinges on the distribution between the judicial and 
administrative and policy-making powers and ... on the minutest details of legislation 
affecting economic and social policy, especially industrial relations". Lastly, he refers 
to the varying degrees of influence which organised interests within a country's power 
structure have over law making as another aspect of the difficulty put in the way of 
legal transplantation by political differentiation.
With specific reference to three branches of law (family, procedural and industrial 
relations), Kahn-Freund seeks to demonstrate that to the extent that laws express and/or 
allocate political power, they remain tied to the history and social structure which 
characterise their countries; hence they are not transplantable. Even though he 
concedes, not without expressing surprise, that the inter-country assimilation of ideas 
and institutions of family law through transplantation has been so intensive and 
r a p i d h e  seems to present this phenomenon as an aberration. The example of Ireland 
which rejected the marriage/divorce law of England (similar, socially and economically 
as the two countries may be) proves very handy for his position that, ultimately, 
different structures of political power keep law localised. He says, "how can the Irish 
rejection of divorce ... be explained except in terms of the political power of the 
Catholic hierarchy?"
With industrial relations law, Kahn-Freund maintains that the obstacles to 
transplantation are formidable. This is precisely because, " it is hard to think of any 
branch of law where decisions in individual cases involve a higher degree of political 
responsibility". For, "in each country the relations between management and labour are
^  He showed how the fundamental rules and details of divorce law "have been transplanted from 
Australia and New Zealand to England" (see the British Divorce Reform Act, 1969). Yet, nothing, in his 
view "can be closer to the moral and religious convictions, the habits and the mores and also the social 
structure of a community than the subject which this law covers".
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organised under the influence of strong political traditions, traditions connected with 
the roles played by organisations on both sides as political pressure groups promoting 
legislation He adds that even the drafters of international standards know too well 
that "collective bargaining institutions and rules are untransplantable".
He submits, then, that "the transformation of the power structure ... [has become] at 
certain times one of the decisive factors in the development of the law" (see Kahn- 
Freund, 1977: lOff). And, logically, he advises that the use of comparative law 
"requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also of its social and above all its 
political context. The use of comparative law for practical purposes becomes an 
abuse... if it is informed [only] by a legalistic spirit which ignores this context of the 
law".
From a survey of most of his works, both before and after 1974, it can be observed
clearly that whatever the subject (or branch of law) of his discourse may be, societal
factors loom large in his account of the emergence, the ontological status of law and the
direction that changes in law take. "Throughout", says Fridman (1979: 413),
... whether the subject under discussion is labour law, matrimonial or 
matrimonial property law, comparative law, or something else, Kahn- 
Freund places particular emphasis upon the social aspects if the law 
itself is to be understood, and especially if the law is to be changed and 
improved.
For instance, his discussion of the development of the Matrimonial Property Law in 
England (1955) is littered with references to the influence of social, economic and 
political factors. "It is difficult", he says, "to imagine any system of law which, in its 
regulation of the impact of marriage on property, could completely ignore ... social 
facts ...". He adopts a similar approach in his contextual discussion of the 'Conflict of 
laws'. As Karsten (1978) has rightly observed, Kahn-Freund demonstrates "how 
differing social, economic, geographical and political conditions ('spheres of life’) in 
different countries have had their impact on the development of conflicts rules in 
different systems". In particular Kahn-Freund uses the great migration of the 19th
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century to explain why, for instance, Italy adopted the "nationality principle" while the 
United Kingdom adopted the "domicile principle"; and why neither of these principles 
took root in the United States. Instead, the U.S chose the lex loci celebrationis rather 
than the lex domiciles to govern capacity to marry (see Kahn-Freund, 1976)*6.
What is more, he seems to be prone to reading his own social product approach into 
other people's works. For example, in his edition of Karl Renner's (1949) The 
Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions, he attributes to the author the 
stance of challenging jurists to approach "the science of legislation ... not only as a 
science explaining a technique, but as an exploration of the political and economic 
forces that go into the making laws and the process by which they translate themselves 
into fixed norms" (p. 302). This challenge does not appear to me to be apparent in 
Renner's work.
In addition, Kahn-Freund translates his social product approach into a pedagogical 
argument when he says:
the teaching of the law is most likely to fulfil an educational function if 
those who teach it and those who learn it co-operate with the 
representatives of the other social sciences. Rubbing shoulders with 
economists and sociologists, political scientists and social
anthropologists is a healthy exercise for a lawyer. It helps to immunise 
him against the illusion of the mirage which Mr. Justice Holmes 
castigated as "a brooding omnipotence in the sky", of law as a self- 
contained unit which develops itself out of itself. It brings home to the 
lawyer that he cannot understand his subject without a constant and 
painstaking effort to see the social forces and changes that promote or 
stunt the growth of the law (Kahn-Freund, 1966).
How Kahn-Freund, being a lawyer in a traditional sense, acquired his orientation will 
not be discussed here. It is, however, pertinent to note that his exposure to subjects 
other than law and to Professor Hugo Sinzheimer^ in his student days at the
16 in an earlier work, Kahn-Freund had shown, through a historical survey, how "nationalism" 
influenced the development of private international law (i.e conflicts of laws) in England, (see Kahn- 
Freund, 1960).
17 Partington (1978: x) observed, in a footnote, that Kahn-Freund did pay tribute to the intellectual 
impact that Sinzheimer had on him and other German law students of his time. We may add here that 
Gurvitch (1947: 50f) had identified Sinzheimer as one of the representatives of the German sociology of
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Universities of Frankfun, Heidelberg and Leipzig "clearly inculcated in him a 
willingness and an ability to look at law from the sociological point of view", thus 
putting him "in a rather different class of legal academic from many of his English 
contemporaries" (Fridman, 1979: 412).
The result is that, although a lawyer by training, Kahn-Freund, finds social sciences are 
an asset, in contrast to Watson to whom they are a liability. Kahn-Freund (1966) 
maintains: "I do not believe that any student of law can understand his subject nor do I 
believe that legal education deserves its name unless law is taught in the frame of a 
Universitas literarum or scientiarum, that is in conjunction with other disciplines". 
Perhaps, as a consequence of this "disbelief, he remained "in the forefront of those 
who have sought to make sociological studies relevant to law "^ until his death in 1979 
(Fridman, 1979: 413).
3.3.3 Power-elite perspective and the conflict argument
In contradistinction to the pluralist argument of numerous foci of power or decision­
making, power elite perspective advances the view of concentration of power in single 
locations. When Vilfred Pareto introduced the concept of "elite" at the turn of this 
century, it was in terms of "those who score highest on scales measuring any social 
values or commodity ('utility'), such as power, riches, knowledge" (Pareto, 1901, 1968: 
8). These individuals could be found in as diverse callings as in government, business, 
religion, and academia - some as conservators, others as innovators - with little to unite 
them on a course of action.
Later in the century this concept was operationalised by Mills (1956) in a way that 
tilted understanding from diversity and "individualism" to concentration of power. One
law who "were occupied mainly with sociological description of the actual state of law and the conflicts 
surging within its bosom ...".
^  While this effort is a significant "improvement" over the exegetical tradition in the study of law, it 
should be borne in mind that it remains, essentially, an effort at "broadening the study of law from 
within" [Twining’s "Some Jobs for Jurisprudence" (1974), quoted in Stewart, 1981: 115]. Nonetheless, it 
seems more profound than what Stone called "the lawyer's extraversion" in his The Province and 
Function of Law (1946), quoted in Stewart, 1981: 115.
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of the subjects upon which he focuses is the failure of the New Deal which, allegedly, 
was an attempt by the American Government "to check the power of private capitalism 
by creating competing centres of power" (Encels, 1961:5). Contrary to intention, Mills 
argues, "the corporate rich came to control and use for their own purposes the New 
Deal institutions whose creation they had so bitterly denounced" (Mills, op. cit: 272f).
The idea of concentration emerges clearly in the process through which the rich are 
said to assume dominance. In Encels' view, the corporate rich form a "power elite [by] 
the interlocking of a greatly enlarged state bureaucracy and the controllers of the big 
industrial corporations". This analysis of the process is similar to Mills' 
conceptualisation, although the implied scope of the membership is more restricted.
For Mills (1956: 278), the power elite is "a coalition of generals in the roles of 
corporation executives, of politicians masquerading as admirals, of corporation 
executives acting like politicians, ... of vice-admirals who are also the assistants to a 
cabinet officer, who is himself a member of the managerial elite". The strength of the 
military component of this group is further reflected by Mills' characterisation of 
American society as a system of military capitalism dominated by a "military 
metaphysics". As Encel (1961: 8) notes, it was "found in 1960 that the leading one 
hundred defence contractors employed no fewer than 726 former senior officers of the 
armed services".
A postulate that has become central to the power elite perspective is that there is "a 
dominant group in society achieving its political (and other) ends against the interests 
of other groups in society" (Tomasic, 1980: 28). With regard to law-making, the 
perspective holds that laws emerge from the demands of the interests of the powerful 
rather than the interests of the less powerful. This perspective is vividly illustrated by
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the works of Richard Quinney, especially those written before his "conversion" to
marxism^.
3.3.3(a) Quinney's contribution
To characterise pre-marxist Quinney as power-elitist in perspective, as suggested here, 
is to disagree with the established viewpoint; hence the need to justify my own view 
from the onset. Akers and Hawkins (1975:47) have argued that Quinney's formulation 
in The Social Reality of Crime: A Sociology of Criminal Law (1970) - one of the works 
which I will use to demonstrate his contribution to the power-elite perspective - "is 
essentially a 'pluralistic' model". How they arrived at this conclusion is not shown but 
this is sufficient to raise questions with my view.
My own characterisation benefits from Quinney's statements in the same work referred 
to by Akers and Hawkins. In that work, Quinney says: "Rather than accept the 
pluralistic conception of the political process, which assumes that all groups make 
themselves heard in policy decision-making, I am relying upon a conception that 
assumes an unequal distribution of power in formulating and administering public 
policy" (p.12). With specific reference to law, he similarly, but more unequivocally, 
states:
My theoretical perspective on criminal law departs from the general 
tradition of the interest theory of sociological jurisprudence in a number 
of ways... law is a result of the operation of interests ... [It] is made by 
men, representing special interests, who have the power to translate their 
interests into public policy. Unlike the pluralistic conception of politics, 
law does not represent a compromise of the diverse interests in society, 
but supports some interests at the expense of others (p.35) (emphasis, 
mine).
Such an affirmation would seem to move him unequivocally out of the pluralist 
tradition - a point to which his pre-1974 works bear strong witness.
19 Evidence of Quinney's post-conversion "marxian model of class domination" approach can be found 
in his Critique of Legal Order: Crime Control in Capitalist Society, 1974; Criminal Justice in America: 
A Critical Understanding, 1974; Class, State and Crime, 1977; and Marxism and Law, 1982 (co-edited 
with Piers Bieme).
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In Crime and Justice in Society (1969), Quinney attempts "a reformulation of 
sociological jurisprudence" by proposing "a sociological theory of interests". This 
theory (1) recognises "the unequal distribution of power and the conflict" within the 
"interest structure of society"; and (2) relates the formulation and administration of law 
"in politically organised society" to this conflict (p. v).
Guided by, or perhaps in demonstration of, this theory, Quinney provides a selection of 
other scholars' research on various aspects of criminal law. The studies of the 
formulation of criminal law are of immediate relevance here. They include Haskins’ "A 
Rule to Walk By"; Chambliss' "A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy"; 
Sinclair's "The Law of Prohibition"; Sutherland's "The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath 
Laws"; and Becker's "The Marihuana Tax Act" (see pp. 33 - 105).
In each of these studies, Quinney finds evidence to warrant such assertions as: "behind 
the formulation of all laws is an enterprising group that stands to benefit in some way 
from a particular law"; and "law is formulated and administered by the segments of 
society that are able to incorporate their interests into the creation and interpretation of 
public policy" - usually, the powerful interest groups (see pp. 5, 8 and 29, respectively). 
For instance, powerful interest groups - landowners and merchants - brought about the 
formulations and changes in the vagrancy statutes. For the law of prohibition (the 
Volstead Act), it was the "dry interest groups" - the "rural Protestant mind". Behind the 
sexual psychopath laws, stood "the occupational interests of psychiatrists". And so on. 
Quinney's view is that in each of these laws, the interests embodied are those of single 
power elites.
Using essentially the same materials, Quinney restates this power-elitist position in The 
Social Reality of Crime (1970). There he shows that "... criminal laws mark the victory 
of some groups over others. The notion of a compromise of conflicting interests is a 
myth perpetuated by a pluralistic model of politics" (p. 43). It is not clear how the 
analyses of some laws which he also introduces - especially, the "criminal laws in
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colonies and territories", "Antitrust Laws", and "Pure Food and Drug Laws" - help to 
advance this position.
In relation to Antitrust Laws, for instance, the assertion that "in broad perspective, the 
interest to be protected in the law was the basic economic order of the nation" (p. 75) or 
that "antitrust legislation was formulated and administered by and for the interests of 
capitalist economics" (p. 77) appears too broad to distinguish his position from other 
conflict perspectives. Equally ambiguous is the claim that "the effort to control foods 
and drugs through criminal law is a demonstration of how the public interest may 
eventually be served in spite of the private interests of individual members of society" 
(p. 77).
How well Quinney accomplishes his objective of showing that "the interests 
represented in each [of the laws] are those of the social segments that have had the 
power to translate their values into social policy" (p. 50), is not my central concern 
here. What he presents as a single power-elite view could well be a pluralist 
perspective in which different groups are seen to prevail on different issues. It should, 
however, be beyond dispute, from the foregoing review, that his works locate the 
source of law in the interests of the powerful. These works exemplify the power-elite 
variant of the conflict argument within the social product model of law and society.
3.4 Implications of the model this study
There is agreement between the two versions of the social product model that law is 
contingent upon, or organically linked to, society. Both posit that this link is objective 
and determinative of the nature of law. While the consensus argument focuses on the 
values of the "collective conscience" of the society as the base from which law 
emanates, the conflict argument emphasizes that what gives rise to law is the victory of
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the "interests" of the dominant class^ in the society. In both arguments, the 
rootedeness of law in its society is underscored.
This convergence should not come as a surprise. In a classificatory analysis of 
sociological perspectives, Rich (1978) has put both the consensus (structural- 
functionalism) and conflict arguments in one category, namely, the "social facts 
paradigm". There the two are shown to be concerned, mainly, with social structures and 
institutions, i.e, objective frameworks of social existence. Also, in another context, they 
have been presented as "two varieties of structuralism", since both are taken to present 
institutional orders as products of the organisation and structure of society (see Cuff 
and Payne, 1979: 22).
The light which the two arguments throw on explaining differences and similarities 
among laws of two or more countries is particularly crucial. The implication of the 
consensus argument is that differences and similarities between laws of more than one 
country are to be explained by the extent to which the social consensus in one country 
differs from, or approximates to, the other. It was observed in Durkheim's contribution, 
for instance, that the differences in law are explicable by the different needs of societies 
around which different solidarities develop. With regard to the repressive law, he says: 
"It has been claimed that penal rules have expressed for each type of society the basic 
conditions for collective life. Their authority thus sprang from necessity. Moreover, 
since such needs vary according to societies, one could in this way explain the 
variations in repressive law" (quoted in Lukes and Scull, 1983: 40). It can be deduced 
from this statement that where such needs are similar they could give rise to similar 
laws.
Correspondingly, the conflict argument postulates the interplay of the "dominant 
interests" in the countries in question as the explanatory factor for differences and
20 This concept is used here, loosely, to accommodate: (a) the interests of the ruling class, put forward 
by the marxist variant, (b) the compromise of interest groups, by the pluralist variant, and (c) the interest 
of the powerful, by the power-elite variant.
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similarities among their laws. A crucial point is that the character of the laws which this 
interplay produces is to be understood from the nature of the mode of production and 
the political tradition of the countries being examined. The substance of this 
implication is that unless there is a parallel development in the economy and polity of 
the countries, the laws would be different, bearing, particularly, the marks of the 
different political contexts in which they operate.
Even differences among the forms of democracy have been held to sustain such 
differences in laws. Arguably, it is within the frame of this orientation that Kahn- 
Freund opposed the British Industrial Relations Act 1971, his ground being that this 
was a reckless use of North American labour law concepts without regard to the vastly 
different political and constitutional contexts in Britain. This, to him, was "an 'abuse' 
rather than a legitimate 'use' of comparative method" (Lewis, 1983: 113).
Regarding similarities, the level of development of a mode of production has been
presented as a crucial factor. For instance, arguing in a manner that can be taken to
mean that advanced capitalism produces similar institutions (including law) in more
than one country, Miliband (1969: 9) says:
When all ... national differences and specificities have been duly taken 
into account, there remains the fact that advanced capitalism has 
imposed many fundamental uniformities upon the countries which have 
come under its sway, and greatly served to attenuate, though not to 
flatten out, the differences between them. As a result, there has come 
about a remarkable degree of similarity, not only in economic but in 
social and even in political terms, between those countries.
If it is recalled that in marxist theory law, politics and ideology belong to the same 
domain of superstructure, then it will be conceivable that this statement contemplates 
an account of similarity of laws in terms of the level of capitalism. Put differently, 
advanced capitalism in two or more countries will be an explanatory factor for their 
similar laws. This view, of course, challenges Weber's argument that "the essential 
similarity of the capitalistic development on the Continent and in England has not been
90
able to eliminate the sharp contrasts between the two types of legal systems" (Weber, 
1922,1968: 318).
Another significant issue that emerges from the construction of the model is the 
question of the link between the social product nature of law and legal transplant. It is 
observed from most of the contributions that, in the social product position, there does 
not seem to be any argument against the transplantability of law as a result of its social 
"nativity". Perhaps, the contributions have considered legal transplant an obvious 
impossibility, meriting no specific attention or it is an oversight on their part. Clearly 
Chambliss (1969), for instance, to which reference has been made earlier, shows no 
surprise at the discovery that the vagrancy laws of England, adopted by the U.S, were 
first created under conditions different from those of the adopting country.
The exception to this view seems to be Kahn-Freund who has argued against legal 
transplant, even when confronted with potentially transplant cases. For instance, in 
explaining the similarities in the law on "fraud in equity" in England and Germany, 
Kahn-Freund maintains that this did not come about by transplantation but as "a 
response to almost exactly the same social needs". Even though "some of the 
provisions of the German law of July 1884 read like summaries of the facts in the 
English cases", he argues, "we can be certain that those who were responsible for 
drafting the German statute knew nothing of the Sombrero decision"^1 (Kahn-Freund, 
1966).
However it would appear that Kahn-Freund's aversion to transplantation is focused 
mainly on the copying of the collective labour law, as can be seen in his reaction to the 
1971 British labour law ^. Ivanov (1987) affirms such misgivings when, in his broader 
discussion on "Transplantation of Labour Norms as a Research Problem", he says: "as a
21 There is no full citation for this case in the work. This has made it difficult to follow it up for more 
details.
22 it is the collective labour law which, for him, is so linked to society that it can hardly be transplanted 
(see Kahn-Freund, 1974).
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rule, if the conditions differ, difficulties and obstacles, sometimes insurmountable, arise 
for transplantation". And there is further support from Pustogarov (1985) in whose 
view it might be impossible to transplant the Soviet Law On Labour C o lle c tive s into 
any capitalist country. For, as he argues, this law "implements in a legal form, the 
political policy of involving large numbers of working people in the management of the 
State, the economy and social processes" - a phenomenon peculiar to a socialist society.
Otherwise, Kahn-Freund acknowledges that between countries which have reached 
similar stages of economic development "transplantation is comparatively easy” (Kahn- 
Freund, 1974). He even believes that individual labour law, for instance, could be 
transplanted between countries which, although having a different political
complexion, are at a similar stage of economic development. This is evident in the 
adoption of the French model of labour courts by the 1968 Report24 of the Donovan 
Commission, a Commission in which the ideas of Kahn-Freund were most influential 
or, indeed, the 'guiding hand' (see Simpson, 1986: 796-7).
3.5 A social-product explanatory framework for differences and similarities in 
national laws
The foregoing review of the consensus and conflict arguments, together with their 
implications for this study, suggest a social product explanatory framework for 
differences and similarities between national laws. This framework can be formulated 
in the following propositional terms: the laws of two countries, being rooted in or 
products of the social conditions of their respective societies, would differ among 
themselves if the conditions which give rise to them are not parallel. Where they are 
parallel, the laws would be similar. The review and the implications also suggest the 
nature of these social conditions:
(a) the nature of the social solidarity;
(b) the nature of the mode of production;
(c) the structure and process of industrial relations;
23 This law was adopted by the Soviet Union in 1983.
24 This was the report by the British Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 
1965 - 1968, chaired by Lord Donovan.
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(d) the interpenetration of polity and economy; and
(e) the social control tradition.
Not all of these factors may be needed to explain the differences and similarities in the 
labour laws of Australia and Nigeria. For the purpose of this study, attention will be 
focused on those factors which demonstrate clearly the nature of the power relations in 
the two countries. The direct relevance of power relations to the branch of law being 
examined in this study has already been emphasised by Kahn-Freund. This emphasis is 
reiterated by Hepple (1986: 5 )^  who argues that "the crucial element in the making of 
labour law is power", and that "it is in power relationships which are rooted in social 
structure that we may find a key to understanding both the common tendencies and the 
divergencies in the labour law of societies which have shared the experience of 
capitalist industrialisation". Needless to add, the power relations can be either 
consensually or conflictually determined.
The foregoing discussion, then, suggests that any attempt to explain the differences and 
similarities between the compulsory arbitration laws of Australia and Nigeria must 
relate the emergence of these laws (at their respective times) to the social 
circumstances and in particular the power relations in each country. Such attempt will 
be made in chapter six.
25 As at 1987, Bob Hepple was a Professor of English Law in the University of London and Chief Editor 
of the Labour Law Volume of the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PHILOSOPHY AND STRUCTURE OF 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN AND NIGERIAN
LABOUR LAWS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter compares the philosophy and structure of compulsory arbitration in 
Australian and Nigerian labour law. These aspects of compulsory arbitration system are 
the first two of the four aspects which have been isolated for analysis in this study. The 
aim of the analysis in this chapter is to identify the differences and similarities in the 
laws relating to arbitration in the two countries. The focus is mainly on the legislative 
(conceptual) framework. Thus, unless needed to clarify the legislative provisions, the 
practice of industrial relations is not discussed in detail.
The comparison, in this chapter and the next, attempts to present and interpret two 
manifestly complex legislative systems, as they were up to the early 1990. Since the 
origins of, and the major changes in, both systems are not contemporaneous, most of 
their characteristics will be seen to correspond as general concepts more than specific 
details. For instance, the Australian law contained certain provisions (e.g on 
prohibition) which were explicit at inception in 1904 but have become largely implicit 
in the 1960s and 1970s when the Nigerian law which stated similar provisions 
explicitly was instituted. The comparison should, therefore, be read, having regard to 
this fact.
As indicated in chapter one the philosophy will be examined in terms of the central 
purpose (i.e the motivation) and the means through which this purpose is to be realised. 
The structure of the system involves the institutional framework within which the 
purpose and the means interact to enhance industrial harmony, i.e the tribunal system 
and the parties between whom the system adjudicates. It will be seen that, with respect 
to philosophy and structure, there are more fundamental similarities than differences 
between the Australian and Nigerian arbitration systems.
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4.2 Philosophy of compulsory arbitration
After examining the main purpose and the means of the arbitration scheme, I shall also 
highlight under this heading the typology of disputes which the purpose and means 
have been devised to settle, the scope of the means, and the constitutional limitations 
on the operations of the purpose and the means. These other subsidiary issues are 
highlighted to clarify further the philosophy. The examination of all the issues shows 
that, with the exception of the differences in the impact of the constitutional limitations, 
the Australian and the Nigerian laws are conceptually similar.
4.2.1 Central purpose: the prohibition of direct industrial action
There are different views about what is the main purpose, object or intent of the 
compulsory arbitration laws in Australia and Nigeria. This does not come as a surprise 
for, with law as a meaning system, "all too often ... there is no clear intent evident from 
the publicly stated official legal position and, even where there is, this may be at 
variance with the private purposes of rule-makers" (Tomasic, 1985: 108). With regard 
to the Australian law, for instance, one view maintains that the purpose has been to 
compel the recognition of trade unions by employers (Macintyre and Mitchell, 1989: 
18). Another maintains it is to institutionalise state intervention in industrial relations 
(see Sykes and Glasbeek, 1972: 368; Macintyre, 1983: 103). My interpretation, derived 
from some relevant literature (e.g Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 1903-4; 
Martin, 1958: 139; Sir Richard Kirby, 1965: 2-3; ILO, 1980: 160; Hancock Committee, 
1985: 55-62;/ Adeogun, 1976: 8-9; Yesufu, 1984: 74-77) and the statutes, is that the 
central purpose of both the Australian and Nigerian laws relates to the prohibition of 
direct industrial actions, in contrast with the industrial relations laws in Britain and the 
United States, for instance; and that this purpose has been expressed in such generic 
terms as the prevention and/or settlement of industrial disputes. "Prohibition" might 
present the issue as a matter of criminal law, but it is used in this thesis in its ordinary 
meaning of forbiding or not allowing something by means of a law, rule or official 
agreement backed by sanctions which may be compensatory or punitive. What follows 
in this sub-section is a detailed presentation of this interpretation.
95
Section (hereinafter, s. or ss. for plural) 2 of Australia's original Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 expressed seven "chief objects". These included 
preventing industrial action, constituting a conciliation and arbitration court with 
jurisdiction to prevent and settle industrial disputes, enabling the court and State 
authorities to aid each other, facilitating and encouraging the organization of 
representative bodies of employers and employees, and providing for the making of 
industrial agreements. However a meticulous examination of the legislation in question 
and other relevant documents shows that the main object, purpose or motivation of the 
compulsory arbitration system is to prohibit industrial action.
As Deakin told the House of Representatives on July 30, 1903 the task of setting up the 
proposed arbitration system was "of a most momentous character [precisely] because of 
its main object, the prohibition of strikes and locks-out". Deakin referred specifically to 
clause 9 of the Bill which provided that "No person shall on account of any industrial 
dispute for the prevention or settlement of which the court has jurisdiction, do anything 
in the nature of a lock-out or strike and asserted: "in this clause lies the keynote of 
the Bill. It has as its first direct object the prohibition of strikes and locks-out" (see 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, hereinafter CPD, 1903 vol. XV: 2871).
No doubt, the Act was amended so much that it appears, in the words of Rawson (1986: 
275), "like a ruined giant, horrible in its form". And in the process of these amendments 
the wording of the "chief objects" of the Act had been changed (in 1930, 1947, 1956 
and 1973). However, the central focus, i.e the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs, had 
been maintained. In my view, s.3 of No. 86 of 1988 (the Act renaming^ the law as 
Industrial Relations Act 1988) which enumerates the objects of the current law and the 
various sections "penalising" industrial action (e.g. ss.124, 125, 178, 311 and 312) 
signify that the motivation of the law remains essentially the same.
1 This clause became s.6(l) of the original 1904 Act
2 There is no admission that the 1988 law is merely a renaming of the 1904 law. But it has been argued 
that it was little more than "a major restructuring of ... the [1904 Act]" (see Mitchell, 1988: 501).
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In Nigeria the relevant expression of this object began in 1968 with the enactment of a 
law entitled Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) Decree 1968. Unlike the 
Australian law, this law did not contain any section enumerating its objects. However 
the preamble clearly suggests what its central motivation was. It states: "Whereas it is 
expedient during the present state of emergency in Nigeria to make transitional 
provisions for the settlement of trade disputes arising within the period of such 
emergency: THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT therefore hereby decrees as 
follows:-". The text of this Decree shows that the nature of the dispute-settlement 
foreshadowed by this preamble involved some restriction upon direct action, 
unprecedented in the history of the Nigerian labour laws.
The thin veil of "provisions for the settlement of trade disputes" was soon removed by 
the amending Decree No. 53 entitled Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Decree 1969. The first section of that Decree provided outright 
for the banning of strikes and lock-outs. The veil was later to be restored in the Trade 
Disputes Act 1976 - a consolidating or cumulative law, incorporating the 1968 and 
1969 Decrees. Its explanatory note employs the disguising phraseology: "the Act makes 
fresh provisions with respect to the settlement of trade disputes However, as will 
be shown below, no emphasis is diverted from the prohibition of industrial action, thus 
keeping the motivation for the legislation which began in 1968 similar to the 
motivation for the Australian law.
In Australia, Part II of the original Act, entitled "Prohibition of Lockouts and Strikes in 
relation to industrial disputes", expressly banned direct industrial action. The 
provisions of this part were made more elaborate by legislation passed in 1918 under a 
non-labor government led by William Morris Hughes, and in 1926 and 1928 under 
another non-labor government led by Stanley Melbourne Bruce. While this elaboration 
may appear to be a "conservative way" of getting at labour, what the terms of these 
early arbitration statutes betray is "a general feeling that the existence of a right to
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strike was inconsistent with the whole basis of a compulsory arbitration system" 
(Sykes, 1980: 329).
The prohibitions were repealed in the 1930 amendment by a Labor government, led by 
James Henry Scullin. However a provision was introduced at the same time which 
penalised union officers for aiding and abetting industrial action (see s. 138 of 1904 
Act; Brooks, 1986:277), and the possibility continued to exist for inserting clauses in 
awards (i.e bans clauses) that parties to such awards shall not take part in industrial 
action, the contravention being treated as a breach of award (Portus, 1971: 89). This 
anti-industrial action provision in awards was held to be valid by the High Court in 
Seamen's Union v. Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association (1936) 54 CLR 626. 
The decision was later endorsed in R. v. Metal Trades Employers' Association; Ex parte 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1950-51) 82 CLR 208 and R. v. 
Spicer & Ors; Ex parte Seamen’s Union of Australia (1957) 96 CLR 341. The insertion 
of a bans clause by an arbitrator or the commencement of the enforcement proceedings 
by an employer against a breach may be a matter of discretion. But the provision for 
the bans clause in the law implies at least discouragement of industrial action.
In 1977 the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 was amended to insert a definition 
of "industrial action" in s.4 which, for all intents and purposes, cast a very wide net 
upon "objectionable" industrial behaviours of workers. And in 1979 s.25A was added 
to the Act restraining the Commission from making an award "in respect of a claim for 
the making of a payment to employees in respect of a period during which those 
employees were engaged in industrial action".
Also in 1977, s.45D was inserted into Commonwealth legislation - Trade Practices Act 
1974 - to prohibit secondary boycotts by unions. Founded upon the Report of the Trade 
Practices Review Committee (the Swanson Committee) which, among other things, 
examined the "development of a free and fair market", the section "extends anti-trust 
laws to trade unions, it prohibits secondary boycotts in certain circumstances and it
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provides for a liability in a union for any loss or damage caused by individual members 
or officers acting in concert" (Brooks, 1986: 272). The insertion of s.45E in the same 
legislation in May 1980 further strengthened this type of prohibition^. There was a 
concomitant amendment to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, inserting 
Division 5A to grant the Arbitration Commission jurisdiction over disputes relating to 
boycotts; but this was not to affect the operation of the Trade Practices Act (s.88DG of 
the 1904 Act; see also s. 162 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988).
There has been other prohibitive legislation in respect of industrial action in Australia, 
some of which is still operational. Outside the industrial relations legislation, there is 
the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which allows for the imposition of penalties for threats, 
intimidation and boycotts in relation to interstate and overseas trade and commerce (see 
ss.30j, 30k). There is also the Commonwealth Social Security Act 1947, s. 107 of which 
disqualifies for unemployment benefits persons whose unemployment results from 
engaging directly (or indirectly through membership of union) in industrial action. S.66 
of the Public Service Act 1922 prohibits public servants from engaging in industrial 
action. More specifically it deems strike to be an illegal action and renders public 
servants who engage in strikes liable to summary dismissal. In the period of 1939-45 
"strikes were or could be made illegal under various National Security Regulations ... 
[providing] power to make employees liable for service in the armed forces" (Portus, 
1971: 90). The National Emergency Coal Strike Act 1949 was designed to deal with the 
strikers in the coalfields: union funds were frozen; unions were fined heavily; union 
officials were gaoled.
Two other Acts regulating, in a prohibitive manner, industrial action were the 
Commonwealth Employees (Employment Provisions) Act 1977 and the Public Service 
and Statutory Authorities Act 1980. Both were introduced by the Liberal-National 
coalition Fraser Government: the former provided sweeping stand-down powers to deal 
with the tactics whereby the Commonwealth public servants relied on "partial work
3 See Healey (1988) ch. 6 for a clear analysis of ss.45D and 45E.
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bans" to achieve the effect of industrial action without attracting the stigma of "going 
on strike"; the latter was brought in to empower the Commonwealth and statutory 
Authorities to effect the "no work as directed, no pay principle", reversing the effect of 
the decision in Bennett v Commonwealth (1980) 30 ALR 423 which appeared to deny 
this power.
This analysis reveals that industrial action is essentially prohibited in the Australian 
law. The absence of any express prohibition of industrial action in the post-1930 
amendments "does not mean that the concept of some kind of general ban on industrial 
action has been entirely discarded" (Creighton, 1984: 123). Or, as argued by Brooks 
(1986: 283; 1988: 161), "while it is possible to say that there is no direct definition of, 
and prohibition on, strikes, go-slows, overtime bans and the like in the Commonwealth 
legislation, the reality is that strikes, lock-outs, working-to-rule and other forms of 
industrial action are prohibited by legislation". In this regard assertions like "in 
Australia strikes are not illegal under the Commonwealth Act" (Galin, 1980:20) appear 
rather unconvincing.
As the review of the 1904 Act and other Commonwealth legislation in the preceding 
paragraphs has shown, the prohibition of industrial action seems to be popular with the 
legislature. Indeed, prohibiting industrial action appears consistent with the notion 
which was dominant at the inception of the arbitration system, namely, the need to 
substitute a new regime for the reign of violence. While moving for the second reading 
of the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill in the Senate on 19 October, 1904 Senator Sir 
Josiah Symon, in a fashion similar to Deakin's submission in the House of 
Representatives in 1903, argued that the measure was a "humane legislative effort to 
substitute in industrial disputes the arbitrament of conciliation, the peaceful arbitrament 
of an appropriate judicial tribunal, for the violent and barbarous methods of strike and 
lock-out" (CPD, 1904 vol XXII: 5710).
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This notion was espoused by Higgins who was the second President of the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court and whose name is more or less 
synonymous with the early development of the Australian arbitration system. On one 
occasion, he said:
the process of conciliation, with arbitration in the background, is 
substituted for the rude and barbarous processes of strike and lock-out. 
Reason is to displace force; the might of the State is to enforce peace 
between industrial combatants as well as between other combatants; and 
all in the interest of the public (Higgins, 1922: 2).
Elsewhere he said
There should be no more necessity for strikes and stoppages in order to 
obtain just working conditions than there was need for the Chinaman of 
Charles Lamb to bum the house down whenever he wanted to roast 
pork. The arbitration system is devised to provide a substitute for strikes 
and stoppages, to secure the reign of justice as against violence, of right 
as against might - to subdue Prussianism in industrial matters (Higgins, 
ibid: 60).
Perhaps it was the entrenchment of this notion which lay behind the inability of the 
Hawke Labor Government to get rid of, or reduce, the sections penalising industrial 
action in the Industrial Relations Act 1988 - an Act intended to represent the first 
thorough overhaul of industrial relations legislation since the enactment of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (see Mitchell, 1988 for a discussion of the 
promise of "emboldened plan for labour reform").
What is the situation in the Nigerian law? As with the Australian law, the Nigerian 
compulsory arbitration law began - via the 1968 Decree - with an express ban on lock­
outs and strikes. In the side note on s.16 of this Decree, the ban is referred to as 
"restrictions". This gives the impression that this ban is not total. This impression is 
reinforced by the following wording:
during the continuance of this Decree and without prejudice to the 
provisions of any enactment ..., an employer shall not take part in a 
lock-out and a worker shall not take part in a strike after the date of 
notification of a declaration of a trade dispute to the Commissioner in 
accordance with section 4 of this Decree, or as the case may be, after the 
time when the Commissioner has notified the parties or their 
representatives of his apprehension of a trade dispute under section 5 (2) 
of this Decree [[s. 16(2)].
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A close reading of the Decree, however, will show that the so-called lee-way (i.e pre­
notification of a declaration of dispute) for industrial action is virtually non-existent. As 
Adeogun (1970: 118-119) has shown, the effect of s.4 of the Decree is that "whereas 
[workers who went on strike before the declaration of a trade dispute] might not have 
committed an offence under s. 16(2) ... they would, nevertheless, have committed an 
offence under s.4". The latter section places obligation on the parties to report a 
declaration of a trade dispute "within a period of seven days of the failure to resolve 
any dispute". A violation of either s.4 or s.16 is an offence, punishable with a fine 
and/or imprisonment [see s. 19( 1)].
In any case, s.l of the 1969 Decree, i.e the Decree which amended the 1968 Decree, 
has put paid to the impression of an incomplete ban. The side note on this section calls 
a spade a spade: there is a ban on strikes and lock-outs. S.2 of the Decree places a duty 
upon employers and trade unions to report strikes and lock-outs, respectively, within 24 
hours to the Inspector-General of Police; failure to comply attracts two years 
imprisonment and no alternative of a fine.
In 1976, another group of military officers took over government. The law which they 
enacted, i.e. the 1976 Decree, allegedly lifted the total ban on strikes and lock-outs 
which had been imposed by s.l of the 1969 Decree. The side note on s .l3 of the 1976 
Decree indicates that industrial action is prohibited only "before [the] issue of award of 
National Industrial Court", suggesting that strikes and lock-outs are allowed after the 
issue of award. But this reading cannot be sustained in the light of paragraph (f) of s .l3 
(1) which states:
13-(1) An employer shall not declare or take part in a lock-out and a worker
shall not take part in a strike in connection with any trade dispute where -
(f) the National Industrial Court has issued an award on the reference.
The other paragraphs of s.l3(1) impose further restrictions: there can be no lock-out 
and strike if (i) negotiation provisions have not been complied with; (ii) a conciliator
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has been appointed; (iii) the dispute has been referred to Industrial Arbitration Panel; 
(iv) a Tribunal award has become binding; or (v) the dispute has been referred to 
National Industrial Court. In a roundabout way a total ban is imposed on industrial 
action. Any one of these paragraphs, (e.g v), in combination with the issue of award by 
the NIC, can produce the effect that parties are not entitled, lawfully, to take industrial 
action at any time (Adeogun, 1976: 8-9; 1980: 13).
The Nigerian Employers' Consultative Association (NECA) which was inaugurated on 
January 16, 1957 to assist, among other things, in the maintenance and promotion of 
good relations between members and their employees^, did provide a synopsis of this 
section (along with other sections of the Decree) without placing any interpretation on 
it (see NECA News, February 1976: 3). On the other hand the Nigerian Labour 
Congress (NLC), which was inaugurated on February 16, 1978 to serve as the central 
labour organization of all trade unions in Nigeria interpreted the provisions, showing 
that the purpose of s.13 of the 1976 Decree is to put a ban on strikes, i.e. "another 
attempt at labour control" (NLC Memo, 1982: 3).
The analysis of the 1976 Decree, along with the Trade Disputes (Essential Services)
Decree 1976, by Yesufu (1984: 74-77) supplies further evidence of the prohibition of
direct industrial action in the Nigerian law. On the 1976 Decree, Yesufu submits: "this
in effect means that once a dispute has started to follow the normal course, strikes are
legally forbidden in Nigeria. It constitutes a fundamental departure from the former
principle of freedom to strike under the British traditional system of free collective
bargaining". And, on the Essential Services Decree, he concludes that
the essence of the Decree is accordingly to ban strikes and lock-outs in 
the essential services of the nation as so defined ... The inclusion of 
banking services, security printing and minting as well as the public 
services of the Federation and of the States as essential services, does 
mean in effect that about sixty percent of wage-earners in Nigeria can no 
longer lawfully exercise the strike weapon.
 ^ See Okogwu (1988) for a detailed presentation on the history and operations of this Association.
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It is not clear whether this analysis by Yesufu is deprecatory or merely stating the law 
as it is. It is known for sure that Yesufu is among those who had, before the 
introduction of the compulsory arbitration system, articulated the notion of banning 
industrial action as a necessary element of maintaining industrial peace. For instance, in 
February 1968, Professor Yesufu addressed the sixth National Management Conference 
in the following terms:
Frankly, I think that strikes and lockouts should be banned at least 
during the current national crisis [the civil war] and the period of 
reconstruction that will follow. The right to strike cannot be seen as a 
fundamental human right except by those who regard conflict with its 
associated sense of victory or defeat as an end in itself. Such a ban must, 
of course be accompanied by an effective and just machinery for the 
location and settlement of grievances and industrial discontent ... 
(Yesufu, 1968).
This address reflects the view expressed by the Morgan Commission in 1964, in which 
Commission Yesufu served as a member. The Commission was of the view that resort 
to strikes and lock-outs should be controlled, for "in a developing economy such as 
ours, strikes are an unnecessary luxury and, like an ill-wind, blow nobody any good" 
(Morgan Commission, 1964: 44).
The point here is that, as in Australia, the notion of forbiding industrial action as an 
effective way of achieving industrial peace pre-dated the enactment of the/ collective 
labour law in Nigeria.
One observation needs be made. Although the position taken here is that the Australian 
and Nigerian laws express a similar purpose, it should be noted that the representation 
of this purpose appears to indicate some difference. In the Australian law, the 
legislation refers to "prevention and settlement"; in the Nigerian, it speaks of 
"settlement". It is difficult to ascertain, from the face of each of the laws, whether 
prevention and settlement are conceptualised as one and the same thing or as different 
aspects of the object.
It has once been urged on the Australian High Court that "the word 'prevention' 
connotes an event which has not yet happened, while the word 'arbitration' connotes
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the presence of parties to an existing dispute" [Whybrow case (1910) 11 CLR 311]. 
This stems from the argument that the means (of conciliation and arbitration) should be 
read distributively either "as meaning conciliation for the prevention and arbitration 
for the settlement, or as conciliation for the prevention and settlement and arbitration 
for the settlement, of interstate industrial disputes" (Ford, 1984: 69). The position 
adopted by the Court was not to decide as urged. This accords with Deakin's response 
to Watson's question in the debate on the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill on 30 July 
1903. "Why leave out the word 'prevention' in your subsequent presentation of the 
Bill?", Watson queried. "Because we speak of industrial disputes, that includes 
prevention. There has to be an industrial dispute, and we can therefore omit the former 
word without affecting the meaning of the sub-section ...", Deakin replied (CPD, vol! p. 
2859).
While in practice differences may be observed regarding the operationalisation of the 
terms "prevention and settlement" and "settlement", conceptually they are understood 
in this study to indicate a similar aspect of the philosophy of the Australian and 
Nigerian labour laws. They both relate to the prohibition of direct industrial action.
4.2.2 Means: full compulsory conciliation and arbitration
The means adopted to effect the prohibition of direct industrial action (or the 
"prevention and settlement of industrial disputes") in both countries is full compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration, applicable to all disputes - whether about interests or rights 
(see 4.2.3 infra) - in essential and non-essential services.
In the first Australasian Constitution Convention Debates in 1891, Charles Cameron
Kingston - one of the main proponents of the industrial relations power for the
Commonwealth - expressed his conviction about this means. He said:
It is impossible, having regard to the disastrous effects which are 
occasioned to society generally, to leave the contesting parties to fight 
the matter out to the bitter end, and the only means which occur to me 
by which some good can be done is the appointment of a tribunal 
qualified to investigate the matters in dispute, to reconcile the parties if 
possible, or, if such a course be impossible, to pronounce an award 
which will fix what, according to the decision of the court, is right and
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proper to be done, and will carry with its pronouncement the means of 
its enforcement. Conciliation and arbitration therefore seem to me the 
only means of doing anything towards settlement of the difficulties ... 
(quoted in Niland, 1978: 24) (emphasis, mine).
In the context of those debates, this conviction supported government intervention 
which, as Niland (1978: 24) has observed, "could only produce a court system of 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration". Evidently, it did produce such a system.
In Nigeria, similar reasoning seems to have informed the establishment of the 
compulsory arbitration system: direct government intervention as a means for resolving 
industrial dispute. When the Federal Commissioner for Labour and Information gave a 
press statement on the 1968 Decree, it was clear that the government had concluded 
that what was required was a speedy and effective means for the settlement of trade 
disputes as well as powers of effective intervention by the Ministry of Labour. And, as 
Oshiomhole (1979: 43) has noted, "by 'effective intervention' the Commissioner 
[meant] a compulsory conciliation and arbitration system".
Professor Adeogun has reached a similar conclusion about the means of the 
compulsory system in Nigeria. While analysing the 1968 Decree, specifically with 
reference to the provision for the binding nature of awards, he said: "By these 
provisions, compulsory arbitration has been introduced into our system of industrial 
relations... This new feature is very welcome and should be retained permanently". 
Although there was room for improvement in the Decree, he was sure that "a good 
beginning has been made by the promulgation of the Trade Disputes (Emergency 
Provisions) Decree 1968". Uvieghara (1985: 158) compares this 1968 Decree - as 
reinforced by the Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree 
1969 - with the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act 1941, and regards the 
former as "radical legislation" because it "introduced compulsory powers for the 
settlement of industrial disputes".
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It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the central purpose or motivation and means 
for the resolution of industrial conflict which were introduced in Nigeria from 1968 are 
broadly similar to those which were introduced in the Commonwealth of Australia 
from 1904. Basically the introduction of the arbitration system in the two countries was 
directed at prohibiting industrial action, itself a state intervention in the industrial 
relations but of a peculiar type. There has been state intervention in countries like the 
United States America and Britain which has not incorporated the prohibition of 
industrial action and full compulsory arbitration as my analysis has demonstrated in the 
case of Australia and Nigeria.
4.2.3 Typology of disputes
Unlike the industrial relations laws of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
United States and the Scandinavian countries, the Australian and Nigerian laws do not 
distinguish between "interests" and "rights" industrial disputes. "Interests" disputes 
involve a question of what should be the terms of a new legal rule or collective 
agreement or award, forming the basis of employment relationships. Another name for 
them is "economic" disputes. "Rights" disputes, on the other hand, involve the question 
of how an existing "rule" should be applied or interpreted. They are also called 
"grievance" disputes. There is nothing in the definitions of "industrial dispute" in the 
Australian law and "trade dispute" in the Nigerian law to suggest that such a distinction 
is contemplated.
The absence of this distinction in the Australian law was underlined by the Hancock 
Committee (1985: 546): "we think that the role of conciliation may be further enhanced 
by a clearer distinction between the processes of settling disputes created by the service 
of a demand aimed at creating an award or varying an award, and disputes involving 
matters already covered by the award". The basis of this remark was spelt out in the 
observation that "the distinction between interests disputes and rights disputes have not 
generally been explicitly drawn in the Australian system" (p.564).
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One implication of this lack of distinction relates to the jurisdiction of the system's 
tribunals. In Mitchell's (1986: 3-4) words, "there is no distinction between disputes of 
rights and disputes of interests in the Australian system. Therefore the jurisdiction of 
the [federal] tribunal can be invoked over matters of the interpretation or 
implementation of existing award rights, or over claims for additional rights".
In the case of Nigeria, little has been written to explicate the distinction. Adeogun's 
(1980: 10) remark that strikes "are not confined to grievances about improvement of 
terms and conditions of employment although such grievances form the bulk of the 
causes of trade disputes involving industrial actions" seems to contain a faint allusion 
to it. Other attempts, usually made within the context of drawing a typology of 
"individual" and "collective" disputes, have produced little more than confusion (see 
for example Ubeku, 1983: 157-161 and Damachi, 1986: 3-5). By using the typology of 
'interest' claims, disputes involving 'rights', and "other cases" to group 29 NIC 
judgements in the years 1978-81 without conceptually clarifying what the terms stand 
for, Ubeku (1983: 179) has left his readers free to assume what they mean. In the 
context of his discussion, a clear understanding is difficult to come by. This lack of 
clear understanding notwithstanding, the absence of the distinction is suggested by such 
comments as: "if a distinction must be made [in Nigeria] ... it should be between rights 
disputes, i.e. claims arising from the contract of employment or a labour statute which 
should be for the ordinary courts and future rights or interests disputes which seem 
more appropriate for arbitration" (Uvieghara, 1985: 169).
The significance of the distinction between interests and rights disputes has been 
documented. Givry's (1978: 6-8) contribution is worthy of note. He shows that the 
distinction corresponds to a fundamental aspect of legal thought which relates to 
distinguishing between "justiciable" and "non-justiciable" disputes, as in international 
law. With regard to national experiences, the distinction is said to be basic to the 
industrial relations systems of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the 
Scandinavian countries. Also it inspires the whole collective bargaining system in the
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U.S and Canada, leading to different methods of settlement for contract-interpretation 
disputes and disputes relating to the terms of new contracts. For example, the U.S. 
Railway Labour Act 1934 established a National Mediation Board to deal with interests 
disputes and a National Railroad Adjustment Board to deal with rights disputes. On the 
African continent, Chad, Ivory Coast and Senegal have laws which provide that 
interests disputes should be settled by awards "in equity" and rights disputes, by awards 
"in law".
Previously, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) had made no distinction 
between interest and rights disputes in its Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration 
Recommendation No. 120 1951. It later rectified this omission by proposing through its 
Grievances Recommendation No 130 1967 that grievance procedures deal with rights 
disputes, and that other machinery be established to deal with disputes aimed at the 
modification of terms and conditions of employment.
In the countries where no hard and fast distinction is drawn between interests and rights 
disputes, e.g. Britain (at least before the Industrial Relations Act 1971) and countries 
with British-inspired industrial relations systems, the justification put forward is that 
the distinction is considered unrealistic or unnecessary since their collective agreements 
do not give rise to legal relations/rights. In the words of Kahn-Freund (1954: 206), 
"conflicts of rights and conflicts of interests do not have to be kept in watertight 
compartments where the 'rights' are enforced mainly by social and not by legal 
sanctions, i.e. where the interpretation as well as the application and enforcement of 
collective standards remains in the sphere of intergroup autonomy". But, this does not 
explain the experiences of Australia and Nigeria where collective agreements and/or 
rights (in awards) are enforced by legal sanctions and, yet, no distinction is made. This 
is much more so in the case of Australia where, in the early stages of the development 
of its system, there were questions about whether or not arbitration was restricted to 
resolving disputes about existing rights only (see Ford, 1984: 68-70).
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It may be added that countries which place less emphasis on enforcement by legal 
sanctions have adopted this distinction in their respective industrial relations systems. 
For instance, in addition to Austria, Denmark, the former Weimar Republic of 
Germany, Norway and Sweden which were the first to adopt the interests-rights 
distinction, there are now Canada and the U.S., Finland, Iceland and the Latin 
American countries^. More recently, New Zealand (in the Industrial Relations Act 
1973) and Pakistan have also followed suit (see ILO, 1980: 6-9).
4.2.4 Scope of the means: general application
Compulsory arbitration systems can either be of general or of specific application in 
scope. In the former type, any dispute can be referred to arbitration irrespective of 
whether or not it relates to an essential service or seriously affects the public interest or 
whether it is a major dispute or one of relatively minor importance. In the latter type, 
compulsory arbitration is applied only to disputes in industries or services "where there 
is a broad consensus that their continued operation is essential to the health and safety 
of the community" (Givry, 1978: 45).
In the Australian law, the means apply to "industrial disputes" in general, subject to the 
constitutional limitations as will be shown in the next sub-section. S.18 of the original 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 stipulated that the "Court shall have jurisdiction 
to prevent and settle, pursuant to this Act, all industrial disputes". In s.4 of the Act, the 
definition of "industrial disputes" is general, i.e there is no limitation as to specific 
industries. Among other things, the application cuts across the public-private sectoral 
divide.
The enactment of the Public Service Arbitration Act 1920 to deal with disputes in the 
public service may suggest that the 1904 Act was restricted to the private sector. On the 
face of the law, there are grounds for this impression. First, the Act was enacted, 
principally, to provide an independent avenue of appeal by Commonwealth employees
5 These include Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Panama, Peru and Venezuela.
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against decisions made by the Public Service Board on their general terms and 
conditions of employment. And, second, the tribunal which was set up under the Act 
was empowered to decide on the claims lodged by any registered staff organisation, the 
Public Service Board or the Minister of a department and to hand down "consent 
determinations".
However under ss. 15A and 15C of the Act, inserted into the Act in 1952, requests for 
reference and appeals to the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission on the decisions 
of the Public Service Arbitrator were available to the parties. These provisions had the 
effect of integrating "the Public Service industrial relations system, through the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, within the Australia-wide industrial relations 
system" (McCallum, 1984: 383). Direct integration occurred in 1983 when the tribunal 
was abolished and its powers were transferred to the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission. This was accomplished by the amendment which incorporated ss. 41A 
and 70A to 70K into the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (see Smith, 1987: 25). 
The integration has been retained in the Industrial Relations Act 1988; thus affirming 
the point that the application of the Australian compulsory arbitration law is not 
restricted in any sectoral way.
Another significant aspect of the history of the Australian law is that, initially, State 
instrumentalities were held by the High Court to be excluded from, or immune to, the 
jurisdiction of the federal tribunals. Two years after the enactment of the 1904 Act, a 
question arose whether the provisions of the Act applied to a State Department of 
Railways. In what came to be known as the States Railway Servants' C a s e the High 
Court - applying the doctrine of implied immunities^ which they had introduced in 
D'Emden v. Pedder (ironically in favour of the Commonwealth) - decided that the 
provisions did not apply to State instrumentalities. The doctrine favoured the notion
 ^Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service Association v New South Wales 
Railway Traffic Employes Association (1906) 4 CLR 488.
7 Zines says this doctrine of immunity of instrumentalities was a direct descendant of principles 
propounded in the United States in the 19th century.
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that the Commonwealth and the States were each 'sovereign' within their respective 
fields and each was to be free to perform its functions "without interference, burden or 
hindrance from the other government" (Zines, 1987: 1).
For well over a decade this doctrine held sway (not without some limits, e.g. of "logical 
necessity") until it was overruled in the Engineers' C a s e The question in that case 
was whether an award of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 
could be made arising out of an interstate dispute where certain of the respondents were 
State instrumentalities. The High Court decided in the affirmative and thus removed the 
limitations previously imposed on the scope of application of the Commonwealth 
conciliation and arbitration law. But then the High Court managed to construe 
"industrial dispute" to mean dispute "in an industry", so that significant sections of 
State governmental employment were excluded, notably school teachers, fire fighters 
and public servants (and by analogy, health and welfare workers). This view lasted 
from 1929 to 1983 when it was overturned in the Social Welfare Union case (1983) 57 
ALJR 574.
The application of the means of compulsory conciliation and arbitration in the Nigerian 
law is also general. From the beginning of the system, the law applied to all workers, 
public and private, with the exception of the armed forces, the police, the prison and 
fire services (see s.21 of 1968). S.38 of the Trade Disputes Decree 1976 added 
Customs Preventive Services to the list of exemptions. Despite these exceptions, the 
law applies to all disputes involving "workers employed by or under the Government of 
the Federation or a State as it applies to persons employed by a private person" 
(Adeogun, 1987: 182-183). "In effect therefore", Adeogun continues, "save as provided 
by Section 38(2), trade disputes involving public sector employees are covered by the 
Act"* 9.
 ^Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. (1920) 28 CLR 129.
9 Section 38(2) provides thus: "This Act shall not apply to-
(a) any member of the Nigerian Army, Navy or Air Force;
(b) any member of the Nigeria Police Force;
112
The enactment of the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Decree 1976 was not 
intended to exclude essential services disputes from the operation of the arbitration 
system. S.5 of the Decree which empowers the Commissioner/Minister to take action 
clearly indicates that these disputes are to be processed within one and the same 
system. It provides:
Where any trade dispute exists or is apprehended and it appears to the 
Minister that the dispute is one to which persons employed in any 
essential service are a party or might become a party, the Minister may 
... refer the dispute for settlement to the Industrial Arbitration Panel 
established under section 7 of the principal Act , and the provisions of 
that section (as well as any other relevant provision of the principal Act) 
shall apply in respect of the dispute to the same extent as they apply to 
any trade dispute referred to the Industrial Arbitration Panel under the 
principal Act.
In contrast to the situation of Australia and Nigeria, the means of compulsory 
arbitration in other countries does not apply automatically to all disputes. For example, 
the Guatemalan Labour Code, the Jamaican Labour Relations and Industrial Disputes 
Act, the Kenyan Trade Disputes Act, the Pakistan Industrial Relations Act 1973, the Sri 
Lankan Industrial Disputes Act, the Sudanese Regulation of Trade Disputes Act and the 
Thailand Labour Relations Act all provide for compulsory arbitration only in disputes 
either involving federations of trade unions as a party, or which are considered of 
national importance, i.e. in essential services (see Givry, 1978: 42-46).
In the United Kingdom, under the now repealed Industrial Relations Act 1971, the 
disputes had to be ones which "seriously threaten the national health, safety, economy 
or livelihood of a substantial proportion of the community" in order for them to attract 
government intervention in the form of limited compulsory arbitration. The means in 
the United States is limited to "public utility disputes". Likewise in Canada some 
employees are "governed by special labour relations legislation [compulsory arbitration
(c) any officer of whatever rank appointed to carry out duties in relation to any prison within the 
meaning of the Prisons Act 1972;
(d) any member of the Customs Preventive Service;
(e^  any member of any other service of the Federal or State Government authorised to bear arms." 
 ^This refers to the Trade Disputes Act 1976.
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schemes] because they are seen as operating in sectors in which it is deemed unwise to 
give them unrestricted collective bargaining rights" (Glasbeek, 1976: 55).
4.2.5 Constitutional limitation on the purpose and means
The scope of the central purpose and means adopted in Australian and Nigerian law is 
also influenced by the constitutions under which both countries are governed. As 
federations, both countries have a division of constitutional powers between federal and 
state governments. In Australia, section 51 (xxxv) of the schedule to the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 ^  allocates industrial power to the 
Commonwealth in the following words:
"51. The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the 
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to -
(xxxv) Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State:"
Establishing the meaning of this placitum or head of power has been a major 
preoccupation of the Australian High Court. However it can be understood from the 
construction that: (1) read together with s.107 of the Constitution, this Commonwealth 
power is concurrent rather than exclusive vis-a-vis the powers of the States, although 
the inconsistency-of-laws provision in s.109 of the Constitution favours the 
Commonwealth's activity within the bounds of the placitum; and (2) the wording of this 
enumerated power precludes the Commonwealth Parliament from dealing with labour 
conditions in a general wav, except as they relate to "any department of the public 
service the control of which is by [the] Constitution transferred to the Executive 
Government of the Commonwealth" or in the Australian Capital Territory or the 
Northern Territory [ss.52(ii) and 122; for more details, see Macken, 1974; Lane, 1987].
11 This is an imperial Act, enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom and given royal assent in 
July, 1900. It provides the constitution for Australia, the full title of which is "the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth".
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It can be deduced from the numerous High Court judgements on this placitum that the 
outer limits marked by the Constitution are, simply put, as follows: there must be a 
dispute; it must relate to industrial matter(s); it must extend beyond the limits of one 
State; and the tribunal must function by conciliation, arbitration or both. In the course 
of its rulings, the High Court has added other limits, including limiting the award to the 
matters in dispute and the inability of the Commonwealth tribunal to make "common 
rule" (Sykes, 1957: 467).
The Nigerian (Constitution) Order in Council I960^  vested the power to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government of the country in the federal Parliament. 
"Labour, that is to say, conditions of labour, industrial relations, trade unions and 
welfare of labour" was placed on the concurrent list, thus empowering both the Federal 
and Regional Governments to make laws on industrial matters. As in Australia, there 
was an inconsistency-of-laws provision, making federal laws prevail where they are in 
conflict with regional laws.
The glaring difference between Australia and Nigeria in respect of this point is that, 
whereas the Australian Commonwealth is limited to conciliation and arbitration in 
interstate industrial disputes, its Nigerian counterpart is apparently not so limited as it 
has power to deal with labour conditions in general. In fact, by mutual agreement, only 
the Federal Government had legislated on labour matters before the Constitution was 
changed in 1979. By item 32 of Second Schedule, Part 1 of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, the matter of "labour, including trade unions, 
industrial relations conditions, safety and welfare of labour, industrial disputes, 
prescribing a national minimum wage for the Federation or any part thereof and 
industrial arbitrations" has been placed on the exclusive list of federal powers (see 
Uvieghara, 1985: 19 and 24). So, unlike in Australia, the scope of the Nigerian law has 
become, de jure, constitutionally unrestricted.
12 This is an imperial law, made under the authority of the Nigeria Independence Act 1960, itself, an 
imperial Act.
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4.3 Structure of compulsory arbitration
Expert opinions indicate that one of the distinguishing features of the Australian 
arbitration system is the presence of permanent public tribunals^. They are created 
and empowered by law to conciliate and arbitrate in all arbitrable disputes with or 
without the consent of the parties. Equally distinguishing is the reliance of the system 
upon collective organisations of the two sides of industry for its effective operation. 
Together, these tribunals and the collective organisations constitute the main frame of 
the structure of the Australian compulsory arbitration.
It will be argued in this sub-section that the adoption of compulsory arbitration system 
in Nigeria has carried with it similar institutional machinery and powers. However 
some difference is observed in terms of the degree to which the Nigerian system relies 
on collective organisations.
4.3.1 Institutions: court-type permanent public tribunals
Australia's original Act of 1904 provided for "a Commonwealth Court of Conciliation 
and Arbitration, which shall be a Court of Record, and shall consist of a President" 
(s. 11). The President who was entitled "to hold office during good behaviour for seven 
years, and ... eligible for re-appointment" was to be appointed from among the Justices 
of the High Court by the Governor-General (s.12). The President could appoint as 
deputy any Justice of the High Court or Judge of the Supreme Court of a State (s. 14)14
S.38 of the original 1904 Act empowered the Court to hear and determine disputes, 
make orders or awards, fix maximum penalties for any breach or non-observance of 
orders/awards and impose penalties for proven breaches. These were arbitral and
13. O'Connor J., in the Why brow's case, used this concept when he said (at p.329): "The tribunal was no 
longer necessarily constituted by an act of the parties, nor for the adjustment of each dispute as it arose.
It might be a permanent public tribunal, appointed by the government for the arbitral adjustment of 
differences of a special kind. The parties between whom such differences existed were compelled to 
resort to it, and were bound by its awards" (emphasis, added).
14 Justice O'Connor, the first President of the Court, was appointed on February 10, 1905. However, 
there was no Deputy President until 1913, when Justice Higgins (who took over from O'Connor J in 
September 1907) appointed Mr Justice Powers as his Deputy.
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judicial powers invested in one body. However, in the Alexander c a s e the High 
Court held that the Court, being composed of a President with no life tenure, could not 
perform the judicial function (i.e exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth) of 
enforcing and interpreting its awards/agreements as this contravened s.72 of the 
Constitution which then provided that judges hold tenure for life^. The seven year 
term provision was repealed in 1926 and the President was renamed Chief Judge; 
thereafter, the Court (or the judicial arm of the system after 1956) consisted of Judges 
appointed for life, until the Constitution was amended in 1977.
In 1918 the power of the President to appoint its Deputy was removed, but in the 1928 
amendments the Chief Judge was empowered to appoint Conciliation Committees, 
comprising equal numbers of representatives from each side of industry, along with 
non-voting chairpersons. These Committees had powers to prevent and settle industrial 
disputes and the agreements reached under them could be certified by the Court and 
would have the force of law as awards. Although the power to appoint the Committees 
was transferred to the Governor-General-in-Council in 1930, there was no change to 
the powers of the Committees. Later, the provisions under which the Committees were 
appointed were held by the High Court^ to be ultra vires the Federal Parliament under 
the Constitution "because ... they attempt to transfer the power to settle industrial 
disputes by award from the Arbitration Court to a committee constituted to exercise 
that power otherwise by arbitration" (Foenander, 1937: 62).
It is significant that the Arbitration Court was conceived from the beginning as a 
standing (permanent), rather than an ad hoc, institution. This contrasts with the United 
Kingdom where, although the need for a standing tribunal had become evident in the 
early part of 1896, there was no permanent court until 1919 when the Industrial
16 Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v. Alexander (1918) 25 CLR 434.
16 The section was amended by a referendum approving s.2 of the Constitution Alteration (Retirement of 
Judges) Act 1977, which changed the tenure to "a term expiring upon [the Justices] attaining the age of 
seventy years".
1  ^The case is Australian Railways Union v. Victorian Railways Commissioners and Others (1930) 44 
CLR 319.
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Court^ was created. The importance of the permanency of this tribunal in Australia 
was dramatised in the 1920s in the confrontation between Higgins and the Hughes' 
Government, as outlined below.
The latter part of World War 1 was dominated by a climate of industrial unrest in 
Australia. The Hughes' Government^, "was frustrated by the failure of Higgins and 
Powers [President and Deputy President of the Court] to secure quick settlements of 
damaging strikes" (Hancock, 1979: 17). In response, the Government appointed ad hoc 
tribunals and later institutionalised them by getting through the Parliament an enabling 
legislation - the Industrial Peace Act 1920. This Act empowered the Government to 
appoint special tribunals, constituted in the manner of wages boards, whose awards 
would override those of the Arbitration Court.
Higgins was infuriated by this manoeuvre and showed it in a statement to the Court on 
September 25, 1920, during which he announced his resignation. Among other things, 
he said:
By the Industrial Peace Act the Prime Minister (unwittingly, I think) 
undermines the influence and usefulness of the Court ... [special 
tribunals] must be merely opportunist, seeking to get the work of the 
particular industry carried on at all costs, even the cost of concessions to 
unjust demands, and of encouraging similar demands from other 
quarters. On the other hand, a permanent Court of a judicial character 
tends to reduce conditions to system, to standardize them, to prevent 
irritating contrast ... The objectives of the permanent Court and of the 
temporary tribunal are, in truth, quite different ... A tribunal of reason 
cannot do its work side by side with executive tribunals of panic 
(Higgins, 1922: 172-173)20.
Despite this crisis in the 1920s, permanent public tribunals have remained the dominant 
institutional machinery in the Australian law. As of 1988, there were 18 of such 
tribunals in the Commonwealth jurisdiction (see Brooks, 1988: 28).
This was renamed "the Industrial Arbitration Board" by the Industrial Relations Act 1971 and 
"Central Arbitration Committee" by the Employment Protection Act 1975.
19 The last seven years of Hughes' Prime Ministership, beginning from November 14, 1916, were on the 
platforms of the National Labor Party - a break-away party from the Australian Labor Party - and the 
National Party - a product of the merger between the Liberals and the National Labor Party in February 
1917. He had begun on the platform of the Australian Labor Party on 27 October 1915 (see Brodie, 
1988: 126-135).
20 For a good window into the background of the clash between Higgins and Hughes, see McQeen 
(1983: 154-162).
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Equally significant is the point that this institution represents a "court" or "judicial" 
approach to the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes. For instance, although 
there is no statutory obligation on the institution to observe formal notions of 
precedence, its operators (e.g Higgins) have apparently adhered to the rule of taking 
cognizance of previously established principles in subsequent award-making. Hancock 
(1979: 16) attributes this to "the adoption, in the Commonwealth jurisdiction, of court- 
type arbitration rather than wages boards". Willis (1984: 4) also underlined this point 
when he remarked that despite the changes over the years "the tribunal of 1904 and the 
tribunal of 1983 are not really all that dissimilar in their respective roles and functions. 
There is still, in essence, a vcourt’ approach to the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes of an interstate character" (emphasis, mine).
In a working paper entitled "Australian Federal Labour Law: Legal Regulation and the 
Arbitral Model", Gardner, et. al. (1989) develop the argument that the Australian 
"arbitral tribunals do not conform to the ideal-type descriptions of courts". Further, in 
the context of this argument, they remark that "the mantle of court-like processes and 
judicial independence becomes less important as a description of aspects of arbitration 
and more important as a mechanism for bolstering the tribunal's claims to autonomy - 
claims which may be vital to effective dispute settling".
One main basis for their argument seems to be that the Australian tribunal system has 
incorporated "the bureaucratic administrative tradition in which the arbitrator adopts a 
more inquisitorial role formulating principles based on the public interest". This 
reflects the reference by Rawson (1980: 293) to the arbitration law as a 
"bureaucratically-oriented public law". The entire argument seems like a response to 
what Gardner et al might have perceived to be an attribution of traditional 
"judicialness" to the tribunals even though they did not demonstrate such attribution in 
their paper.
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It is nonetheless pertinent to draw attention to the fact that the framers of the system
were certainly not in doubt about the extra-ordinary character of the tribunal which
they were putting in place. Let us witness the emphasis which Deakin put on the Court
while presenting the Bill. He said: "... I now come to the general scheme of the Bill ...
[I]n the forefront of the scheme of the Bill there is a Court - a Court in every sense of
the name worthy of that title" (CPD, 1904 vol. XVIII: 767). He was quick to point out
that this was "a Court which has not yet its parallel in this country, except in New
South Wales, and which in the area of its jurisdiction has probably a parallel nowhere
outside the Supreme Court of the United States, and one or two of the courts of great
nations". How extra-ordinary? Here it is:
The Court is first a committee of conciliation and then a court of 
arbitration ... the Court is clothed with a power with which Judges are 
not endowed in our ordinary courts, except in very rare instances and to 
a very confined degree. Here we have connected judicial and 
administrative duties of the highest importance (CPD, ibid) (emphasis, 
mine).
It is clear from this presentation that, from inception, the Australian tribunal was 
conceptualised to embody judicial and administrative approaches. It began operation as 
such and later this gave rise to significant constitutional cases including R. v. Kirby; Ex 
parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254. These cases, in turn, led 
to significant amendments, reshaping the character of the tribunal. For example, the 
Boilermakers case resulted in the 1956 amendment in which the arbitral and judicial 
powers of the Court were located in two separate bodies: the former in the 
Commonwealth (later Australian) Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and the 
latter in the Commonwealth (later Australian) Industrial Court and then Federal Court. 
Whether this separation effectively put an end to these bodies adopting a judicio- 
administrative approach to dispute settlement is open to debate.
It can be argued, though, that the restructuring which followed the Boilermakers was a 
logical extension of what had been begun in 1947. In that year the 1904 Act was 
amended to restrict the Arbitration Court to purely legal matters (judicial functions) and
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to specific disputes involving basic wage (now defined for the first time), minimum 
female wage, hours of work, and annual leave with pay. Simultaneously the role of the 
Conciliation Commissioners was enhanced. Outside the matters specified for the Court, 
the Commissioners could conciliate and arbitrate in all matters. In a later amendment in 
1952 under the Menzies Government, parties could apply to the Chief Judge to have 
their disputes transferred from the Commissioners; and a limited right of appeal against 
the decisions of the Commissioners was also allowed. Clearly there were signs before 
1956 that the jurisdictions of the Court could or should be put in two mutually 
exclusive bodies, except that the separation was not clear-cut.
The post-1956 changes have left the jurisdictional divide largely intact. The 1972 
amendment was seen as significant in that it altered the qualifications for the 
appointment of Deputy-Presidents and also created two categories of Commissioners - 
Arbitration Commissioners and Conciliation Commissioners. This did not affect the 
separation of judicial and arbitral jurisdictions. Even the distinction between the 
Commissioners was soon abolished by the 1973 amendment to the Act. In 1977 the 
Industrial Court became the Industrial Division of the Federal Court of Australia; and 
the 1988 Act changed the name of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission to the 
Industrial Relations Commission.
In the Nigerian law, innovative as the introduction of compulsory arbitration through 
the 1968 Decree was claimed to be, the tribunal system which was originally set up to 
operate it was ad hoc - a carry-over from the system under the Trade Disputes 
(Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance 1941. Sections 9 and 11 of the 1968 Decree 
provided for the appointment a of Board of Inquiry and an Arbitration Tribunal by the 
Commissioner for Labour on an ad hoc ("appointed for the purpose") basis to inquire 
into, and settle, any trade dispute pursuant to the Decree. Once the Tribunal "gave an 
award in respect of the dispute it became functus officio" (Adeogun, 1972: 116).
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Soon, however, a permanent public tribunal system was introduced under the amending 
law - Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions)(Amendment)(No. 2) 1969. In s.3, a 
provision was made for the establishment of a standing tribunal "to be known as the 
Industrial Arbitration Tribunal", consisting of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and five 
others - all appointed by the Commissioner. The Decree came into force on 12 
December, 1969, and three months later the tribunal was inaugurated on Monday, 
March 16, 1970. Apparently, this was a welcome development. In Adeogun's (1970: 
125) words, "the establishment of a standing Industrial Arbitration Tribunal is very 
welcome and serious consideration should be given to the possibility of making it a 
permanent feature of our industrial relations system after the cessation of the current 
national emergency".
Evidently such consideration was indeed given, for the Trade Disputes Decree 1976 
established the Industrial Arbitration Panel as a standing institution (or "permanent" 
body - see ILO, 1980: 157) in the place of the Industrial Arbitration Tribunal. This 
Panel was composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and not less than ten other 
members. Of these members, two each were to be nominated by the employers 
organisations and workers organisations, so appearing to the Minister of Labour as 
representing the interests of employers and workers respectively [s.7(2)]. The members 
of the Panel had three years tenure of office and could be eligible for re-appointment.
Quite significantly, the 1976 Decree also introduced the "court" approach into the 
Nigerian industrial relations system by providing for the establishment of the National 
Industrial Court, with a President and four other members (see s.14). The appointment 
of these members was to be done by the [National Assembly] acting, in the case of the 
President, after consultation with the Federal Judicial Service Commission [s.16(1)]T 
Under s. 17 the President was empowered to appoint, with discretion, assessors to assist 
the Court, consisting of two each nominated by employers' and workers' 
representatives. The members of the Court could hold office up to the time they 
attained the age of 62 years (see s. 19).
#  (see Emiola, 1982: 492)
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The establishment of this Court had been recommended by a number of sources long
before it eventuated. For instance, the Morgan Commission^* in 1964 remarked that
they "received submissions on the desirability of making provisions for the
establishment of Industrial Courts in the country". Convinced by the evidence, they
accordingly recommended "that legislative provisions should be made for the
establishment of Industrial Courts to adjudicate upon industrial disputes" (Morgan,
1964: 44). In 1969, Adeogun recommended in a similar vein:
An industrial court should ... be set up to deal with such labour matters 
as termination of contracts of employment, interpretation of collective 
agreements and adjudication upon industrial disputes. The establishment 
of an industrial court, it is hoped, would obviate the present painful 
delays, not to talk of the expense, involved in litigation through the 
ordinary courts (Adeogun, 1969: 40).
The Adebo Commission^ is also said to have made a similar recommendation in 1971 
(see Adeogun, 1976: 6 - footnote 11).
The Court actually commenced functioning in June 1978. Armed with original and 
appellate jurisdictions, the Court emerged "as the final arbiter in all trade disputes 
between the management and the trade unions" (Launching address, 1981: 8). These 
jurisdictions cover the settlement of trade disputes and the interpretation of collective 
agreements. Thus, there now exists in Nigeria, as in Australia, a separate judicial 
institution dealing solely with industrial or labour matters.
4.3.2 Institutions: Parties - individual/collective distinction
What is the status of collective bodies in the two compulsory arbitration systems? How 
does this affect the standing of individual disputant before the tribunals? These 
questions, inter alia, constitute a significant aspect of the debate about the position of 
"parties" within the structural frameworks of the Australian and Nigerian collective 
labour laws. They are examined in this sub-section.
21 This Commission was set up to hold an inquiry into the salaries and wages of junior employees, the 
abolition of the daily-wage system and the introduction of a national minimum wage.
2? This Commission was set up to review the wages and salaries in public service and to recommend in 
respect of rationalising and harmonising remunerations in the public and private sectors.
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Early debates in the 1903 Australian Commonwealth Parliament attributed
considerable importance to "organisations". Deakin remarked that "a very important
part of the measure is that which relates to the organisations of employers and
employes(sic)". He then drew attention to the clauses which provided for the
incorporation of organisations, including those that provided for dealing "with those
who seek to avoid coming under the provisions of the measure by neglecting to
organize" (CPD, 1903 vol. XV: 2881). Another expression of opinion on organisations,
albeit on a higher level of generality, came from Reid. He said:
I do not attempt to disguise my opinion that trade unions are the 
evolution of intelligence ... I have come to look upon a union ... as the 
form in which the most intelligent spirits assert their vitality and their 
power ... I have the keenest belief in that sort of evolution which makes 
labour speak with one voice as much as possible, and which causes 
capital to speak with one voice as much as possible. With only two 
voices reason may prevail, but in the tower of industrial Babel what 
hope is there of any rational settlement of the everlasting differences 
between these two great powers? (CPD, 1903 vol. XV: 3192-3).
Regarding the specific place of organisations in the system, as was originally 
conceived, let Deakin speak again:
under this Bill, ... the organizations themselves ... are sought to be made 
extensions of the machinery of this Court. The object is ... to enable 
findings to be binding; to allow the decisions to cover a large area; to 
prevent isolated disputes, and to enable broad principles and practices to 
be adopted in particular trades ... By all these ways and means they are, 
so to speak, constituted a part of the machinery of justice (CPD, 1904 
vol.XVIII: 772).
In consonance with the position expressed in this remark, great emphasis was placed on 
organisations in the 1904 Act and it does not appear to have diminished to date. As it 
was in that Act, so it seems to be in the 1988 Act, the increase of State control over the 
internal affairs of the organisations over the years notwithstanding^.
Against this historical background it can be better appreciated why registered 
organisations have, apparently, acquired the exclusive right to be the parties in matters 
brought before the tribunals. This situation is underlined by Higgins' (1922: 15) remark 
that
23 The Hon Ralph Willis, MP once said: "The Act now covers organisations from the cradle to the 
grave,... and regulates almost every aspect of their affairs in extraordinary detail".
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the system of arbitration adopted by the Act is based on unionism. 
Indeed, without unions, it is hard to conceive how arbitration could be 
worked ... [N]o party can file a plaint for the settlement of a dispute 
except an "organization", that is to say, a union of employers or 
employees registered under the Act.
During his time as a President of the Arbitration Court, Higgins adopted the policy that 
the Court would not "assist an employer in devices to stamp out unionism" or wreak 
"gradual bleeding of unionism by the feeding of non-unionism".
It was also an early view of the High Court that the status conferred upon the 
organisations by the legislature was valid and justifiable under the Commonwealth's 
incidental power, i.e s.51.(xxxix) of the Constitution. In Jumbunna Coal Mine, No 
Liability v. Victorian Coal Miners Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, the incorporation of 
workers association was challenged. The Court held, as per O'Connor J., at 361, that 
"the constitution of these representative bodies as legal entities in the corporate form is 
merely the adoption of a means for effectually carrying out the powers expressly 
conferred by sub-sec xxxv. Being, therefore, according to the test I have laid down, 
means appropriate and plainly adapted to that end, their creation in the form enacted is 
within the power conferred on Parliament by sub-sec xxxix".
Moreover the High Court endorsed the position that the organisations can create and be 
parties to disputes and to awards. They are parties as "principals" not agents, for as held 
in Burwood Cinema Ltd v. Australian Theatrical and Amusement Employees' 
Association (1925) 35 CLR 528, "an organisation registered under the Arbitration Act 
is not a mere agent of its members: it stands in their place, and acts on their account 
and is representative of the class associated together in the organization. It is, as my 
brother Higgins said, 'a  party principal’, and 'not a mere agent or figurehead’" (as per 
Starke J., at 551).
In addition to acting as representatives at tribunal hearings, the organisations are said to 
have played the role of policing, i.e. carrying "the burden of detecting breaches and 
non-observances of the Act and the awards" (Foenander, 1958: 225). This view has
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been echoed in Scherer's (1983: 170) observation that unions were recognised not "only 
for the purpose of serving claims for wage increases to be heard by the tribunals. They 
were also responsible - in their role as organisations registered under the Act - for the 
enforcement of awards". In fact, Scherer is of the view that, until 1928, the unions 
"were solely responsible for the enforcement of federal awards". Whatever uncertainty 
there may be with this view, there is little question that the organisations under the 
Australian law have had a special standing.
It goes without saying that the standing of the individual disputant pales in comparison 
with the registered organisations within this tribunal system. When the legal framework 
of this system was being fashioned, Senator Symon was unequivocal on the lack of 
standing of the individual. He stated: "I wish to say, generally, that the Bill is not 
intended, and will not give any benefit to individual employes (sic). It is only as 
members of organizations that they can secure any benefit under this Bill" (CPD, 1904 
vol.XXn: 5719).
In the Jumbunna case Isaacs J., at 373, added a judicial notice to this emphasis on the 
"collective" when he stated that "dispute in the industry generally, which is an 
industrial dispute in the large economic sense, must be carefully distinguished from an 
industrial dispute between a specific single employer and one of his employees. The 
latter may be an industrial dispute too but in a narrower sense, and not in the broad 
national sense which the Constitution intended". This position was affirmed in R. v. 
Staples; Ex parte Australian Telecommunications Commission (1980) ALR 533.
In that case, it was argued for Telecom, inter alia, that Michael Morris - the employee 
whose dismissal gave rise to the case - was an individual acting in his own cause and 
that the Commission had no jurisdiction to settle disputes between a single employee 
and an employer. The Court upheld this argument, stating that "even if Mr Morris were 
able to bring the subject-matter of his dispute within the literal terms of the definition 
of 'industrial matter' ..., we would have grave difficulty in drawing a conclusion in
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favour of jurisdiction" (per Stephen, Mason and Wilson, JJ p. 542). It is not clear how 
McCallum (1990: 212) has arrived at citing this case as an authority in which "the High 
Court has held that individual employees may be industrial disputants in their own 
right". Perhaps, because the Court noted that individuals may mount a dispute with 
implications for other workers, e.g health and safety matters.
In the 1987 Industrial Relations Bill there were provisions which could have given a 
right to individual employees to approach the tribunals. For instance, clause 188(4) 
provided that a complaint on unfair dismissals may be made by the person or an 
organisation of which the person is a member. The Bill never became law. The 1988 
Bill - under the same name - which did become law, omitted this provision. Thus, as 
Mitchell (1988: 491) has observed, "on the basis of the existing authority, individuals 
will find it difficult, if not impossible, to create an industrial dispute which will give 
rise to the exercise of the Commission's jurisdiction". The system remains, essentially, 
the domain of collective parties.
In Nigeria it is not obvious how much the system depends on unionism. The first 
legislation which introduced compulsory arbitration into Nigeria’s industrial relations 
defined a "party" to a dispute as including "an employer or organisation representing 
the interests of the employers, the trade union directly concerned in the dispute, and 
where there is no such trade union then, the representatives of the workers directly 
engaged in the undertaking" [s. 1 (2)(iii) of the 1968 Act]. This definition does not give 
unions or organisations the sole right to be "parties"; neither does it exclude them. It 
has, nonetheless, been regarded as "a significant change" which has led to the industrial 
relations practice of having unions and associations as parties (Adeogun, 1972: 115).
However, on the face of the current principal law, it can be argued - as Emiola has 
done, albeit tentatively - that the 1976 Act has kept the trade union out of the business 
of dispute resolution:
apart from section 24(4) of the [Trade Disputes] Act which deals with
the granting of consents to the publication by the minister of
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confidential matters relating^to the affairs of 'any trade union' in the 
report of a board of inquiry-4, there is nowhere else that the new Act 
specifically [not even indirectly! mentions a 'trade union' as a party to 
the resolution of any dispute (Emiola, 1982: 222).
Sections 2(1), read together with 37(1 )(a) and (b), provides to the effect that any 
collective agreement for the settlement of a trade dispute, being an agreement 
concluded between an employer or organisation of employers and trade unions, shall be 
deposited by these bodies with the Minister for Labour. Yet any order made by the 
Minister upon this agreement "shall be binding on the employers and workers to whom 
they relate" [s.2(3)] (emphasis, mine). How about the union with which the agreement 
was concluded? Adeogun (1969: 37) seems to have answered this question while 
commenting on the earlier version of this provision [i.e. s.2(2) of the 1968 Act). He 
pointed out that although the trade union is a party for the purpose of concluding a 
collective agreement, "when it comes to legal enforceability, the trade union drops out 
and the individual workers step in".
Other unclear provisions include s.3(l) of the 1976 Act which states that "if there exist 
agreed means for settlement of the dispute apart from this Act, whether by virtue of the 
provisions of any agreement between organisations representing the interest of 
employers and organisations of workers ... the parties to the dispute shall first attempt 
to settle it by that means" (emphasis, mine). There is nothing in this provision to 
suggest that the "organisations" between whom the agreement is entered are necessarily 
the said "parties". Also, it cannot be implied from s.34(2) of the Trade Unions Act 
1973, which recognises a trade union as "a party to collective ... bargaining" (emphasis, 
mine), that the trade union has to be the party in a dispute arising from the bargaining.
Uvieghara (1985: 146) has remarked that to conclude a collective agreement does not 
give general acceptance to collective bodies, i.e. the trade union, to act as agent for its 
members. The National Industrial Court has pointed out that "the primary right... to be 
a party to a trade dispute belongs to the workers on the one hand and the employers on 
the other hand. Contrary to the argument that has been canvassed for the trade union,
24  This section is more or less a re-enactment of s. 10(4) of 1968 Decree.
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the right of appearance before this Court belongs to the workers. The trade unions are 
only the representatives of the workers"^.
In Nigerian Tobacco Co. Ltd v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco 
Employees1-, the Court held that a trade dispute "can be taken up by a recognised trade 
union on behalf of its members" (quoted in Uvieghara, ibid: 168). The union would, 
however, need to show that it has been asked to do so by its members in order to obtain 
locus standi before the Court.
In the light of all this, it is not immediately clear why Adeogun (1976: 12) needed to 
recommend that "the jurisdiction of the NIC ... be widened to allow individual workers 
to have access to it ...". For, as things now stand, the system seems to give more 
recognition to individual, than to collective, parties. This conforms, for instance to the 
British system which is built upon the "inviolability of individual's rights" principle and 
is in sharp contrast to the Australian experience in which collective parties are held as 
pillars of the system.
It will now be noted, by way of summary, that out of the seven themes upon which the 
Australian and Nigerian laws have been compared in this chapter, differences occur on 
two themes (i.e, the constitutional limitation and the parties to disputes). On the 
remaining five, namely the purpose, the means, the disputes types, the scope in terms of 
application, and the tribunals both laws are parallel to each other. Obviously, the two 
laws are overwhelmingly similar, given that these are laws of countries not connected 
by race, geography or direct colonial relationship. But more significantly they stand in 
a class of their own in comparison to other countries like Britain, France, Germany, the 
Scandinavian countries, and the United States.
^  Western Textile Industries Ltd. v. Ado-Ekiti Westexinco Workers’ Union [19781 79 NICLR 107 at 111. 
2' Unreported Suit No. NIC/5/82.
129
CHAPTER FIVE: THE PROCESSES AND PRODUCTS OF COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN AND NIGERIAN LABOUR LAWS
5.1 Introduction
In chapter four an attempt has been made to identify the differences and similarities 
between the philosophies and institutional frameworks of compulsory arbitration 
systems in the Australian and Nigerian labour laws. The focus in this chapter is on the 
remaining two key aspects of these systems, namely, the processes and products of the 
means which has been adopted to achieve industrial peace in the two countries.
What are the various stages in the settlement of industrial disputes? How are they 
initiated, by whom and under what conditions? What is the nature of the outcomes of 
the settlement and how are they enforced? The answers to these questions constitute 
what are here regarded as the processes and products of the systems. As in the 
preceding chapter, the attempt here is to identify the differences and similarities 
between the two systems.
5.2 Processes of compulsory arbitration
There are four main stages in the processes of arbitration system in Australia and 
Nigeria: negotiation, notification, conciliation, and arbitration. In their initiation and 
conduct, it will be seen that the Executive arm of Government plays a more significant 
referral role in Nigeria than in Australia. Apart from this material difference, the 
processes in both countries are fundamentally similar in that they are automatic and 
mandatory.
5.2.1 Negotiation and the status of collective bargaining
In the Australian and Nigerian laws there are provisions which recognise collective 
agreements concluded by parties to an industrial dispute. The implication of this, 
regarding the status of direct negotiation or voluntary collective bargaining in systems
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that are essentially compulsory and arbitral, has remained a question for debate. 
Nevertheless, the recognition of collective agreements underlines the importance that is 
attached to direct negotiation in the arbitration systems of both countries.
Part VI (ss.73-78) of the original Australian Act of 1904 provided that organizations 
may make industrial agreements with themselves "for the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes by conciliation and arbitration", a duplicate of which was to be filed 
in the office of the Industrial Registrar within 30 days of the making thereof. The 
Registrar was, if requested, to investigate and confirm with a certificate "that the fact is 
as stated". Upon this confirmation, the agreements would, during their continuance, be 
binding on all parties thereto and their breach was punishable by pecuniary penalty.
In 1972 there was an amendment to the law. In addition to the existing provision for 
industrial agreements (now Part X, ss. 172-180 of the Act), it was provided to the effect 
that the Commission, in dealing with an industrial dispute, should encourage the parties 
to agree on procedures for preventing or settling further disputes and this should be 
included in an award (s.20 of the Act 1904-1986). This amendment followed the 
publication by the National Labour Advisory Council of guidelines on "Procedures for 
Dealing with Industrial Disputes" which listed principles to guide parties seeking to 
incorporate grievance procedures in their awards or agreements.
Does this provision encourage negotiation for procedural agreements or for substantive 
agreements or for both*? At the early stages of the system, there was a judicial ruling 
on a question of this nature in Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association of 
A'asian v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (No 3) (1913) 16 CLR 715. The parties had made an 
agreement purporting to settle the wages and working conditions of members of the 
workers organisation. They described the agreement as made pursuant to the Act and
* As defined in s. 167 of the English Industrial Relations Act 1971, these are key elements in collective 
bargaining, being "negotiations with respect to terms and conditions of employment, or with respect to 
the making, variation or recission of a procedure agreement, or with respect to any matter to which a 
procedure agreement can relate".
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incorporated the provision for the reference of any dispute arising under the agreement 
to a conciliation board. The High Court, however, held that this was not an agreement 
within the meaning of Part X because it contained such substantive issues as wages and 
working conditions.
Mills and Sorrell (1975: 404) drew upon this judicial ruling in their comment that "the 
only industrial agreement contemplated by this part of the Act is one for the prevention 
and settlement of industrial disputes by conciliation and arbitration". In effect, the 
negotiation contemplated is one which would lead to an agreement only on procedures 
or methods for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes. This understanding 
appears to be at variance with that submitted by the Hancock Committee (1985: 367) 
when they say
The provisions of Part X of the Act enable parties covered by a federal 
award to choose, by mutual consent, to enter into an industrial 
agreement for the prevention and settlement of disputes by conciliation 
and arbitration. Bv the use of such procedures, agreed terms and 
conditions of employment could be arrived at and provision made for 
the enforcement of those terms and conditions (emphasis, mine).
Even though this understanding appears, in the light of the existing judicial 
interpretation, to be stretching the construction of Part X too far, it is closer to the 
meaning which the framers of the law had put on Part X. In his explanatory speech in 
the House of Representatives Deakin referred to the agreements contemplated in Part X 
as voluntary industrial agreements between employers and employees made quite 
independently of the Arbitration Court "in regard to the conduct of the particular trade 
or business in which they are engaged" (CPD, 1903 vol. XV: 2861-2). McCallum 
(1986: 301) has a similar understanding of this Part as indicated by his view that the 
framers of the original 1904 Act made room for voluntary agreements by employers 
and employees on substantive issues such as wage rates and work rules.
However, the judicial interpretation shows that the provision would not meet a 
generally held definition of collective bargaining as "a method, or process, of
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conducting negotiations about wages and working conditions and other terms of 
employment between an employer, or group of employers, or employers' associations 
on the one hand, and representatives of workers and their organizations on the other, 
with a view to arriving at collective agreements ..." (Marsh, 1979: 54). Neither does it 
accord with article 4 of Convention 98 (Concerning the Application of the Principles of 
the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively), adopted by the ILO in its 32nd 
session on 8 June 1949. This Convention provides that appropriate measures be taken 
"to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for 
voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers' 
organisations, with a view to the regulation of the terms and conditions of employment 
by means of collective agreements". Nonetheless it can be suggested that the restriction 
on the Part X agreements was the creation of the High Court, not the Legislature.
Another provision in the Australian law recognising "collective agreements" is s.28 of 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Acfi. It provides that parties could make a 
memorandum of an agreement reached between themselves on terms for the settlement 
of all or any of the matters in dispute before this dispute is referred to arbitration in 
accordance with the Act, or during arbitration proceedings as per s.30(3). The parties 
could request the Commission to certify this memorandum which, when certified, 
would have "the same effect as, and shall be deemed to be, an award of the 
Commission for all purposes of this Act". Compared to the provision under Part X, the 
difference here is that this provision allows negotiation to reach agreements on 
substantive issues of industrial relations. That is, the negotiation can address issues 
which would normally be addressed in a conventional collective bargain.
Niland (1978: 82) is sceptical about this measure of negotiation as it is provided for in 
"the Australian approach to industrial regulation [which] is still dominated by the 
institutions and mental postures of compulsory arbitration". The negotiation is to be 
conducted under the shadow of arbitration. Nonetheless, drawing on the "Direct
2 This was introduced into the law by s.7 of the amendment No. 44 of 1956 as "s. 16Q(1)".
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Negotiation Survey" and the "Scott & Co Survey" conducted in 1975 and 1977 
respectively, he attempts to demonstrate that the "incidence of collective bargaining", 
especially outside the tribunal structure, has been significant in Australia (see pp.83- 
85).
Creighton, et. al. (1983: 510-513) share the view that "direct negotiation and collective 
bargaining play a more significant role in our industrial relations systems than is often 
supposed". In support of this position they then list a number of case studies which 
have focused upon "'conventional form' bargaining in Australia". They also highlight 
"one extremely important form of direct negotiation - namely, overaward bargaining" 
which Niland appears to have overlooked in his categorisation of bargaining proper in 
Australia.
The Industrial Relations Act 1988 seems to have given more recognition to substantive
agreements than was previously the case. It strengthens the provisions in the old law
and adds new ones. In addition to providing for the Commission to give greater
"encouragement" to the parties to agree on grievance procedures (s.91), it enjoins the
Commission, in exercising its powers in relation to an industrial dispute, to have regard
to the extent to which the parties have complied with the procedures (s.92). The latter
provision is entirely new in the law. It says:
Where the parties to an industrial dispute are bound by an award that 
provides for procedures for preventing or settling industrial disputes 
between them, the Commission shall, in considering whether or when it 
will exercise its powers in relation to the industrial dispute, have regard 
to the extent to which the procedures (if applicable to the industrial 
dispute) have been complied with by the parties and the circumstances 
of any compliance or non-compliance with the procedures.
It should be observed that this new statutory requirement reflects, to some extent, the
[existing] practice of the Arbitration Commission.
Of more significance is the new provision in s. 115 which, in my view, contemplates 
negotiation in its own right and not as a stop-gap between conciliation and arbitration 
as was the case in s.28 of the 1904 Act. One is inclined to this view even though
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s. 103(1 )(a) of 1988 describes the action in s. 115 as part of the completion of 
conciliation proceeding. Perhaps this unclear picture has arisen from the situation in 
which the provision "embraces but transforms two different types of agreement 
envisaged by [the 1904 Act] - s.28 (certified memorandum of agreement) and Part X 
(industrial agreement)" (Weeks, 1989: 2043)^.
In any case, the provision allows for the making of a memorandum of agreement on 
"terms for the settlement of all or any of the matters in dispute". Upon application by 
the parties and satisfying certain conditions, the memorandum shall be certified by the 
Commission. The certification gives the agreement the effect of an award and makes its 
terms prevail over any existing award or order of the Commission dealing with the 
same matters and binding on each of the parties to the agreement (s. 116). This 
provision is a clear indication that direct negotiation, leading to substantive agreements 
in their own right, is contemplated in these provisions and it reflects the 
recommendation which had been made on this issue by the Hancock Committee (1985: 
369).
It may well be that the recommendation was part of the pressure under which the 
federal government had been "for some considerable time ... to enact legislation which 
would enable employers and employees within an enterprise to negotiate agreements 
relating to wages and conditions" of employment (Marks, 1989: 68-69). Whatever the 
motivation may have been, it is defensible, as Mitchell (1988: 493) has argued, to see 
this provision "as a contribution to the strategy aimed at enhancing the flexibility of the 
centralized system".
Obviously, the full impact of this new regime on conventional collective bargaining in 
Australia, in contrast to that of the old regime, cannot be ascertained as yet. Put 
differently, "it is still too early to pronounce upon its fate" vis-a-vis private negotiation.
3 Weeks' work under reference provides a very useful detailed comparison between the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 and the legislation it replaced, i.e the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904.
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The signs are that it may not go far, for its enactment and operation "has not silenced 
those who wish to see a much higher level of decentralised and enterprise focused 
bargaining under federal law" (McCallum, 1990: 223).
The criticism of the old regime is that it destroyed the underpinning, or stultified the 
growth, of collective bargaining. It is yet to be seen how the new regime can change 
matters, given that it will still operate within the compulsory tribunal system in which 
industrial action is essentially unlawful. For, as Sykes and Glasbeek (1972: 369) have 
observed,
it stands to reason that if disputants know that, if they refuse to agree, an 
independent body will settle their dispute, they will not be required to 
gamble on the outcome of a trial of strength. Yet preparedness to wage 
an economic warfare to the bitter end is a fundamental tenet of a 
collective bargaining system.
In Nigeria, s.2(l) of 1968 Decree and s.3 of 1976 Decree have recognised negotiation, 
with or without mediation, by providing that its products (collective agreements) - 
where they exist - should be deposited with government and complied with in the event 
of a trade dispute. The 1968 provision made failure to deposit the agreements an 
offence. It also provided for the Commissioner to make an order on the terms of the 
agreement which would make them binding on the "parties", and failure to comply 
with the agreement thereafter would be an offence.
While s.3(2) of the 1968 Decree left it to the discretion of the parties to adopt any 
procedure stipulated in any collective agreement as a first step towards the settlement 
of their dispute, s.3(l) of the 1976 Decree has provided that parties are obliged to 
negotiate according the existing means in the circumstance of a dispute. In both 
Decrees, however, it is provided that the Commissioner/Minister may order due 
compliance with any existing agreements [see s.6 (1968); s.5 (1976)].
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As in the Australian law, it is not clear from the face of the Nigerian law whether the 
recognition is restricted to those agreements which deal solely with dispute settlement, 
i.e. procedural agreements, or whether it extends to all agreements so long as they 
provide for dispute settlement among other things. The definition of "collective 
agreement" in s.37 of the 1976 Decree - referring to the settlements of disputes and 
relating to terms of employment and physical conditions of work - which appears wider 
than the scope of "for the settlement of a trade dispute" in s.2 contributes to this lack of 
clarity.
Be that as it may, the views of some scholars have indicated that the recognition in the 
law extends to conventional collective bargaining whose outcomes can include 
procedural and substantive issues. Adeogun (1969: 36) has argued that the 1968 Decree 
did not abolish the "principle of free and voluntary collective bargaining" or, as he put 
it a few years later, "Decree No. 21 of 1968 leaves unimpaired the principle of free and 
voluntary collective bargaining which is the State's policy to foster ..." (1972: 112). The 
law has left the employers and the workers to set up collective bargaining machinery 
(Whitley Council system in the public service sector and Joint Industrial Councils/Joint 
Consultative Councils in the private sector) for the regulation of wages and other 
labour matters and to reach agreements on them. In the event of a trade dispute, the law 
begins by obliging the parties to settle according to their agreements, failing which 
other procedures are bought in.
Although Fashoyin also holds the view that conventional collective bargaining is
legally retained in Nigeria, he seems to argue that this machinery now operates within
the tribunal structure. His argument can be abridged from his own words as follows:
After a case has been referred to arbitration, the parties set to argue their 
case, ... the parties, sometimes with the urging of the LAP [i.e. Industrial 
Arbitration Panel], have gone back to the bargaining table to resume 
negotiations, though they have not formally withdrawn their case from 
the tribunal ... the agreement thus reached is taken to IAP [for 
certification as award] (Fashoyin, 1977: 159-160).
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Although he describes this process as "accommodative conciliation", it appears more 
like a combination of what Niland (1978: 18) has conceptualised as referred 
negotiation and accommodative arbitration
Essentially, Fashoyin sees the law as combining compulsory arbitration with collective 
bargaining, and takes the view that this legal framework "has had the direct positive 
effect of encouraging private negotiation" (Fashoyin, 1980: 84). He demonstrates this 
effect in a table, showing that collective bargaining machinery has maintained a strong 
lead over other machineries for dispute resolution, particularly since the seventies. 
Bearing this in mind, the point he makes a couple of paragraphs later that arbitration 
"may often have a negative impact on the collective bargaining process" (emphasis, 
mine), presumably by inhibiting consensual industrial relations, appears hollow with 
respect to Nigeria. But it brings him somewhat in line with the contention of Sykes and 
Glasbeek (1972: 369) that "any scheme which embodies both compulsory arbitration 
and private settlement can hardly claim to have a consistent attitude to the management 
of industrial relations".
Another scholar who has expressed views on this question is Emiola (1982: 216). He 
appears inclined to the opinion that "free and voluntary collective bargaining [is] the 
cornerstone of our industrial relations" or, in the official parlance, "the process of 
consultation and discussion ... is the foundation of industrial democracy in industry", to 
which the Nigerian government is committed. From this point of view, Emiola seems 
to maintain that the changes that have taken place since 1968 or, in his words, "such 
intervention that there has been, ... is the extension of the legal framework of collective 
negotiation".
The work by Imoisili (1984) is one indication of the extent to which procedural and 
substantive agreements are being concluded through direct negotiations in the private 
sector in Nigeria. In the public sector, the constraints to collective bargaining
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machinery appear formidable, but they have not dampened expressions of the 
desirability of the machinery in the sector (see Fashoyin, ed. 1987).
The point remains that the Nigerian law does not appear to shield substantive issues 
per se away from direct private negotiation. In fact, in another statute - the Wages 
Boards and Industrial Councils Act 1973 - employers and workers are enjoined to 
establish Joint Industrial Councils for the purpose of negotiating and reaching 
agreements relating to such matters as are considered to be matters for negotiation, 
including wages and conditions of employment (see s.18).
In practice, the difficulty has been where to draw a line between issues that are 
negotiable and those that are not. One illustration of this dilemma can be derived from 
the dispute between Allied Workers Union and Michelin (Nigeria) Trading Limited in 
1975. The IAP turned down the request of the Union to amend a procedural agreement 
already in existence so that welfare matters, medical facilities, etc could be included on 
the list of items that are negotiable. The reason for the decision was not because those 
matters were substantive; rather it was because, in the industrial relations practice in 
Nigeria, they are for discussion only and not for negotiation (see Ubeku, 1983: 176- 
177). However, in Nigerian Breweries Ltd v. Nigerian Breweries Management 
Association (1978-79) NICLR 35, the NIC was urged to set aside an award which the 
IAP had made, rather inconsistently, in favour of the workers’ argument that medical 
facility was a negotiable matter. The Court did set aside the award.
It can be observed from the foregoing presentation that, prior to the 1988 changes, the 
Australian law differed from the Nigerian law in terms of the issues which they allow 
for direct negotiation outside the shadow of arbitration. More significantly, however, 
both laws have consistently and in a similar way given the force of law to agreements 
arising from such negotiations. In regard to the latter point, both laws differ from the 
British law under which agreements are generally "gentlemen's agreements", binding 
upon the parties in honour only.
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5.2.2 Notification of industrial dispute
Notification as a procedure in dispute settlement occurs at different times in direct 
negotiation in Australia and Nigeria. Under the Australian law, except, perhaps, for the 
effect of s. 115 of the 1988 Act, notification occurs before the negotiation of substantive 
agreement begins; in Nigeria, it occurs after. However, the condition under which the 
procedure occurs and the character that it takes are similar in the two countries: once a 
point of impasse is reached, notification is mandatory. In this respect, both countries 
contrast with Britain where the compulsory arbitration system which operated between 
1940 and 1959 (see Kahn-Freund, 1959) placed no obligation on the parties to a dispute 
to notify the relevant Minister, not even during the regime of the notorious Conditions 
of Employment and National Arbitration Order 1940 (Tumer-Samuels, 1951: 289).
At the start of the Commonwealth system in Australia, the law empowered the 
Arbitration Court to have cognizance of all industrial disputes which were certified by 
the Registrar as proper to be dealt with by the Court in the public interest, those which 
were submitted to the Court by an organisation (by plaint in the prescribed manner) and 
those which any State Industrial Authority or a State Governor-in-Council has 
requested the Court to deal with (s.19 of the original 1904 Act). In 1956, this procedure 
was changed to notification (see "s.l6M" as inserted by s.7 of No. 44 of 1956).
Section 25 of the 1904 Act (as amended) and s.99 of the 1988 Act provide that once an 
industrial dispute has occurred, the parties are (or any of them is) obliged to notify the 
tribunal forthwith, i.e. "as soon as an organisation or an employer becomes aware of an 
existence of an (alleged) industrial dispute affecting" them. The sections also permit the 
Minister who becomes aware of a dispute to notify the tribunal. The notification covers 
all such disputes except, as now provided in s.99(4) of 1988 Act, those relating to 
secondary boycotts.
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Also, if it appears to the tribunal that an industrial dispute has occurred or is likely to 
occur, the tribunal shall, whether it has been notified or not, immediately ascertain the 
parties and the matters and shall take such steps as it thinks fit. The tribunal can do this 
because it is has been armed with a compulsory power of intervention (see s.21 of the 
1904 Act; s.33 of the 1988 Act). In other words, in contrast to the United States and 
Britain where the existing procedure is basically contractual, i.e. based on consent of 
parties, the tribunals in Australia have power to take over dispute situations whether the 
parties like it or not. Thus the notification, howsoever made, obliges the parties to the 
dispute to answer to the tribunal.
The Hancock Committee (1985: 547) specifically supports the provision for the 
tribunal's intervention which, according to them, has "the effect of placing disputes 
before the Commission earlier than might otherwise occur". In fact they are in favour 
of the legislation making this power more explicit by requiring "the relevant member 
of the Commission to make himself aware of actual or impending disputes situations 
and to move quickly on his own motion ..." (p.548).
In the Nigerian law, either party to a dispute which has not been resolved by the 
collective bargaining machinery, where it exists, is obliged to report the dispute to the 
Minister of Labour, Employment and Productivity within a specified period after the 
failure of the direct negotiation and/or mediation (s.4 of 1976 Decree). Under s.4 of 
1968 Decree, now superseded by the 1976 Decree, the party had to declare a dispute 
and then notify the Commissioner of the declaration accordingly; and failure to do so 
was an offence.
This statutory obligation to notify is similar to that which the Australian law has 
imposed upon parties to an industrial dispute. The opposite is the case in Britain where, 
as indicated earlier, parties are under no obligation to notify disputes either to the 
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service or the Government. In the United States,
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notification is required to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service only in 
certain types of disputes (see Blain, et. al., 1987: 185).
Section 5(2) of the Nigerian 1968 Decree empowered the Commissioner (as the official 
was then called) to apprehend disputes and take action. This provision was dropped in 
the 1976 Decree but restored by amendment No. 54 of 1977, inserting s.3A which 
says: "where a trade dispute is apprehended by the Minister he may in writing inform 
the parties or their representatives of his apprehension and of the steps he proposes to 
take for the purpose of resolving the dispute” (per sub-section 1).
This provision gives the Minister power of direct intervention, similar to the power 
which the Australian law has given to the Commission. For, as Adeogun (1972: 114) 
had observed with regard to the 1968 provision, "what is new is that the [Minister] can 
resort to [conciliation, formal inquiry and arbitration] without the consent of the parties 
to the dispute ...".
It is pertinent, at this juncture, to examine the question: when has a dispute occurred or 
when is there a dispute situation? It is the existence of such occurrence or situation that 
triggers the process of notification in Australia and Nigeria.
Brooks (1986: 157) has noted that originally the High Court in Australia looked to 
strikes and lock-outs as evidence for the existence of an industrial dispute; and that this 
approach changed in 1938 when the Court ruled that demands genuinely made in the 
interest of an organisation and not acceded to, so long as the geographic limits of one 
State are exceeded, bring into existence a dispute ^
The change in approach is a fact, but it would seem that it actually occurred much 
earlier than 1938. Before 1913 the judicial position was that "a process of written
 ^See The Australian and Motor Omnibus Employees Association v Commr for Road Transport and 
Tramways (NSW) & Anor (1938) 58 CLR 436 at pp442-443.
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demand for the improved working conditions and refusal thereof had not brought into 
existence a 'dispute' within the meaning of section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution" 
However in the Merchant Service Guild Case^ this process was held to be sufficient to 
create a dispute. Also, in the Builders' Labourers' Case (1914) 18 CLR 224, the High 
Court decided that a formal demand for improved conditions of pay and work, if 
refused, affords a prima facie evidence of a dispute.
Plowman (1983: 13-15) makes a sociological point by attributing this change in 
approach to the appointment of Charles Powers, Frank Gavan Duffy and George 
Edward Rich to the High Court in 1913. He said, "one of the first industrial results of 
the new appointments was the acceptance of the 'paper' dispute as constituting a 
'genuine' dispute". While the death of Justice O'Connor in 1912 and the enactment of 
the Judiciary Act 1912 which increased the size of the Court from five to seven were 
the immediate pretext for this appointment, what is significant is that the change in the 
personnel of the High Court brought with it a change in the dominant perspective of the 
Court.
In any case, it does not seem that there are, any longer, questions about the sufficiency 
of "paper disputes" for the purpose of notification, and ipso facto of setting the 
industrial machinery in motion. Sykes (1957: 471 footnote 36) characterises this as 
"merely a technique to justify the court, with the assistance of the parties, in writing a 
code for the industry". Typically, a union seeking an award draws up a "log of claims" 
which it sends to specific employers in at least two States. If the claims are refused, 
which is often likely since their ambit is usually wider than what the union expects to 
obtain at the time, a dispute has arisen and the union notifies the tribunal (the Registrar, 
a member or a Presidential Member of the Commission) accordingly, or it may be 
apprehended by the tribunal or the Minister who in turn may notify the tribunal.
 ^See The King v. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and the Merchant Service Guild of 
Australasia (1912) 15 CLR 586.
6 Merchant Service Guild of Australasia v Newcastle and Hunter River Steamship Co. Ltd. and Other 
(1913) 16 CLR 591.
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As Creighton and Stewart (1990: 63) have noted, "if there is a conscious and 
premeditated desire ... to involve the Commission, the dispute will normally be 
formulated in such a way as to fall within the parameters of the Commission's 
jurisdiction". It might be pointed out that this accepted process of creating disputes is 
not obvious on the face of the law. It is a product of practice.
Unlike in Australia, the creation of "paper disputes" does not appear to be an 
institutionalised practice in Nigeria. Under the Nigerian law a dispute situation is said 
to exist when there is a failure by the parties, at the end of the procedures of direct 
negotiation machinery, to resolve a dispute. This situation brings the parties to the point 
where reporting the dispute to, or apprehension of the dispute by, the Minister is 
mandatory. The party doing the reporting is expected to do so in writing and to state the 
points on which disagreement has occurred. The Minister apprehending may in writing 
inform the parties or their representatives of his apprehension and the steps he 
proposes to take to resolve the dispute.
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that, although notification takes place at 
different points in the Australian and Nigerian processes of dispute settlement, the laws 
of the two countries have, in a similar manner, made this stage mandatory for the 
parties to an industrial dispute. In addition these laws have also similarly vested the 
tribunals with the power to apprehend and to assume jurisdiction over such dispute, 
with or without the consent of the parties.
5.2.3 Conciliation of disputes
Although there is a tendency to confuse conciliation as practised in Australia and 
Nigeria with the conventional collective bargaining in countries like Canada, the 
United States of America and Britain, the position is that conciliation in the laws of 
Australia and Nigeria appears peculiarly different.
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Niland (1978: 16-19) has shown that conciliation in Australia breaches the five basic or
necessary elements of conventional collective bargaining. The summary of his
argument by Brooks (1988: 33) is apt:
[Conciliation] occurs only after legal procedural steps have been 
completed; it occurs under the supervision of permanent industrial 
tribunals which play an active part in the process; it is compulsory and 
the agreement which emerges conforms to a common pattem as the 
parties know with a high degree of precision the likely outcome if the 
dispute is unresolved at conciliation and goes to arbitration. This 
conformity and predictability is a contrast to unfettered collective 
bargaining which is characterised by general uncertainty as to the 
outcome of the final contract.
In Nigeria, conciliation is a legal requirement which is invoked at a certain stage in the 
settlement of trade dispute whether or not the parties have a "positive philosophical 
commitment to the process”; the conciliator is required to take an active part in the 
process; the parties know that the terms of settlement concluded under a third party not 
of their choice will be incorporated in the contracts of employment of their members; 
and they also know that failure to resolve the dispute at that stage will result in 
arbitration. As in Australia, this process can hardly be regarded as a conventional 
bargaining.
How is the process of conciliation provided for in the Australian and Nigerian laws? 
The Australian law makes conciliation one of its chief objects. S.2(III) of the original 
1904 Act expressed this object as: "to provide for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the 
Court by conciliation with a view to amicable agreement between the parties". In 
subsequent amendments, the expression came to be: "to encourage, and provide means 
for, conciliation with a view to amicable agreement, thereby preventing and settling 
industrial disputes" [s.2(b) of 1904]. Although recast in different words, the same 
object is maintained in the 1988 Act [see s.3(b)].
The law goes further to set out how this object is to be achieved. Where an industrial 
dispute has been notified in accordance with the law or apprehended, the Presidential
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Member shall, unless it would not assist the prevention or settlement of the dispute so 
to do, refer the dispute for conciliation by himself or another member of the 
Commission [s.25(4) of the 1904; s. 100(1) of the 1988 Act].
At this stage the law enjoins the Commission to do all such things, appearing to be 
right and proper, to assist the parties to reach an agreement on terms for the prevention 
or settlement of the dispute. Such things include arranging conferences for the parties 
or their representatives presided over by the member, or conferences at which the 
member is not present. These conferences, which can be called on the tribunal's own 
motion or upon application made by a party to, or intervener in, the dispute, are 
compulsory (see ss.26 & 27 of the 1904 and ss.102 & 119 of the 1988).
The conciliation process is considered complete when agreements settling the dispute 
have been reached or when the tribunal is satisfied that conciliation is not likely to be 
achieved within a reasonable time (s.29 of 1904 and s.103 of 1988).
Commentators on the Australian system have observed that there is a strong emphasis 
on conciliation in the process of dispute settlement. For instance, Kirby, C.J. once said: 
"we all rely heavily on the availability of Conciliators to bring about settlement of 
disputes by negotiation" (quoted in Sykes and Glasbeek, 1972: 505). This emphasis is 
also apparent in the remark by the Hancock Committee, after they had reviewed the 
conciliation procedures as set out in sections 25(4), 26, 27, 28, 29, 34 and 34A of the 
1904 Act. They said: "Thus it is a feature of the present legislation that a priority is 
given to the conciliation phase in the dispute settling process" (see p.535).
It might be added that the observed emphasis on the process of conciliation can be 
traced to the inception of the system in one of Deakin's addresses to the House of 
Representatives in 1903 on the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill. There he referred to 
the Court which was being proposed as "first a committee of conciliation and then a 
court of arbitration" (CPD, 1904 vol.XVIII: 767). One of the early practitioners of the
146
system equally expressed this emphasis in the phrase "the process of conciliation, with 
arbitration in the background" (Higgins, 1922:2).
The process of conciliation in Nigeria begins upon notification or apprehension of a 
trade dispute, assuming that the authority before whom the dispute has come would not 
need to order compliance with the requirements of direct private negotiation. This is 
similar to the Australian process of conciliation. But, unlike in Australia, the authority 
empowered to initiate conciliation process in Nigeria is the Commissioner/Minister in 
the Ministry of Labour - an arm of the Executive Government as opposed to a separate 
tribunal.
The authority receives notification on, or apprehends, a dispute and may appoint a fit 
person to act as a conciliator. The practice seems to be that the person is appointed 
from among senior labour officers in the Ministry of Labour. This person shall inquire 
into the causes and circumstances of the dispute and by negotiation with the parties 
endeavour to bring about settlement.
The process is completed either when agreement is reached and a memorandum of the 
terms of the settlement is signed by the parties and forwarded to the authority or when 
the impasse is unresolved and the conciliator reports same to the authority (see ss.5 & 7 
of 1968 and s.6 of 1976).
It has been observed that to ensure effective achievement of conciliation, the Ministry 
of Labour would send guides to professional officers in the Labour Division of the 
Ministry. These guides provide hints on the attitudes of conciliators, approaches to 
conciliation, etc (see Ubeku, 1983: 172-173 for summary of one of such guides). There 
is no indication that this course of action necessarily leads to an effective conciliation 
process in Nigeria.
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5.2.4 Arbitration of disputes
The final stage in the process of preventing or settling industrial disputes in Australia 
and Nigeria is arbitration. Generally, this stage occurs when conciliation fails.
In Australia, the first Commonwealth legislative provision for arbitration occurred in 
s.2(IV) of the original 1904 Act and it reads: "In default of amicable agreement 
between the parties, [the object is] to provide for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the 
Court by equitable award". Perhaps, to be consistent with the nature of the award which 
it was expected to make, the Court was enjoined to act "according to equity, good 
conscience, and the substantial merits of [industrial disputes]" (s.25 of the Act). This 
provision has been retained in subsequent changes to the law [see s.40(l)(c) of the 1904 
Act as amended; s.110(2)(c) of 1988].
The need to avoid legalism was expressed in paragraph s.40(l)(b) of the 1904 Act as 
amended, thus: "the Commission is not bound to act in a formal manner and is not 
bound by any rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as 
it thinks just". This paragraph has been reproduced, more or less verbatim, in the 
Nigerian law [see, in particular, s.27(3)(a) and (b)] of the 1976 Decree.
Where conciliation fails or the dispute has not been wholly settled, the Australian law 
empowers the Commission to refer the dispute (or the unresolved part) to arbitration 
(s.30 of 1904; 104 of 1988). The referral is automatic. Barring the provision in s.22, 
now s.105 of 1988, (i.e. with regard to either party objecting) and any matters reserved 
for the Full Bench, a member of the Commission who had taken part in conciliation can 
also arbitrate if the same dispute is referred for arbitration.
It should be noted that the 1972 amendment to the 1904 Act introduced a "task force" 
principle into the organization of the Commission for the purpose of dealing with 
industrial disputes. According to s.23 of the Act (s.37 of 1988), the President may 
assign an industry or a group of industries to a panel of members who shall exercise the
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functions/powers of the Commission in relation to that industry or group of industries. 
In the ordinary course of events, therefore, when a dispute is referred to conciliation 
and ultimately to arbitration, it will be handled by the appropriate panel of the 
Commission.
In Nigeria, upon the failure of conciliation, the authority (i.e. the Minister for Labour) 
to whom the report is made shall refer the dispute either to the IAP (s.7 of 1976) or, in 
some circumstances, directly to the National Industrial Court (NIC) (s.12 of 1976) for 
arbitration. Whether the Minister directs the dispute to the IAP or the NIC, the referral 
is, as in Australia, automatic and mandatory.
The format of the referral to the IAP usually indicates the power under which the 
referral is being made, confirms the existence of a dispute not settled by "intervention", 
and specifies the terms of the referral. It is worded as follows:
"IN THE MATTER OF SECTION OF THE TRADE DISPUTES
DECREE, 1976 
AND
IN THE MATTER OF A TRADE DISPUTE BETWEEN ... AND ...
Whereas a trade dispute has arisen and now exists between the ... and ...
And whereas the endeavours to promote a settlement through intervention have proved 
unsuccessful;
Now therefore, I [name and office of the Minister], in exercise of the power conferred 
upon me by Section 7 of the Trade Practices Decree, 1976, hereby refer the matter in 
dispute to the Industrial Arbitration Panel with the following terms of reference:-".
For the purpose of settling the dispute, the Chairman of the IAP is to constitute an 
industrial tribunal which may consist of a sole arbitrator, a single arbitrator assisted by 
appointed assessors, or one or more arbitrators nominated in equal numbers by each 
party to the dispute from the panel of employers' and workers representatives drawn up
* r
by the Minister in accordance with s.33 of the Act [s.7(3) of 1976].^While the 
arrangement of this panel system appears different, its underlying philosophy is similar 
to the one which informed the "task force" approach introduced in Australia in 1972.
Perhaps, the actual practice of this procadure differs markedly. But this is beside the 
point.
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5.3 Products of compulsory arbitration
The processes of compulsory arbitration in Australian and Nigerian laws which have 
been examined in the foregoing section produce outcomes called consent and arbitral 
awards. These awards are not subject to judicial review on the merits. In the laws of 
both countries, while proceedings of the tribunals may be challenged and halted by 
applications on jurisdictional questions to superior courts, the tribunals’ final awards are 
final and binding. The enforcement of these awards is backed by sanctions which the 
tribunals have powers to impose. These characteristics are examined in this section in 
more detail.
5.3.1 Certified agreements and Consent awards
In section 5.2.1 above, it has been shown that the Australian and Nigerian laws 
recognise collective agreements concluded outside the formal systems or in the course 
of the conciliation and arbitration processes. The certification of these agreements 
makes them certified agreements or consent awards, as the case may be, and gives them 
a binding force.
There is a subtle difference between the two. Whereas certified agreements are 
memoranda drawn up by the parties and endorsed through certification by the tribunal 
or portfolio authorised by law, consent awards are orders of these institutions which 
embody the terms of settlements reached by the parties. However, both stand in the 
same status as awards for the purposes of enforcement (Creighton, et al, 1983: 369).
In the Australian law, certified agreements and consent awards are binding on each of 
the parties who make the request that their memorandum be certified. The binding 
effect, of consent awards in particular, is upon all members of an organization that is 
such a party, and an employer who is a successor to or an assignee or transmittee of the 
business of such a party, including a corporation that has acquired or taken over the 
business of such a party [s.28(4) of 1904; s.l 12(3) of 1988].
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It is not obvious on the face of the law whether industrial agreements (Part X of 1904 
Act) need be certified before they can acquire a binding force. Neither is it obvious 
whether they must come within the limits marked by s.51(xxxv) of the Constitution 
before they can be certified by the Industrial Registrar that they are duly made and 
executed pursuant to the Act. However, under ss.174 and 175 of the 1904 Act, they 
must comply with the form and filing requirements. On the other hand, since the 
memoranda under s.28 of 1904 Act and 112 of 1988 Act are made, clearly, in the 
course of the formal proceeding of arbitrable disputes, it is straightforward that all the 
constitutional and statutory criteria which determine whether or not the tribunal has 
jurisdiction to arbitrate must be fulfilled before they can be certified and be deemed to 
be awards for all the purposes of the Act. This was the view of Sykes and Glasbeek 
(1972: 647) on this provision, then s.31 of the 1904 Act. Creighton, et. al (1983: 370) 
have put the matter this way: "certified agreements or consent awards going beyond the 
Commission's jurisdiction are not illegal. They are merely unenforceable and have 
none of the attributes of a valid award".
In the Industrial Relations Act 1988, certified agreements and consent awards have 
been put in two separate sections: the former in s. 115 and the latter in s.112. This is 
probably due to the intention of the new law to give certified agreements a scope of 
operation wider than that of the consent award (see s.l 16 of 1988). For, subject to some 
residual controls such as a review by the Full Bench of the Commission upon 
application by the Minister [s.l 17(1)], or a declaration by the Commission to unbind a 
party upon application made by that party against whom an industrial action has been 
taken by the other party to the agreement [s.l 17(6)], the agreements, during their 
operation, will prevail, as far as the parties are concerned, over any award dealing with 
the same matters and the Commission is not empowered to vary them otherwise (see 
Creighton and Stewart, 1990: 69). Although Mitchell notes in his comment on this 
provision as expressed in the Industrial Relations Bill 1988 that it is "not a scheme for 
opting-out in the sense proposed by Hancock", it can be suggested that the scheme,
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now on the statute book, is "a partial response" to Hancock (Creighton and Stewart, op 
cit).
The certified agreements and consent awards in Nigeria acquire a legal force once the 
authority makes an order specifying that their terms are binding on the employers and 
workers too whom they relate [s.7(4) of 1968; s.6(3) of 1976]. However, as in 
Australia, they must conform to the statutory requirements of being in writing and 
deposited/filed within 30 days before the binding order can be validly made on them. 
As at 1985, seventeen years after the provision was made in the 1968 Decree, the 
authority had not exercised its power to make an order on collective agreements 
(Uvieghara, 1985: 146). This implies that, in practice, the collective (procedural and 
substantive) agreements which had been concluded up to that time operated or were in 
force by what Imoisili (1984: 385) has described as "mutual consent" or "common 
understanding".
5.3.2 Arbitral awards
The products of the arbitration stage in the process of dispute resolution in Australia 
and Nigeria are arbitral awards. Unlike the products of the other processes, the element 
of consensus is, technically speaking, absent in these awards. Once validly made, the 
awards are "binding and conclusive".
The Australian law provides directives for the subjects, framing and operations of this 
type of award. Those dealing with the subjects can be seen in ss.48, 51-55 of the 1904 
Act and ss.94-97, 123 of the 1988 Act. The subjects covered include rates of wages, 
uniformity throughout an industry in relation to hours, holidays and general conditions, 
schemes of apprenticeship, safety, health and welfare of employees. The awards are to 
be framed in such a manner as to best express the decision of the Commission and to 
avoid unnecessary technicalities (s.56 of 1904 and 144 of 1988).
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Furthermore, in terms of the operation, the awards are to specifiy the period during 
which they will continue in force. The periods nominated in s.58(l) of the 1904 Act 
(five years for arbitral awards and three years for certified agreements) have been left 
out in the 1988 Act. They are now replaced by the directive that the Commission have 
regard to the wishes of the parties to the industrial dispute and the desirability of 
stability in industrial relations. This new provision (i.e for the Commission's 
cognizance of the wishes of the parties) does not suggest that the consensus of the 
parties is now required for the making of awards.
In the Nigerian law, the making of arbitral awards is governed by ss.7, 9-12 of the 1976 
Decree. When a dispute is referred to arbitration, the tribunal had, under paragraph 
s.9(l)(a), to make its awards within 42 days of its constitution or such longer period as 
the Minister may in any particular case allow. By the Decree No. 39 - Trade Disputes 
(Amendment) Decree 1988 [s.l(d)], the former period has been reduced from 42 to 21 
days. This has restored the period which was stipulated in paragraph s.l2(l)(a) of the 
1968 Decree.
Upon making the award, the tribunal is to send a copy thereof to the Minister. The 
Minister may refer the award back to the Tribunal for re-consideration (no grounds 
specified) or give/cause to be published a notice to the parties setting out the award and 
specifying the time and manner for a notice of objection to be lodged with her/him. 
Barring all this, the Minister is to publish in a Gazette a notice confirming the award, 
thus making it binding on the employers and workers to whom it relates.
Where an objection to the award is raised by the parties according to the Decree, the 
Minister shall refer the dispute to the NIC whose award shall be final and binding. If 
the terms and conditions of employment in this award are more favourable than any 
statutory provisions, i.e. "in any written law [and instruments made under them] in 
force in Nigeria”, the award shall prevail [see s. 10(3)].
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Ubeku (1983: 174) has joined issue with the argument of Adeogun that "the awards of 
the IAP should, without more, become binding on the parties immediately upon 
publication, leaving it to the parties themselves to decide whether or not an appeal 
should be lodged with the National Industrial Court"^. This argument can be 
interpreted to have two parts: one, the provision that the award of the IAP should be 
confirmed by the Minister before it acquires a binding force is unnecessary and reduces 
the independent stature of the IAP; and two, the parties should have direct access to the 
NIC.
Ubeku's disagreement seems to be with the first part of the argument. He believes that 
"the IAP, sometimes out of enthusiasm, hands down decisions that are not in accord 
with practice in industry" or which offend "provisions of government's incomes 
policies". Therefore, "the involvement of the Minister of Labour is necessary to ensure 
that the award is not only fair and just but in accordance with government economic 
parameters and industrial practice generally".
Obviously there is the need for awards to be fair, just and in accordance with policies
and practice. What is not clear is whether Adeogun's argument per se jettisons these
virtues and how the involvement of the Minister by way of confirming awards
necessarily guarantees such virtues. Ubeku talks of the need of opportunity for the
Ministry of Labour to register awards for future experience and to be made aware of
actions taken in law in the settlement of disputes. This objective can easily be
accomplished through an administrative arrangement requesting the IAP to deposit
their determinations with the Ministry on a regular basis. What this aspect of Ubeku's 
argument seems to ignore is the fact that without the power to vary any award (see s.9 
of 1976), the Commissioner/Minister could do very little to ensure fairness in awards.
Regarding the need for harmony between awards and government incomes policies, 
Ubeku himself cited a case which, on the face of it, shows that the involvement of the 
Minister may not, in itself, guarantee harmony. The award of the IAP in the 
Management of the Nigeria Airways Ltd. v Airline Pilots Association of Nigeria in
 ^The page reference to Adeogun (1976) in Ubeku's note 24 should be 6, not 5.
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October 1975 was confirmed six months later by the Federal Commissioner of Labour 
(as the office was then called). The federal government considered the scale of salaries 
awarded too high, was apparently unhappy about this and, in the circumstances, passed 
the Industrial Arbitration Tribunal (Variation of Certain Award) Act 1979 to annul the 
award. Where does the "lapse" lie: with the enthusiasm of the IAP or the Commissioner 
who did not pick out the lack of harmony of the award with government incomes 
policy? In any case, the guidelines which are issued at the beginning of every financial 
year since 1977 by the Productivity, Prices and Incomes Board under the Productivity, 
Prices and Incomes Policy Act 1977 are meant to ensure harmony between awards on 
wages and government incomes policies.
It must be mentioned in passing that the power of intervention, as shown in action of 
the government in the above-cited case, is reminiscent of the power of the Australian 
Commonwealth Parliament over its public servants. As Higgins (1922: 36) has pointed 
out, although the Parliament entrusted the function of the settling of wages, hours and 
conditions of labour for Federal public servants to the Arbitration Court in 1911, the 
Parliament retained the final control. Until 1983, if an award was made on those issues, 
it would "not come into operation till the expiration of thirty days after it has been laid 
before both Houses, and Parliament [could], ... pass a resolution disapproving of the 
award".
It might appear from the foregoing discussion that the role of the government shows a 
significant difference between Australia and Nigeria with regard to the entire process of 
award-making. There is a view that apart from the National Wage Cases where the 
Industrial Relations Commission must consider macro-economic matters and the 
Commonwealth government is just one party making submissions, there is little 
political intervention in Australia as in Nigeria. This does not reflect the whole matter. 
In law and practice, significant political intervention exists in both countries. Beside the 
submissions by the government in wage cases in Australia, ss.36 and 106 of the 1904 
Act or 44 and 60 of the 1988 Act give rights of intervention to the Minister in matters
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before the Commission and Industrial Court. And, in addition to the clash between 
Hughes (the then Prime Minister) and Higgins (the then President of the Arbitration 
Court) summarised earlier in the thesis, there are other illustrations of the practice of 
political intervention in Australia (see Hancock, 1979: 15).
5.3.3 Status of awards
It is probably evident from the presentation in the preceding sections of this chapter 
that the Australian and Nigerian laws place great importance on permanent public 
tribunal awards. This has involved, among other things, placing awards at the apex of 
their respective systems. But, what is the juridic nature or character of these awards? 
And to what extent are they subject to substantive litigations or judicial review? These 
are the questions now to be examined.
Although it has been said that the character of the federal awards in Australia has never 
been a central focus of major inquiry, there are hints as to how they are to be classified 
- that is, whether they should be classified as judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or 
administrative. Creighton, et al (1983: 374) consider Fullagar's, J. remark, in R. v. 
Hamilton Knight; Ex parte Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association (1952) 86 
CLR 283, an adequate statement on the character of the awards. At p.319, Fullagar, J. 
said:
[An award] is not subordinate legislation. It is not legislation at all. It is 
no doubt, an "instrument" in the general legal sense: it is a document 
affecting rights. ... The making of an award is not an exercise of judicial 
power, but an award is essentially a decision inter partes upon matters in 
dispute inter partes.
This position appears to be at variance with some other descriptions of the character of 
the awards. For instance, the often quoted description of the New Zealand equivalent 
by Salmond, J. states that "an industrial award is in form a judicial decree, but in 
substance is an act of legislative authority" This is similar to the position of Sykes 
who, in his "Labour Regulation by Courts: the Australian Experience", says:
 ^This statement is said to have been made in New Zealand Waterside Workers' Federation v. Frazer 
(1924) 43 NZLR 689 at 708.
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When the court makes the first award for an industry, there will be a 
host of matters of a general nature provided for which are not in dispute 
between the parties at all. The parties want a legislative code, and a 
legislative code is what they get (Sykes, 1957: 471) (emphasis, mine).
He maintained this position in a later work where he remarked that "once it was clear 
that 'dispute' meant no more than that there was an issue for decision, the way was 
open for the tribunals to exercise a general legislative function in relation to which the 
judges were no more restricted than was the medieval chancellor in England" (Sykes, 
1980:311).
The apparent controversy apart, it will be recalled from chapter four that the Australian 
system was intended by its framers to be a judicio-administrative structure. The 
ultimate product of such a structure will, at the very least, be a charter of the rights and 
obligations of the parties whose disputes have been prevented or settled by the 
structure. As a charter, an award will, for all intents and purposes, be legislative in 
character.
If the treatment of the character of awards has only been incidental to other inquiries in
Australia, in Nigeria it seems non-existent. Nonetheless there is a legislative conception
in which awards are given the character of a charter of rights and obligations. With this
character, the awards prevail over existing contracts of employment. For, as provided
in s.37(2) of the 1976 Decree, where there is a binding award,
the contract between the employers and workers in question shall be 
deemed to include a provision that the rate of wages to be paid and the 
conditions of employment to be observed under the contract shall be in 
accordance with the award or terms of settlement until varied by a 
subsequent agreement, settlement or award; and accordingly the 
provisions of that contract shall be read subject to the award or terms of 
settlement and any failure to give effect to the award or terms of 
settlement shall constitute a breach of contract.
Being implied into the contract of employment, a breach can give rise to claims for
damages (Uvieghara, 1985: 163). It is pertinent to observe here that the situation about
implying awards into existing contracts of employment in Australian labour law is
obscure, as it has remained largely unexplored. The only available research on this
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aspect of the Australian labour law seems to be the work of Mitchell and Naughton 
(1989) whose problematic is derived from Gregory v. Philip Morris (1987) 77 ALR 79.
With respect to judicial review, the language of the law in Australia and Nigeria has led 
to some debate about the extent to which the awards of the industrial tribunals can be 
challenged in the ordinary courts. In both countries, there are provisions to the effect 
that the awards are final and conclusive. The question is, are these provisions intended 
to oust the appellate jurisdictions of the superior courts of record of the realm? Are they 
also intended to oust the original jurisdiction of the highest courts to entertain 
applications for a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction over all matters?
S.60(l)(a)-(c) of the Australian 1904 Act provides that "subject to this Act, an award 
(including an award made on appeal) is final and conclusive; shall not be challenged, 
appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and is not 
subject to prohibition, mandamus or injunction in any court on any account" [see also 
s. 150(1) of 1988]. "An award made on appeal" in this provision refers to the award 
which the Full Bench of the Commission makes upon an appeal against an award or 
decision of a member of the Commission (see s.35 of 1904; s.45 of 1988).
It can be read from these provisions that the only review contemplated is internal and 
not external to the tribunal system. The internal appeal process was first proposed in 
1947 but was defeated by the opposition of the Labor Party. It was finally introduced 
into the system by the 1952 amendments. The then Minister for Labour in the Liberal- 
Country Party Government, Harold Holt, gave the reason to be that the government 
wanted "to achieve co-ordination on large questions of industrial principle and ... a 
more authoritative decision on large industrial issues" (Healey, 1972: 82-86). This 
provision was introduced at the stage when the arbitral functions of the system were 
divided between the judges of the Arbitration Court and a number of Conciliation 
Commissioners.
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Regarding the exclusion of external review, there are comments which show that,
subject to certain exceptions, this "protection" stems from a concern to exclude delays
associated with judicial procedures. Portus (1971: 79) argues that
in legislating this way the parliaments [i.e Commonwealth and States] 
were in effect saying that the arbitrator’s decision may be in error but it 
is better that this should happen rather than allow the normal legal 
machinery to exist for the correction of errors which entails delays and 
additional expense. If the error is important the legislature can correct it.
Like Portus, the ILO (1980: 177) has supported the understanding that such provisions 
give expression to "one of the principal concerns of policy-makers in planning the 
design for compulsory arbitration [which] is to avoid the delays usually associated with 
judicial procedure, of which one of the main causes is the taking of appeals". Yet 
Murphy (1984: 86) has observed that s.60 has not been very effective, presumably 
because "the proceedings of the Commission can so easily be halted by application to 
the High Court for constitutional writs of prohibition, mandamus or injunction".
There are good summaries of the judicial interpretations of these "final and
unappealable" provisions in the Australian law in Mills and Sorrell (1975: 234-237)
and Creighton and Stewart (1990: 71-72). From these it can be gathered that, while the
awards of the tribunal may be appealed against on the question of excess or absence of
jurisdiction, they are not subject to judicial review on the merits. This understanding is
in accord with Deakin's explanation in 1904:
once an award has been made, it stands, unless varied by the Court 
itself, without appeal to any other Court of the realm. The decision is 
final, unless, of course, challenged as outside the law altogether. Within 
its own limitations and the powers of the Court, an award is subject to 
no appeal (CPD, 1904 vol.XVIII:773).
Generally, the argument on the jurisdictional appeals turns on the questions: is there a 
dispute?; does it relate to industrial matters?; and does it extend beyond one State? 
There is the view that such appeals cannot be sustained before the High Court under 
s.73 of the Constitution because the Commission, whose awards are supposed to be the 
subject of the appeals, is not a Federal Court within the meaning of the Constitution.
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However they can be sustained under s.75(v) of the Constitution which gives the High 
Court original jurisdiction "in all matters in which a writ of Mandamus, or prohibition 
or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth", since the 
Commissioners are officers of the Commonwealth. Although the Federal Court, since 
1983, now possesses concurrent jurisdiction in regard to this section of the 
Constitution, it does not share in the jurisdiction over the 1904 and 1988 Acts with the 
High Court (see Creighton and Stewart, 1990: 71).
The volume of the High Court cases relating to the awards of the tribunal suggests that 
the High Court has not shunned this constitutional right. In fact, at the early stages, the 
Court had fought to retain the right. When the Fisher Labor Government amended the 
1904 Act in 1911 and provided for the removal of the High Court's power to issue 
prohibitions in respect of federal awards, the Court declared the amended section 
invalid, "thus reserving to itself the right of deciding whether the [Arbitration Court] 
was acting within its powers" (Plowman, 1983: 12-13).
In Nigeria the balance of opinion seems to be that the awards of the tribunal are not 
subject to judicial review except on the question of jurisdiction. Within the framework 
of the law, Part II (item 7) of Schedule 1 to the 1968 Decree did provide that "the 
Arbitration Act shall not apply to any proceedings of an arbitration tribunal appointed 
under this Decree or to any award made by such a tribunal". The relevant law which 
this provision has excluded can be found in s. 12 of Arbitration Ordinance 1914 (Cap 
13 of the Laws of Nigeria). That section states:
”12(1) Where an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself, the court may 
remove him.
(2) Where an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself, or an arbitration 
or award has been improperly procured, the court may set the award aside".
Thus, under the 1968 Decree, the power of the ordinary court to remove arbitrators and 
to set aside awards was disallowed. Also, item 10 of Schedule 1 to the 1968 Decree did
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provide that "an act, proceeding or determination of an arbitration tribunal ... shall not 
be questioned on the ground that a member or assessor was not validly appointed .. ". 
This is now operational under s.8(4) of 1976 Decree. And in s.15(2) of this Decree 
there is another provision that "No appeal shall lie to any other body or person from 
any determination of the [National Industrial] Court".
Although this framework of the law tends to suggest complete immunity from judicial 
review for the awards of the arbitration tribunals, judicial decisions and subsequent 
legislative changes show that judicial review, at least on jurisdictional questions, has 
been available. For instance, in Bashorun v. Industrial Arbitration Panel (1971)^, 
Odesanya, J. held:
Industrial disputes are ... committed to the special Tribunal instead of 
the Courts. Judicial control of its awards and determinations will, 
however, ensure that such awards and determinations are kept within the 
law including the provisions of the Constitution. In my view any award 
by the Tribunal must be made within the law. Otherwise it is made 
without or in excess of jurisdiction ... There is nothing in the Decree 
ousting the supervisory control of the Court or preventing judicial 
review of awards made by the Tribunal. Even if a clause is inserted into 
the Decree ousting the jurisdiction of the Court as long as an award is 
prima facie ultra vires ... the High Court will intervene (quoted in 
Adeogun, 1972: 118).
An amendment in 1978 (No. 25) inserted s. 15(3) into the 1976 Decree, providing that 
the exclusive power of the NIC to make awards and determinations and the 'no appeal’ 
provision "shall not prejudice any jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Appeal under 
section 259(1) of the Constitution of the Federation or any jurisdiction of a High Court 
under section 42 of that Constitution" ^  The comment of Uvieghara on this provision 
is scanty, but his submission on the legal status of the awards of the NIC with regard to 
this provision is probably the most comprehensive submission available on this 
question of judicial review (see Uvieghara, 1985: 166-170). The reading of the 
Constitutional provisions shows that the jurisdictions of the Federal Court of Appeal
9 Unreported Lagos High Court Suit No. LD/105/71 of 22 March 1971.
It would seem that this 1978 amendment was made in anticipation of the Constitution becoming 
operational in 1979.
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and the High Court apply only to the extent that the awards raise "substantial questions 
of law" or contravene fundamental human rights. This is not judicial review on merits.
In 1988 there was a further amendment to the law - Trade Disputes (Amendment) (No. 
2) Decree 1988. The amendment inserted S.15A into the 1976 Decree which states: "An 
appeal shall lie from the decisions of the Industrial Arbitration Panel to the Court as of 
right, in matters of disputes conferred upon it by section 15 of this Act". The 
explanatory note to the Amendment Decree states that "the Decree ... confers appellate 
jurisdiction on the [NIC] from the decisions and awards of the Panel". However, what 
in essence has been introduced is an internal review process, similar to the process 
introduced into the Australian law in 1952.
5.3.4 Enforcement of awards
It has been shown in chapter four that the central purpose of the compulsory arbitration 
systems in both Australia and Nigeria is the prohibition of direct industrial action 
within the context of achieving industrial peace. To attain this object, the settlements 
by the tribunals of the systems - by way of conciliatory and arbitral awards and 
determinations - should be respected by the actors between whom the settlements are 
effected. It is in order to secure this respect that provisions have been made in the laws 
to enhance the enforcement of the tribunals' awards.
As Creighton et. al (1983: 469-471) have shown, there is some difficulty in knowing 
where to draw a line between anti-direct action provisions and those for the 
enforcement of awards per se; and this difficulty should be recognised. In this sub­
section, the emphasis is on those provisions which have direct bearing on the 
enforcement powers of the tribunals.
In the original Australian Act of 1904, Part IV - entitled "THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
ORDERS AND AWARDS" - provided for the Arbitration Court to impose penalties 
for any breach or non-observance of orders and awards, recoverable in any Federal or
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State Court having civil jurisdiction. These penalties include the issuance and execution 
of "process ... against the property of any organization" or the members of the 
organization "where the property of the organization is insufficient to satisfy fully any 
process ..." (see ss.44-47; ss. 119-121 of 1904-86; ss.178 and 357 of 1988).
Also the Arbitration Court was empowered to make an order in the nature of 
mandamus or injunction to compel compliance with the award or to restrain its breach 
under the pain of fine or imprisonment. This was in addition to the power granted to the 
President of the Court to require, from organisations submitting any industrial dispute 
to the Court, security of a maximum of 200 pounds for the performance of the award 
(s.33 of original 1904). The 1947 amendment to the Act, inserting what came to be 
s. 119(3) and (4) of 1904, also empowered the Court to order repayment of wages to 
employees in actions for breaches of awards by employers, provided that the 
proceedings were commenced within six years after the commission of the breach [see 
now s. 178(6) and (8) of 1988].
The law has contained an array of sanctions in these enforcement provisions. In 
addition, before their repeal in 1930, the express prohibitions of direct industrial action 
equally had bearing on the enforcement powers of the Court. Although they were 
manifestly anti-direct action provisions, "the generality of [their] application suggests 
that [they were] seen as part of the overall control mechanism in maintaining the 
authority of the Court" (Creighton, et. al, 1983: 470). These provisions carried with 
them sanctions of 1000 pounds for organisations for strikes or lock-outs and 20 pounds 
for individual employers/employees for dismissal of employees or ceasing to work for 
employers on account of awards.
It has been pointed out in chapter four that the 1930 amendment, in which the repeal of 
the anti-direct action provisions was effected, also marked the beginning of a defined 
use of a "bans clause" provision in awards. This provision enables the tribunal to insert 
a clause into an award, limiting the right of an organisation who is a party the award to
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engage in any ban upon work (see ss. 32 and 33 of 1904; ss.125 and 181-186 of 1988). 
The content of such a clause suggests that the provision is an enforcement device 
directed, mainly, against workers' organisations. For example, the bans clause which 
operated in the Metal Trades Award from 1947 to 1969 reads thus:
(i) An employer may require an employee to work reasonable overtime ...
(ii) No organisation party to this award shall in any way, ... be party to ... any 
ban, limitation or restriction on the working of overtime ... (quoted in Hutson, 
1983: 238).
Up to 1969, once this clause is breached, the aggrieved party is allowed to approach the 
tribunal for a statutory injunction to restrain the other party from continuing the breach. 
As Sorrell (1979: 73) explains, "if the union continued with its industrial iniquity, the 
employer could then issue a summons, not for a penalty for breach of award, but for the 
entirely inappropriate (or only technically appropriate) contempt of court".
The power of the Industrial Court to punish contempts of court was provided for in s.83 
of the original 1904 Act. Although the construction of this section appears to show that 
the object was to protect the Court from verbal assault, it is reasonable to suggest that it 
also extended to any disregard for the Court's determinations. In s . l l l  of the 1904-86 
Act, the contempt is shown to consist, specifically, of a failure to comply with an order 
of the Court made under s.l09(l)(b), i.e. enjoining an organisation or person not to 
commit or continue a contravention of the Act or the regulations made under the Act.
Other enforcement provisions include those on the suspension or cancellation of 
awards (s.62 of 1904; s. 187 of 1988), prohibition of incitement to boycott award (s. 138 
of 1904; s.312 of 1988) and deregistration or cancellation of the registration of 
organisations (s.143 of 1904; s.294 of 1988)^
The 1928 amendment added a new ground for the suspension or cancellation of awards, 
i.e. a party to an award doing something in the nature of lock-out or strike; but, this was
^  In Creighton, et. al. (1983: 498-500), other informal enforcement sanctions, including "refusal to 
arbitrate" (the history of which can be traced to Higgins) and "discounting an indexed increase for 
industrial disputation", were discussed.
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later removed by the 1930 amendment to the Act. Although the provision on the 
suspension or cancellation of awards has not been widely used, there is little doubt that 
its existence in the law may be "an effective deterrent to those who might be tempted to 
stray from the paths of industrial righteousness" (Creighton, et. al, 1983: 498).
Equally seldom used is the provision on the incitement to boycott awards. Introduced 
into the law in 1930, this provision was designed to protect the award system against 
obstruction by holders of office in an organisation or branch of an organisation. 
Ironically it was introduced at the same time as the amendments to abolish the anti- 
direct action provisions, including s.87 of the original Act which made counselling or 
procuring any offence against the Act punishable.
With regard to deregistration of organisations, it is noted that the grounds which are 
relevant to the context of enforcement of awards are those stipulated in paragraphs (g) 
and (h) of subsection 143(1) of 1904 or sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of paragraph 
294(1 )(a) of 1988, i.e conduct in breach of order or award of the Court/Commission 
and conduct preventing or hindering the achievement of an object of the A c t .  
Creighton et. al indicate that paragraphs (j) and (k) of s. 143(1) - 1904 [now, (b) and (c) 
of s.294(l) - 1988] are also relevant.
A well known case in which the deregistration provision has been applied is R. v. 
Joske; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders Labourers' 
Federation (1974) 130 CLR 87. Commenting on the "green bans" campaign mounted 
by the Federation, Smithers, J. noted in that case that the resolve that the members of 
the Federation should voluntarily withhold their labour from green banned projects 
constituted ugly and menacing "conduct of the kind specified in s 143(l)(h) and 
[operated] to hinder and prevent achievement of objectives of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act".
12 The element of mens rea (criminal intent) in para, (h) of 1904 is now absent in para, (a) of 1988.
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Of all the enforcement provisions, none has been so notoriously used as the "bans 
clause". Commentators on this aspect of the Australian law are agreed on the position 
that the bans clause procedure was "the established centre-piece of the enforcement 
powers" from the late 1940s until the late 1960s (see Boulton, 1986: 84-87; Creighton, 
et. al, 1983: 482-488; Creighton and Stewart, 1990: 221 and Hutson, 1983: 237-284).
In 1936, the High Court upheld the validity of inserting this clause in awards (Seamen's 
Union of Australasia), but it was only after it had been inserted into the Metal Trades 
Award in 1950 for the second time that its use became widespread. Between 1956 and 
1969, there were at least 77 occasions on which the tribunal made or varied awards 
containing a bans clause. Within the same period, fines amounting to a total of about 
$282,410 were imposed upon unions for defying orders made in respect of the clause 
(Creighton, et. al., 1983: 486; Hutson, 1983: 242).
This period has come down in history as one in which the Australian arbitration system 
was ostensibly effective. There were 788 convictions and "up until 1967 all but one of 
the fines imposed upon unions under the bans clause provisions were paid" (Boulton, 
1986: 84). The last two years of this period (1968-69) were particularly notorious. A 
major wave of industrial action followed the 1967 Metal Trade Award case and the 
unions were now beginning to avoid payment of fines. This culminated in what is 
popularly referred to as the O'Shea case.
The case is too well known to the scholars of Australian labour law to require more 
than a brief detail here. In 1969 the Tramway Employees' Association was fined for 
breaches of the bans clauses in their industrial award. The Victorian secretary of the 
Association, Clarrie O'Shea, refused to disclose information about or make the union 
funds available to pay the fine. He was jailed for contempt of the Industrial Court and, 
for this reason, the unions engaged the Commonwealth government in a serious 
confrontation. The government "backed away" and thereafter the bans clause penalties
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fell into disuse: the case marked the end of an era of enforcement of awards based
largely upon the bans clause procedure. In Rawson's (1980: 293) words,
this case was the culmination of a period in which the Commonwealth 
Industrial Court had been imposing increasingly heavy penalties on 
trade unions for breaches of 'bans clauses' in arbitration awards ... 
[F]rom the time of the O'Shea case it was plain ... that the imposition of 
sanctions was at an end, at least for that era.
Indeed, the case led to significant amendments of the law in which procedures for 
dealing with breaches of bans clauses in awards were tightened. For instance, ss. 32 and 
33 of the 1904 Act (as substituted by No.37 of 1972) intended "that there would be no 
prosecution under the bans clauses unless the dispute has been investigated by a 
Presidential Member of the Arbitration Commission" (Rawson, 1980: 294). There was 
an attempt, in Part VI (Division 4) of the Industrial Relations Bill 1987, to replace 
these procedures with "directions" procedures. The Bill failed and the strictured "bans 
clause" were restored, but with further tightening, in the 1988 Act.
It is pertinent also to examine the structural aspect of the enforcement of awards as 
provided within the Australian law. In this regard it seems that governments on the 
conservative wing of politics have taken most of the initiatives, rightly or wrongly, in 
setting up structures for the enforcement of awards.
In 1928 the appointment of Inspectors who would secure observance of awards was 
introduced by the Bruce-led National-Country Coalition Government through an 
amendment to the Act (see ss.36 and 42 of No. 18, 1928). The Menzies-led Liberal- 
Country Coalition Government advanced on this by establishing an Arbitration 
Inspectorate in 1950. It was the function of this Inspectorate, being referred to as the 
"industrial policeman", that was taken over by the Industrial Relations Bureau which 
was created by the 1977 amendment to the Act under the Fraser-led Liberal-National
Coalition Government^.
13 For a summary of the history, politics and operation of the Industrial Relations Bureau, see Creighton, 
et al.(1983: 471-3); Hutson (1983: 306-314); Mitchell (1979: 435).
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Part VIA of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-82 specified the functions of the 
Bureau. In the interpretation of Dabscheck and Niland (1981: 262-3), these functions 
included (1) securing the observance of awards, orders and agreements made under the 
Act; (2) acting as a type of industrial ombudsman helping organisations and individuals 
become aware of their rights and obligations under the Act; and (3) ensuring the lawful 
conduct of the parties in the overall industrial relations process.
In June 1983 the Bureau was abolished by the Hawke-led Labor Government. In its 
place, Part V of the 1988 Act has provided for the appointment of inspectors (under the 
Public Service Act 1922) who are empowered to initiate proceedings to secure penalties 
for the contravention of awards. This is, in some ways, a return to the 1928 approach 
where the issue of an inspectorate was first raised.
In the Nigerian law, the provision for enforcement of awards began with the stipulation 
of an offence with no specific penalty. S.7(4) of 1968 Decree provided that non- 
compliance with a confirmed conciliation memorandum was an offence under the 
Decree. However it was provided in s.19 that any person guilty of an offence under the 
Decree for which no special penalty is provided was liable, in the case of an individual, 
to a fine of 50 pounds or 3 months imprisonment or both; and, in the case of a body 
corporate, to a fine of 500 pounds maximum. In a rather general way, the amendment 
Decree (No. 2) of 1969 introduced another enforcement provision. It empowered the 
Inspector-General of Police or the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to direct any 
person concerned with acts prejudicial to industrial peace to be detained in a civil 
prison or police station [s.6( 1) of 1969]. Although there is no indication that the offence 
exists only if the person to be detained is a party to any confirmed industrial agreement, 
the provision was wide enough to have covered breaches to awards so long as they 
could be regarded as prejudicial to industrial peace.
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The 1976 Decree specifies some procedures relating to the enforcement of the awards 
of the IAP and the NIC. In s.2(4), failure to comply with the terms of an order 
confirming a collective agreement is an offence punishable by a fine of 100 naira or 
imprisonment for six months. Also a 1977 amendment (No. 54) inserted other 
enforcement of awards provisions into the 1976 Decree. Sub-section (3A) of s.6 
provides for the punishment of any breach of "consent award", i.e a signed 
memorandum of the terms of settlement forwarded to the Minister by the conciliator. 
Sub-sections (4) and (5) of s.9 and (4) and (5) of s.10 punish breaches of arbitration 
awards and awards of the NIC respectively. The prohibition of industrial action, "where 
the NIC has issued an award on the reference" [s.l3(l)(f)], applies to the enforcement 
of awards as much as it does to strikes and lock-outs (its application to the latter has 
been shown in chapter four).
The 1977 amendment also changed the penalty figures to 200 naira for a worker or 
trade union; and 2,000 naira for employer or employer organisation for offences under 
s.6(3A) of 1976; and the same figures for offences under s.9(4) and s,10(4). These 
figures run for each day on which the offences continue.
As in the Australian law, the penalties attached to these offences are exercisable in the 
jurisdiction of ordinary courts. Since the terms of agreement or awards are implied into 
the contract of employment of the employers and employees to whom the settlements 
and awards relate, any aggrieved party could bring an action for breach of contract in 
either the magistrates court, if the amount involved is not more than 1000 naira or the 
High Court, if the amount is more than 1000 naira. This arrangement has been found to 
be inadequate in terms of the powers of the NIC to enforce its judgements.
The Nigerian Union of Civil Typists, Stenographic and Allied Staff v. Attorney-General 
of Ogun State and Governor of Ogun State (1982-83) NICLR 190 provides an 
illustration of this inadequacy. In a judgement on March 12, 1981, the NIC had 
awarded that all the Governments of the Federation should pay the new scales of salary
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to the members of the Union with effect from April 1, 1980. All the governments who 
complied with the award did so fully, with the exception of Ogun State Government 
which complied partially^. The Union then brought the action, asking for the direction 
of the Court to enforce the judgement against Ogun State.
The Court ruled that the officers of the Union were at liberty to file claims either 
individually or collectively in the appropriate High Court or Magistrate's Court. 
Adesalu (1984: 16) expresses the view that this was begging the question and that it 
prolonged matters which could have ended quickly had the Court the powers to enforce 
its judgements.
Another inadequacy which Adesalu deprecates is in respect of the contempt of court. 
Unlike the Australian law, the Nigerian law did not empower from the start of the 
system the arbitration tribunals, themselves, to punish for contempt. For instance, s.26 
of the 1976 Decree empowers the tribunals to compel attendance by persons and 
production of materials for the purpose of dealing with any trade dispute or other 
matter referred to them under the Decree. Indeed they are to exercise these powers as if 
they are powers "exercisable by the Supreme Court of Nigeria". However, although the 
Supreme Court can punish a breach of its directions in respect of issues similar to the 
ones in s.26, the arbitration tribunals could not. Sub-section (4) of s.26 "took away the 
steam" by vesting the power to punish contempt of the tribunals in the High Court.
Adesalu's proposal is that subsection (4) be repealed. However there is another 
argument, mounted by Audi (1986: 45-47), that the Court has not availed itself of the 
power to commit persons of contemptuous conduct to the High Court, limited as the 
power may be. An example is the Management of Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. 
National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institution Employees (1982-83) 
NICLR 185. In that case, the workers "deliberately defied the NIC's order to go back to
^  According to Audi (1986: 49), the Court's notes show that 11 out of 19 States complied in full. With 
the creation of Akwa Ibom and Katsina States in 1987 and nine more states in 1991, there are now 30 
States in Nigeria.
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work pending judgement". Rather than committing them to the High Court, the 
response of the NIC was, like the Australian Arbitration Court under Higgins, to refuse 
to hear the case until they complied with the order to go back to work. Audi sees this 
failure to utilise the minimum power that the Court has as the result of sympathising 
with the view that it was difficult for the trade union leaders to persuade the rank and 
file to see reason. She argues that the Court should not have been carried away by such 
an extra-legal consideration.
Indeed Adesalu had referred to other cases where the management defied the awards of 
the Court to further underline the point that the Court's enforcement powers were 
inadequate. While the Court could not punish this contemptuous defiance, there is no 
indication that in those cases, such as the Stadium Hotel v. National Union of Textiles 
and Personal Service Workers and the Western Textile Co. Ltd & Anor v. National 
Union of Textile and Tailoring Workers of Nigeria, the Court even committed the 
offenders to the High Court for contempt.
In 1988, the 1976 Decree was amended by Decree No.57 to empower the NIC and the 
IAP to enforce their awards and, at their discretion, to commit for contempt trial any 
person or representative of a trade union or association who commits an act or omission 
which, in the opinion of these tribunals, constitutes contempt (see the inserted SS.15B 
and 15C). Except for the provision in S.15C that the President of the NIC or the 
Chairman of the IAP "shall, until the trial, either admit [the person] to bail or send him 
to prison for safe keeping", it is difficult to see how these 1988 amendments have 
significantly improved the enforcement powers of the Nigerian tribunals.
Further, one's understanding on this matter is not helped by the report, in May 1989, 
that the Minister for Labour in Nigeria "has added another feather to the cap of the 
IAP" when he said that anybody guilty of contempt against the IAP "will henceforth be 
committed to jail" and that the Panel "has now been given judicial powers to enforce its 
awards" (Daily Times, Tuesday May 30, 1989, p.18). However, despite this uncertain
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situation regarding the contempt powers of the Nigerian tribunals in contrast to the 
Australian tribunals, the provision of penalties (compensatory or punitive) for offences 
against the breaches of awards puts the Nigerian law in a position quite similar to the 
Australian law on the question of the enforcement of awards.
Generally, the fact that in Nigeria a person can go to jail in lieu of fines for breaches or 
offences under the law while in Australia the penalties are only percuniary might 
suggest a significant difference - the former, impliedly, a criminal matter; the latter, 
civil. A close examination of the Australian law indicates that such suggestion seems 
overdrawn. Proceedings for the recovery of penalties in Australia can be brought by the 
Industrial Registrar on behalf of the Commonwealth and the penalties or part thereof 
can be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund [ss. 119(2) and 120 of the 1904 Act] - 
arguably, not an entirely "civil" approach. As a matter of historical interest, s.5 of the 
original 1904 Act did empower the Court to imprison any person, convicted of an 
offence under the Act, who continued or repeated the offence.
As the foregoing discussion shows, out of the eight themes upon which the Australian 
and Nigerian laws have been compared in this chapter, only one theme bears a 
significant difference between the two laws, namely the pre-1988 restriction of 
collective agreements to procedural matters in the Australian law in contrast to the 
wider scope for these agreements in the Nigerian law, covering substantive and 
procedural matters. Thus the similarities between the laws on these themes appear even 
more overwhelming than the similarities on the themes examined in chapter four.
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CHAPTER SIX: AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL PRODUCT EXPLANATIONS OF 
THE DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES IN THE COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION LAWS OF AUSTRALIA AND NIGERIA
6.1 Introduction
There is an overwhelming similarity between the Australian and Nigerian legislative 
frameworks for compulsory arbitration systems, most importantly with respect to the 
philosophy of compulsion. In chapters four and five where both laws have been 
compared with respect to fifteen conceptual themes, differences are observed to occur 
only in three of these themes. On the remaining twelve themes, the laws of the two 
countries are strikingly similar.
The primary task of this chapter is to explain this fundamental similarity. A secondary 
task will be to explain how the few differences arose, given the overall similarity of the 
legislation. Both tasks shall draw upon the autonomy and social product models which 
have been constructed in chapters two and three. In essence, this chapter addresses the 
guiding question for this thesis: in the light of the debate as to whether law has some 
independent existence or is a mere product of society, how do we account for the 
differences and similarities between the labour laws of Australia and Nigeria?
6.2 Autonomy and social product explanations of the similarities among the laws
Dürkheim once said in his "Rules for the Demonstration of Sociological Proof that
[t]he mere parallelism in values [or conceptual orientations] through 
which two phenomena pass, provided that it has been established in an 
adequate number of sufficiently varied cases, is proof that a relationship 
exists between them... Now this connexion alone suffices to demonstrate 
that they are not foreign to each other (quoted in Lukes, 1982: 151).
In this section the concern will go beyond the Durkheimian standard of the "proof of
relationship" which the quotation above suggests and ask why the Australian and
Nigerian laws "are not foreign to each other". Specifically the attempt is to determine
first what the autonomy model has to say about the fundamental "parallelism" which
has been observed in the conceptual orientations of these laws: are the similarities
among the arbitration laws of Australia and Nigeria due to both countries conforming
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to the natural law principles or to legal transplantation (i.e to Nigeria borrowing the 
Australian model in the course of preparing her own law)? As shown in chapter two, 
the model also suggests similar modes of production as an explanatory factor, but the 
factor is considered too diffuse to be of much value to the explanation. Next the attempt 
is to address what the social product model has to say: are the similarities due to 
parallel development of social conditions?
6.2.1 Conformity to natural law principles and the similarities among the laws
To ascertain whether the Australian and Nigerian laws conform to the natural law 
principles as a possible explanation for their overwhelming similarity, it is pertinent to 
determine from the outset what these principles are. For, the principles of nature which 
are supposed to act as universal standards or extratemporal values for the positive laws 
are themselves not self-evident. In their most tangible manifestations they still remain 
abstract universal principles of justice and reason, notwithstanding that human beings 
can rationally apprehend them and translate them into the ideal norm or standard of 
right conduct and of justice for social institutions. Put differently, they remain at the 
level of general moral principles which, according to one philosophical school, God has 
implanted in human nature and embodied in the "law and the Gospel" Although 
immutable, they can be set aside, e.g in laws enacted to meet the exigencies of the 
moment, as a necessary accommodation to the corrupt state of human nature. This 
point is elaborated upon by Haines (1965: 1-27).
There are claims that the Civil (Roman) and Common (Anglo-Saxon) Laws embody 
these principles. When the Roman praetors built the jus gentium to regulate the 
commercial dealings between citizens and aliens, they associated it with jus naturale 
and thus sanctioned it as a universal system of law, superseding the jus civile. This 
association has been officially endorsed by Gaius and Justinian in their Institutes.
1 »'Law and the Gospel" is a concept used to represent the Old and New Testaments of the Bible.
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Equally the early Common Law lawyers have treated the Common Law itself as an 
embodiment of the jus naturale. Bracton is said to have written on the Common Law 
under the influence of the doctrines of the natural law. Sir Francis Bacon who sided 
with the King in most of the King's conflict with Justice Coke has argued that the 
Common Law "is grounded upon the law of nature" (ibid: 35). Writing about The 
Expansion of the Common Law, Pollock (1904) did assert that the central idea of 
natural law as the ultimate principle of fitness with regard to the nature of man as a 
rational and social being and the justification of every form of positive law "is fully 
recognized in our own system" (ibid: 39). Sir William Blackstone, the first Vinerian 
Professor of English Law at Oxford, a one time Member of Parliament for Westbury, 
and a Judge of Common Pleas had supposed that "the English Common Law was the 
natural law, the law of God" (Richards, 1977: 10).
The claims about the Common Law being an embodiment of the natural law principles
have been well summed up in Figgis' The Divine Right of Kings:
The Common Law is pictured invested with a halo of dignity, peculiar 
to the embodiment of the deepest principles and to the highest 
expression of human reason and of the law of nature implanted by God 
in the heart of man... Common Law is the perfect ideal law; for it is 
natural reason developed and expounded by the collective wisdom of 
many generations (quoted in Haines, 1965: 40, footnote 2).
The validity of the claims that Civil and Common Laws embody the principles of 
natural law will not be discussed here, but the claims are not beyond question. Indeed 
Bentham who had attended Blackstone's lectures at Oxford was appalled by the claim 
that the English Common Law, with all its barbarities, was 'the natural law, the law of 
God' (see Richard, 1977: 11). Assuming that the claims contain some measure of 
validity, the immediate concern is to ascertain the principles in these Laws which 
constitute a standard for measuring the conformity of the Australian and Nigerian 
arbitration laws.
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The relevant literature show that the dominant concept of the principles of natural law 
in the Civil and Common Laws relates to the inborn and indestructible rights belonging 
to the individuals as such (see Haines, 1965: 19). It is a concept of the priority of the 
individual to the collectivity where the individual in the state of nature is seen as his 
own sovereign (see Gierke, 1934: 96). The canon lawyers translated this concept into 
the doctrines of freedom and equality for all human beings to pursue their own 
individual happiness. In Blackstone's explanation, the Creator laid down certain 
"eternal immutable laws of good and evil" and, for ease of discovery, "graciously 
reduced" them to one simple precept: man should pursue his own happiness (see 
Robson, 1935: 45-46). And "Governments, to justify their existence, were to be 
measured by the security they furnished for the natural principles of freedom and of 
equality" (Haines, 1965: 55). The framers of the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen (1793) upheld these principles when they provided, in Article 1, 
that "Men are bom and remain free and equal in rights... The aim of all political 
association is the preservation of the natural and indefeasible rights of man...".(ibid: 
63).
The aspect of the Australian and Nigerian labour laws with which this study is 
concerned deals with arbitration as a method of industrial dispute resolution. It is, 
therefore, pertinent to further determine how these principles of natural law feature in 
this method of dispute resolution or indeed if they do: is arbitration a universal 
phenomenon and how do the institutional framework, processes, and outcomes of 
arbitration coexist with the rights of freedom and equality of the individual?
A view has been expressed that arbitration is one of four principal means which natural 
law has recommended to individuals and nations for the settlement of their disputes; 
the other three being amicable adjustment, compromise, and mediation. In this view 
"arbitration is a very reasonable means, and one that is entirely in accord with the 
natural law" (Vattel, 1758: 224). In other words, it is a means capable of preserving the
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natural doctrines of freedom and equality. It would be illuminating to examine how the 
Civil and Common Laws embody this natural means of dispute resolution.
The enactment of Justinian (the Justinian Code)^ provides for arbitration and sees it as 
"intended to put an end to litigation". It is a method in which no one is compelled to 
undertake or submit to an arbitration since it "is voluntary and depends upon the 
exercise of the will" (The Civil Law, vol.3: 117). The arbitrators are to be selected by 
the parties and the decisions of these arbitrators are to be based upon the consensus 
between the parties. These decisions are binding only in honour.
Another law, in the Civil Law tradition, which embodies arbitration is the French Civil 
Code. Drafted in 1804 by a Commission headed by two lawyers of distinguished 
reputation - Portalis (of academic bent) and Tronchet (a practitioner), this Code aimed 
at distilling "the most basic and enduring elements [or fundamental values] of private 
law whereby the essential rights and obligations of and between citizens in their private 
affairs of life would be set forth" (Crabb, 1977: 5).
In the original version of the Code there were some provisions (articles) relating to 
arbitration in TITLE XVI, under the heading "Corporal Restraint in Civil Matters". 
This TITLE was abrogated by the Law of 22 July 1867 but partly reinstated by the Law 
of 5 July 1972 (No. 72-626), under the heading "Arbitration Agreement". The essence 
of these provisions is that individuals could "make arbitration agreements on rights of 
which they have the free disposition" (Article 2059).
With regard to the Common Law Blackstone presents arbitration, in his Commentaries,
as part of the laws of England and describes it as a method
where the parties, injuring and injured, submit all matters in dispute ... to 
the judgement of two or more arbitrators; who are to decide the 
controversy... This decision ... is called an award. And thereby the 
question is fully determined, and the right is transferred or settled, as it
2 Promulgated around 530, this Code was a convenient packaging and systematising of the whole 
Roman law as it had developed up to that date.
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could have been by the agreement of the parties or the judgement of the 
court of justice (Blackstone, 1765, 1978: 16).
In the foregoing examination a recurring feature in the Justinian Code, the French Civil 
Code, and the Laws of England is that arbitration is a universal phenomenon and that it 
is organised around the principle of voluntarism. For, although arbitration involves the 
intervention of third parties, the rights of freedom and equality for the individual are 
not eroded thereby: the arbitrators are chosen by mutual consents of the parties; when 
and how the parties go to arbitration are to be in accord with the natural liberty of the 
parties; the awards of the arbitrators are to emanate from the consensus of the parties; 
and these awards bind the parties only in honour and not in law.
On these essential points it is evident that the Australian and Nigerian labour or 
industrial laws which institutionalise compulsion in arbitration have deviated from, 
rather than conformed to, the principles of natural law. This deviation is made more 
significant by the fact that in all other substantial respects the laws of Australia and 
Nigeria have conformed to the general principles of the Common Law which have been 
viewed by people like Blackstone as natural principles. For instance as Sir John Latham 
(1960: 57) has observed, although the basis of most of the law of Australia is the 
common law of England, "an extensive body of industrial law in Australia ... has no 
connection with any common law principles". This is truest in the area of industrial 
arbitration. Similarly in Nigeria the deviation from the common law principles is most 
marked in the area of industrial arbitration. The point that both arbitration laws have 
been recognised as deviations from the principles of natural law will now be 
demonstrated.
It is significant that at the inception of the Australian arbitration system the issue of 
deviating from the natural law principles was fiercely contested and defended. The then 
Attorney-General, Alfred Deakin, who introduced the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill 
in 1903 argued that, although the measure which the Bill proposed was a novel 
experiment, the power which this measure conferred upon the State was kept well
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"within the limits of reason, justice, and constitutional governments" (CPD, vol.XV 
1903: 2862). While the aim of this argument may be to project the measure as being 
within the natural law framework, it does also suggest that some deviation has 
occurred. But, in response to the challenge to the principle of compulsion in the 
measure, Deakin maintained that "any apparent infringement upon that freedom [of the 
employee to choose his employer or of the employer to choose his employee] is more 
nominal than real. Both the employer and the employe (sic) are practically free" (CPD. 
vol.XV 1903: 2869).
The then leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives, Mr Reid, although 
supporting the measure, disagreed that the measure was in conformity with the natural 
law principles. For him, "this Bill comes so largely into conflict with the personal 
liberty of the individual" (ibid: 3185). He described the provision for the 'common rule' 
in clause 63(d) - later, s.38(f) of the original 1904 Act - as "one of the grossest 
invasions of the ordinary rights of the individual and of the first principles of British 
justice which we can conceive" (ibid: 3189). In yet stronger terms, he portrayed this 
measure as a serious departure:
I am supporting this Bill with a full knowledge that ... it involves one of 
the most serious violations of all the principles upon which our system 
of politics and our system of justice have hitherto been administered. 
But, just as in martial law, all the sanctions and usages of civilized life 
disappear, is it not better that, in this case, they should disappear for a 
time in order to prevent the destruction, bloodshed, and hatred which 
these quarrels engender? (ibid: 3190).
Later on in the debates he contended: "no man is more sensible than I am of the 
multitude of points in which the provisions of this Bill seem to shock all one's instincts 
of personal liberty, and all one's desire to see a free Commonwealth composed of free 
and independent subjects" (ibid: 3195). From an angle different from that of Reid, 
Hughes acknowledged that the Bill invaded the liberty of the subjects but that this was 
properly so. "The employer", he says, "is no longer to be allowed freedom of contract. 
The shibboleth which has served him so admirably in the past is to be taken away from 
him. He is robbed of his ewe lamb, and is correspondingly downhearted" (ibid: 3377).
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The first uncompromising opposition to the measure on the grounds that it violated 
natural law principle was mounted by Bruce Smith, the honourable member for Parkes. 
In his view this measure was undoubtedly "a great departure". He affirmed the position 
of the then President of the American Federation of Labour, Mr Samuel Gompers, that 
compulsory arbitration "is the very antithesis of freedom, order, and progress" or a way 
to commit industrial affairs to "political jugglery". This position is echoed by a 
statement attributed to the then Treasurer of the American Federation of Labour, Mr 
Lennon, that compulsory arbitration is "a system of slavery" and "a method 
inconsistent with the principles of ... American Government and the natural rights of 
man" (see Sawers, CPD. vol.XV 1903: 3485-6).
Smith also referred to the Moseley Commission's branding the compulsory arbitration 
as one of "ready-made milleniums" which the workmen of England must reject in 
favour of "[working] out one for ourselves by natural laws" (see CPD. vol.XV 1903: 
3456-7). For him, "the whole tendency of history - certainly that of Anglo-Saxon 
history - is to give the individual increasing liberty so long as he does not interfere with 
the equal individual liberty of others''^ (ibid: 3459). Therefore, and as a ground for his 
inability to support the measure, Smith concluded that "the spirit which has led to the 
introduction of the Bill is a retrograde one, and is opposed to the experience of the last 
century, during which individual liberty matured and became a living principle among 
Anglo-Saxon people" (ibid: 3464). If by this conclusion he meant the absence of the 
State intervention in labour-capital relations, Mr Edwards and Sir John Quick were 
quick to point out that he either had been "asleep for forty years" or had "not studied 
the lessons of English history" at all (see CPD. vol.XVI 1903:4001).
In general, the protagonists of the measure were unanimous in their view that the Bill 
was in line with the direction of State intervention which had crystalised in Britain by
This, as Sir John Quick has pointed out, is the well-known dictum of Herbert Spencer - the law of 
equal freedom (see CPD. vol.XVI 1903: 4004).
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the 14th century (see in particular the contribution of Mr Spence, the honourable
member for Darling, CPD. vol.XV 1903: 3490-3496). They were, however,
unsuccessful in denying that the measure was an interference with individual liberty or
a deviation from the natural law principles and resorted to redefining liberty or
rationalising the measure. For instance Mr Higgins, the honourable member for
Northern Melbourne, attempted to reconceptualise this liberty in terms of restraint in
the interest of the social order. "Have not people come to recognise", he asked, "that the
greatest liberty is obtained where there is the greatest law - that where there is the
greatest restraint in the common interest there is to be found the greatest liberty for the
individual and for individual action?" (CPD. vol.XV 1903: 3472). When Sir John
Quick was driven to admit the interference with individual freedom by the Bill, he
invoked a social-utilitarian argument:
the only justification for the Bill is that, although it interferes with 
freedom, it does so with the object of securing the greatest good to the 
greatest number... If we want a scheme which will work in a satisfactory 
manner we must make the necessary provision, even though it may 
interfere with individual rights and interests (CPD. vol.XX 1904: 
2663) .
On balance it was recognised by the politicians who enacted the Australian arbitration 
law that the law, so far as it embodied compulsion, departed from the natural law 
scheme for arbitration. The law was not just state intervention par excellence in 
industrial relations, it was an intervention of an unprecedented type. The debates of the 
then Supreme Military Council which decreed the Nigerian arbitration law could not be 
accessed for reasons beyond the control of this writer. It is not therefore known how the 
military debated (if at all)^ the question of conforming to or deviating from the 
principles of natural law. Insofar as the law which they decreed embodied compulsion,
 ^Paradoxically Mr Shack, the honourable member for Tangney, referred to this argument in 1988 in his 
opposition to the 'compulsory unionism1 provision in the Industrial Relations Bill 1988 (see the 
Commonwealth House of Representatives Weekly Hansard, No. 9, 1988: 2804).
 ^ As Robin Luckman has observed in his The Nigerian Military (1971), the meetings of the Supreme 
Military Council took the form of "a military briefing in which information is exchanged and orders 
given, rather than the political caucus in which bargains are struck and compromises achieved" (quoted 
inOjo, 1987: 152).
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that which has been said about the Australian law vis-a-vis the natural law principles 
apply to the Nigerian law.
The principle of compulsion which the arbitration laws of Australia and Nigeria 
embody is a major departure from natural law. Hence conformity to natural law 
principles cannot be an explanation for the similarity among the Australian and 
Nigerian laws. A second possibility mentioned in connection with the autonomy model 
was that laws could be similar if both started from some notion of natural law and 
deviated in a similar fashion because of similar social exigencies. Since this amounts to 
a social product explanation I shall deal with this possibility in the next section (i.e 
6.3). A third possibility suggested by the autonomy model is transplantation; it will 
now be addressed.
6.2.2 Legal transplantation and the similarities among the laws
Legal transplantation involves the moving of a rule or a system of law from one 
country to another, or from one people to another. This can be through borrowing from, 
adapting or, at least, studying of, one country’s laws by another country. The 
construction of the autonomy model in chapter two raised the possibility that 
transplantation might be the explanation for similarities in substance and/or formulation 
among laws of many countries. To explain the similarities in the Australian and 
Nigerian arbitration laws, using the factor of transplantation, there is the need to 
consider the status of the Australian law: how independent the law was from its society, 
i.e. taking on a life of its own or surviving beyond original "causes” to be moveable. 
Then I shall discuss whether Australian law was in fact transplanted to Nigeria and the 
process through which such transplantation would have been effected. These issues will 
now be examined in turn.
6.2.2(a) Status of the Australian law (Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904)
An informed examination of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, 
being the law which was in force at the time when Nigeria started her own compulsory 
arbitration system in 1968, will show that the legal form of that Act was largely
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abstracted from its underlying social interests and origins. Although it is in the province 
of the social product explanation coming up later to discuss the relative strength of the 
various interests which were associated with the enactment of this Act in 1904, it can 
be observed here that the representation of these interests in the Act not only equalises 
these interests but also obliterates any significant traces of their association with the 
enactment of the law.
On the equalisation, one illustration is that while the recognition of the union of 
workers by the employers was a key factor in the process which culminated in the 
enactment of the Act, the formulation of the chief objects of the law concealed this fact. 
Thus the object which relates directly to the recognition of unions was expressed in the 
following terms: "to facilitate and encourage the organisation of representative bodies 
of employers and employees ..." [s.2(VI) of the original 1904 Act]. Further, in the Act, 
both employers and employees are equally prohibited from 'injuring' one another (i.e 
the former shall not dismiss or threaten to dismiss and the latter shall not cease work) 
by reason, among other things, that the other party is an officer, delegate or member of 
an organisation registered or about to be registered under the Act (see ss. 9 and 10 of 
the original 1904 Act; s.5 of the amended 1904 Act and s.334 of the 1988 Act). Such 
equalisation effectively disguises the conditions under which the necessity for 
compulsory arbitration arose.
It needs be observed that this equalising expression was not accidental nor was it
incidental to any legal drafting tradition at the time; it was deliberately contrived by the
framers of the law. Deakin maintained:
This Bill contains nothing in favour of the employe (sic) any more than 
in favour of the employer. Their unions are both classed in the same 
way. Every privilege given to the one is given to the other, every 
liability imposed on the one is imposed upon the other. They are placed 
in a position of equality before the law (CPD. vol.XV 1903: 2870).
A similar approach was adopted by Kingston as can be seen in his declaration:
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I make no distinction between masters and men in this respect... I say 
treat all fairly; treat all alike... I defy any honourable member to find 
within the four corners of the Bill ... any provision which makes an 
unjust distinction between masters and men, or makes any difference at 
all between them (ibid: 3196).
This mode of expression produces, in effect, what Isaac Balbus has termed "universal 
e q u iv a len ts]It tends to re-enact in the industrial law what Anatole France has 
observed about the criminal law: "the law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as 
well as the poor to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread". The 
social consequence (manifest or latent) of such legal form may not be difficult to 
fathom. One illustration is the view expressed by the Editorial Collective (1978: 85) 
that
to prohibit both rich and the poor from sleeping in the park; from 
begging on the streets; to prohibit the propertied and the propertyless 
from stealing from each other; to prohibit the wealthy and the downcasts 
from being vagrants, is quite simply absurd, [and] far from being 
equalising [it] merely criminalises, harasses, degrades and oppresses 
further the poor, the propertyless and the structurally disadvantaged.
In a more aphoristic manner, this consequence has been expressed as follows: "the 
systematic application of an equal scale to systematically unequal individuals [or 
groups] necessarily tends to reinforce systematic inequalities" (Balbus, 1978: 79). This, 
of course, is subordinate to the other consequence which is "to mask and occlude class 
differences and social inequalities, contributing to a 'declassification' of politics which 
militates against the formation of the class consciousness necessary to the creation of a 
substantively more equal society" (id).
It may be argued that the 1904 Act emerged as part of an egalitarian package which the 
Australian labour movement, through its Parliamentary arm (the Labor Party), was able 
to "wrest" from the political leaders of that period and, therefore, could not have 
intended such unequalising consequence(s). But there is evidence in the 
Commonwealth parliamentary debates about the law in 1903-4 that the government of 
the day did not want the law to be seen as a class legislation. In any case the point 
remains that the form which the law took conceals the class or power differences
184
between labour and capital. That is, it is difficult to read from its face any express 
ideological affiliation or concrete particularism pointing to its origins.
Regarding the obliteration of the association between the emergence of the law and the 
surrounding circumstances, one good illustration is the absence of a detailed preamble 
in the 1904 Act. Generally, the practice before its enactment (especially in the pre- 
Federation period) was to provide a relatively long preamble and/or detailed provisions 
in each enactment, encapsulating the factors which have given rise to such law. Some 
randomly selected examples of such enactment include the New South Wales 
University and University Colleges Act 1900 and the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900. One common feature of these pieces of legislation, which the 
1904 Act lacks, is that their preambles provide some clear hints about their social and 
historical origins.
These laws compare closely with a classic British illustration - the Black Act 1723. The 
preamble of this Act shows that it was a law "for the more effectual punishing wicked 
and evil-disposed persons going armed in disguise, and doing injuries and violences 
(sic) to the persons and properties of his Majesty's subjects, and for more speedy 
bringing of the offenders to justice". A good number of the seventeen articles which 
this Act contains distinctly indicate the origins and the interests from which the Act has 
emanated.
For instance Article I shows that many persons had associated themselves into 
confederacies under the name of Blacks (going about with their faces blacked or in 
disguised habits) to support and assist one another in stealing and destroying the 
"valuables" of the propertied class. It also shows the means used by these "wicked" 
persons, including the coercion of "peaceable" subjects into compliance with their 
allegedly nefarious demands. It was "for the preventing [these] wicked and unlawful 
practices" that the Act was enacted "by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with
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the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal and commons, in parliament 
assembled".
If one's concern is merely, at a glance, to get an idea of the origins and the interests 
associated with the enactment of this law, the "history" in the Act appears quite 
adequate even though it is the official version. In other words, the form of expression 
of this Act retains, rather than extinguishes, the memory of its social origins and 
different interests. It is for a critical analysis of the Act and an extended explanation of 
its enactment that some insights may be sought in other works such as Sir Leon 
Radzinowicz's A History of English Criminal Law and Its Administration from 1750, 
vol. 1 (1948) and E. P. Thompson's Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 
(1975).
A view has been expressed that the objects enumerated in the Australian 1904 Act 
provide a substitute for a detailed preamble. In the context of the discussion in this 
chapter, these objects amount only to a statement of the focus of the legislation and this 
is not denied. Rather, the argument is that this statement of the focus (including the 
general expression of the provisions in the Act) essentially abstracts from and/or masks 
(1) the qualitatively different needs of, and the social relationships between, those for 
whom the Act has some direct relevance and (2) the concrete historical processes with 
which the Act has generally been associated.
In the statement of the focus of the 1988 Act which has replaced the 1904 Act there are 
hints about the contemporary necessity of the law. The objects relating to the need to 
promote industrial harmony and co-operation among the parties to the Australian 
industrial relations, to minimise the disruptive effects of industrial disputes on the 
community, and to ensure proper regard for the interests of the parties and those of the 
Australian community [see s.3 (a), (b) and (c)] are indicative of the structure and 
processes of industrial relations in Australia. Even then they are faint signals, compared 
to the explicit statements which come from the detailed preambles of, at least, the pre-
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20th century pieces of legislation. Yet they appear stronger than those signals which the 
1904 Act emits.
The point being made in the foregoing discussion is that by equalising its subjects and 
obliterating the association between its rise and the prevailing social processes, the 
1904 Act acquires a form which enables the law to present itself in a manner that it can 
apply to the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes generally. In this form, 
although still far from being as epigrammatic as the form of the French Civil Code has 
been described to be^, the 1904 Act becomes transplantable or eminently practical to 
transport into other places no matter how socially different from its original society 
these places may be. In particular, it becomes transplantable to social contexts in 
which the aim is to protect employers rather than employees. As will be shown later 
these were the circumstances in Nigeria at the time of transplantation.
6.2.2(b) The fact and process of transplantation of the Australian law to Nigeria
The question to be addressed now is: did Nigeria borrow the Australian model of 
industrial arbitration law? On the evidence, the answer to this question is resoundingly 
in the affirmative. From the interviews with some of the officials directly connected 
with the emergence and development of the Nigerian compulsory arbitration system I 
established, clearly, that the system was modelled closely after the Australian system. 
These interviews were with Mr G. C. Okogwu and Mr O. Efueye. Mr Okogwu was the 
Federal Director of Labour in the Federal Ministry of Labour at the time when the 
compulsory arbitration system was started and, as a lawyer, he participated directly in 
the drafting of the arbitration legislation. Fie was quite familiar with the works of E. I. 
Sykes and J. E. Isaac on the Australian arbitration law and system. Mr Efueye, also a 
lawyer, was appointed to the IAP as vice-chairman and later became the chairman 
between 1975 and 1986.
6 For an argument as to how this form assisted the widespread transplantation of the French Civil Code, 
see Max Weber: Economy and Society, vol. II (1978), pp.865-6 - edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich; John 
H. Crabb's The French Civil Code (1977), pp. 2-12.
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Both officials indicated that from the time of the 1963-4 general strike it became plain 
that the existing system of industrial dispute resolution was inadequate^ and a question 
of major law reform was raised. For instance the Morgan Commission which inquired 
into the causes of the strike recommended, among other things, "that all labour 
legislation in Nigeria should be reviewed as a matter of urgency": this would entail the 
establishment of Industrial Court, the banning of industrial action while the process of 
settlement is in progress, and the introduction of compulsory arbitration (Morgan 
Commission, 1964: 44).
Although the Ministry of Labour had tacitly embarked on the review of the labour laws 
in line with some of the Morgan Commission recommendations, it was under the 
military regime of General Yakubu Gowon that this question of labour law reform 
overtly received the much needed attention (Yesufu, 1984: 54, 223). According to 
Okogwu, the Morgan inquiry and their recommendations "were still fresh" when the 
regime approached the civil administration in the Ministry of Labour and instructed 
them to search for a workable industrial dispute settlement system. Okogwu said 
something to the effect that the legal group to whom the task was assigned looked 
among the Commonwealth countries for a model in a country 'of similar level of 
development'. The reason for this approach was that, in time of difficulty, the point of 
reference for Nigeria was the United Kingdom or the Commonwealth countries.
The group found in Australia a system of industrial relations which was radically 
different from, and considered more efficient than, the one existing in Nigeria. The 
element of compulsion in the Australian system had previously been recommended by 
the Morgan Commission. There was, therefore, not much difficulty in "convincing" the 
regime that the Australian system was the model upon which to base the new system 
for Nigeria. One crucial point in Okogwu's recollection is that the compulsory system 
was perceived to be faster than the existing voluntary system and to be based on unified
 ^The details of this strike will be provided in the next subsection.
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and centralised control which fitted squarely with "the identification marks of the 
military".
To a large extent the story of Mr Okogwu was corroborated by Mr Efueye. He noted 
how Britain could not make their industrial relations system work; how Australia had 
already provided the model for the Nigerian criminal code at the turn of the twentieth 
century0; how Australia, Nigeria and a few other countries were operating federalism; 
how Australia and Nigeria were using the Westminster system of government; and 
how, through "natural process, selective affinities and closeness in spirit", Nigeria is 
similar to Australia.
Mr Efueye was definite in his view that the source of the Nigerian compulsory 
arbitration system is Australia. As a matter of fact he visited Australia in 1980 to 
observe the practical working of the arbitration system upon which the one he was 
administering in Nigeria was based. Asked why this connection between the Australian 
and Nigerian systems is not readily admitted in official documents, he pointed to the 
practice of the bureaucrats who copy without acknowledging their sources. This 
practice, he said, is usually rationalised in the way that Sheridan replied to the criticism 
of plagiarism in his work, The Rivals: "Faded ideas float in the fancy like half-forgotten 
dreams. And the imagination in its fullest enjoyment becomes suspicious of its 
offsprings and doubts whether it has created or adopted".
In addition to the foregoing anecdotal evidence there is documentary evidence, 
supporting the position that Nigeria borrowed its compulsory arbitration system from 
Australia. Between 1959 and 1963 there were at least two ILO-Fellowship holders 
from Nigeria who came to Australia to study the legal framework and practice of the 
Australian industrial relations systems. The reports which they submitted to the 
Department of Labour and National Service (now the Department of Education,
 ^ In 1904 the Queensland Criminal Code 1899 was adopted and used as a model for the enactment of a 
criminal code for Northern Nigeria. Following the amalgamation of the North and South in 1914 this 
code was extended to the whole of Nigeria. Its operation became confined to the South from 1960.
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Employment and Training, DEET), indicate a substantial appreciation of both the State 
and the Commonwealth laws and systems in Australia.
One of these reports, written by Abiodun^, records extensive discussions and 
observations by the writer on the systems. The officials with whom Abiodun had the 
discussions include Industrial Relations Officers in the Department of Labour and 
National Service, Industrial Registrars, Conciliation and Arbitration Commissioners, 
Arbitration Inspectors, Company Industrial Officers, Presidents/Secretaries of workers' 
and employers' organisations (at state and federal levels), and University lecturers. The 
subjects upon which the discussions were conducted include the background and 
achievement of the Australian system of compulsory arbitration, wage theory/wage 
fixation in Australia, operations of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission and the Arbitration Inspectorate, the role of the peak unions like the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions in the arbitration system, and the prospects for 
compulsory arbitration in Nigeria.
From these discussions, coupled with the observations which he personally made at the
relevant sites, Abiodun came to the view that
the Arbitration System in Australia has worked satisfactorily but it has 
not taken the place of collective bargaining in industry. In fact, the 
Arbitration System itself encourages the idea of collective bargaining 
since both sides of industry are afforded by the machinery in existence 
to iron out their differences themselves through discussions at the 
factory level and with Conciliators appointed under the Law before 
taking particular cases to Arbitration Commissioners for decisions.
He maintained that despite the "imperfections in the ... System" which the "textbooks ... 
written by Professors and University Lecturers" have disclosed, "the consensus of 
opinion is that the system has proved to be effective Having observed that the 
arbitration system then existing in Nigeria was different from the Australian system, he 
noted that with further development in industries and trade union movement in Nigeria
9 The source of this report is CRS A.838 [DFAT, C.O. files], item 2037/3/12 "I.L.O. Fellow Nigeria. 
Abiodun, Mr M.O. 1959-60", obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra.
190
"it will become necessary to give thought to either improving on the [voluntary] system 
or finding a more suitable one". If by "a more suitable one" he was contemplating a 
compulsory arbitration system for Nigeria, the assertion was prophetic. Somewhat 
anticipatorily, Abiodun alluded to the effectiveness of an Industrial Court in dealing 
with the problem of trade union demanding what the economy could not bear and 
employers not paying fixed wages.
Apart from the arrangements for the Nigerian ILO-fellowship holders to undertake 
educational visits to Australia, there were other avenues through which the Australian 
arbitration system "migrated" to Nigeria. For the most part of the 1960s the Australian 
Department of Labour and National Service, through their representatives like Mr B. J. 
Watchom who were attached to the Australian Mission in Lagos, were in contact with 
the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Labour. In fact, Mr Watchom did advise on the 1968 
arbitration legislation in its draft stages. It has been observed that when Mr B.J. 
Watchom departed from Lagos the Nigerian Ministry maintained some informal 
contact through ILO conferences at Geneva and by correspondence with other officers 
of the Australian Department of Labour and National Service (see DFAT files, 201/4/4 
728; DEET files, C83/7057 pplll-112: by special access).
In 1971 Mr Leonard Lamboume of the Federated Clerks' Union, New South Wales 
State Executive of the Australian Labour Party and Commonwealth Council of the 
Institute of International Affairs visited Nigeria. During his call on the Federal Ministry 
of Labour the then Federal Director of Labour, Mr Okogwu, engaged his expertise: the 
Director disclosed to him that "a major review of Nigerian industrial legislation and 
arbitration machinery [was] under way"; that his "Ministry had a lively interest in 
Australian advancement in the area of industrial relations"; that his Ministry "would 
like to receive a complete set of [Australian] Commonwealth legislation covering 
industrial relations" and, finally, he organised for Lamboume a panel discussion with 
the senior officers of the Labour Division of the Ministry (ibid).
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In response to the request for the Australian laws a set of the Australian federal 
legislation covering industrial relations were delivered to the Nigerian Ministry of 
Labour in July 1972 (see DFAT files 201/4/4). This gesture is consistent with the 
technical assistance which Australia had given to Nigeria before and after 1971. For 
instance in 1967 when Dr J.W.C. Cumes, the then out-going Australian High 
Commissioner in Nigeria, paid a farewell call on the Head of State, Major-General 
Yakubu Gowon, he was told that the Nigerian Government was grateful to Australia 
"for the technical assistance she had been giving to Nigeria, especially in the field of 
education" (Daily Times, August 9, 1967 in NIIA files). And in 1974 Australia 
contributed books on various subjects including "books on Criminal Law, 
Commonwealth Acts and Industrial Law" to the rebuilding of the libraries of the then 
Midwest State and East Central State after the civil war (see Nigerian Observer, July 6, 
1974, p.5; the Renaissance, July 10, 1974, p.l). Through such assistance and, partly, 
through purchases books on the Australian system, including notably Higgins' The New 
Province of Law and Order (1922) and Foenander's Towards Industrial Peace in 
Australia (1956) have become available in many Nigerian libraries.
The foregoing examination shows that in the 1960s a question of major law reform had 
been raised in the area of the Nigerian industrial legislation, a question which led the 
body charged with the responsibility for finding the solution to consider the Australian 
model. As it turned out this model had a form sufficiently abstracted from its social 
origin; it was written in a language used officially in Nigeria; it was developed by a 
fellow Commonwealth federation; and it was accessible in literature to a legal elite 
obviously fascinated by the model. It is also shown that first-hand information about 
the Australian model was acquired through educational visits, formal and informal 
contacts or correspondence between relevant government agencies. The availability of 
books in the libraries, through donations and purchases made the Australian model 
accessible and easy to be adopted.
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The examination also shows that there is no question about the Australian system 
being regarded with enough respect. It should be noted that the borrowing of the 
Australian model of compulsory arbitration took place towards the end of the 1960s, at 
the time when the system was well placed especially in the pre-O'Shea period, to be 
admired and borrowed. It was in the heyday of the use of 'bans clauses' and the 
imposition of heavy fines on the trade unions. In the works published shortly after this 
period the notion of the effectiveness of the law was conveyed. For example, Macken 
(1974: 150) maintained that "the arbitration law has often been held up as a model for 
the world ... It has proved to be fast and effective in carrying out its task of preventing 
and settling disputes".
Thus the fact and process of the transplantation of the Australian arbitration law to 
Nigeria seems to fit a classic textbook image of the factor of borrowing in the 
autonomy explanation for similarities among national laws. In addition to the 
overwhelming similarity with respect to the philosophy of compulsion, there are traces 
of identical wordings in the two laws. For example, s. 15 and s.26 of the Nigerian 1968 
and 1976 Decrees respectively which provide for the procedures of the tribunals are 
more or less a verbatim reproduction of s.40(l)(b) of the Australian 1904 Act: the 
tribunal shall "not be bound to act in any formal manner and shall not be bound by any 
rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter as it thinks just".
Although the foregoing autonomy explanation sheds some light on the role of legal 
transplantation in the similarities between Australian and Nigerian laws, it does not 
address the crucial sociological question why it was possible for Nigeria to adopt or 
borrow the Australian system. Neither does it address the question whether the social 
conditions which motivated the borrowing were similar to the conditions associated 
with the emergence of the system in Australia. The factors to which one has been 
sensitized by the social product model have to be interrogated for the answers to these 
questions.
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6.2.3 Parallel social conditions and the similarities among the laws
The issues to be addressed in this subsection relate to the social foundations of the 
similarities between the Australian and Nigerian arbitration laws. Did the conditions in 
the Australian and Nigerian industrial relations systems which provided the immediate 
pretext for the enactment of compulsory arbitration laws in both countries develop in 
the same way as to produce such similar consequences? Did the development of the 
political and economic structures/traditions in the two countries parallel each other as 
to give rise to similar laws? For the latter question I will be examining how the 
interaction of the political structures/traditions and the modes of production with the 
industrial relations systems influenced the adoption of compulsory arbitration laws in 
both countries. In the discussion of both questions attention will be paid to the 
"consensus" and "conflict" dimensions of the power relations in the two countries.
6.2.3(a) Industrial relations context
Under this heading the focus is on those conditions which derived from (a) the creation 
and maintenance of the labour markets, (b) the raison d'etre of the organisation of 
labour and capital, and (c) the industrial turmoil that significantly struck the 'moral 
conscience' of both countries prior to the adoption of the arbitration systems. The aim is 
to ascertain how similar to those of Australia these conditions in Nigeria were at the 
time the arbitration law was adopted.
One of the basic determinants of the nature of any country’s industrial relations is the 
labour market, involving the whole complex of structures that "make labour power a 
commodity" (i.e the creation of wage labour) and guarantee "the accumulation of 
capital out of the labour process" (Connell and Irving, 1980: 19). Invariably, these 
structures ensure the availability and discipline of labour, and a fair 'return' to the 
buyers of labour power. What aspects of these structures proved congenial to the 
emergence of compulsory arbitration laws in Australia and Nigeria, and how similar 
are they?
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The creation and control of the labour markets in Australia and Nigeria began with a
heavy involvement of the state. In the early white settlement of Australia and the early
colonial period in Nigeria the responsibility fell, entirely, to the state to "create" and
discipline labour for both public and private employment and services. Confronted with
the demand for the construction of basic infrastructures for the penal settlement which
began in 1788 and the comfort of the officers and officials of this settlement, the state
in Australia introduced a convict assignment system. Describing how this system
began, Coghlan (1918, 1969 vol.l: 24) remarks:
As there was no other labour obtainable - there being not a dozen free 
men outside the ranks of the soldiers, sailors and civil servants - the 
Governor [Captain Phillip] found it expedient to grant to those whose 
position admitted of the concession being made, the services of convicts 
to clear the ground, build houses, and do such other work, both 
mechanical and domestic, as might be required.
By the time this system of bond (compulsory or forced) labour ran its course in 1839, 
being the year it was abolished, it had passed through three phases^. In the first phase 
the feeding and clothing of the assigned convicts were undertaken by the Government, 
the masters having their labour without being required to support them; and the 
convicts worked without wages. In the second phase, the convicts also worked without 
wages but the masters, and not the Government, were made to feed, cloth and house 
them. And in the third phase, in addition to maintaining the convicts, the masters were 
required to pay wages to these convicts, following the practice whereby the 
Government allowed the convicts in its own employ 'to work on their own hands' for 
wages.
During these phases the system developed into a legal covenant between the 
Government and the private employers, the former laying down the regulations for the 
conditions of employment (the mode of obtaining labour, the hours to be worked, the 
general treatment of the labourers, etc) and the rates of wages. The only part allowed
Only a summary of the system is provided here. For details, see Coghlan (1969 vol. 1: 24-39 and 175- 
199).
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for the assigned convicts to play was to make appeals to the magistrates over any 
mistreatment from the private employers. Thus it can be seen clearly that, in the 
beginning, the state not only created a labour market but also contracted on behalf of 
labour. Connell and Irving (1980: 37) made this point in more ideologically colourful 
terms: "the legal basis of assignment was decidedly marxist, the convict's labour-power 
being regarded as a kind of commodity that was granted to the settler by the 
government, which maintained (in theory) control over the convicts' persons".
More significantly, by dictating the terms of the contracts of employment in the early 
settlement, terms which the convicts and employers were theoretically not at liberty to 
challenge, modify or reject, the state invariably confined labour and capital to passive 
roles in the labour market which it had created. There is no suggestion that both labour 
and capital were subjected to equal treatment: the state generally used its penal 
authority to maintain labour discipline in favour of the ensuing capitalist enterprise and 
its bearers (i.e. the private employers), a discipline which "gave labour relations in 
early Australia [a] horrific cast" (ibid: 45).
The approach of the state in the early colonial administration of Nigeria which began in 
1862 parallelled the Australian experience in essential aspects. Although the 
colonialists did not find Nigeria "terra nullius”, wage labour force was not readily 
available for the administration. While labour relationship of some sort existed in those 
pre-colonial societies which were later brought together to form Nigeria, wage 
employment was generally unfamiliar in these societies (see Fashoyin, 1980: 12; 
Emiola, 1982:1 and Yesufu, 1984: 14). Early in the twentieth century Friedrick Lugard, 
one of the colonial governors, did complain that the natives would not "seek wages for 
hire" (Lugard, 1919: 224).
In the circumstances the colonial administration resorted to creating and using forced 
labour from among the indigenous. This use of compulsion became institutionalised 
and widespread under Lugard who justified it "as an educative process to remove fear
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and suspicion" among the "primitive tribes" (ibid: 243). The forced labour was 
employed on the construction of railways most of which was done between 1900 and 
1936; in the tin mines in Jos area which were opened in 1902 and the coal mines of 
Enugu, opened in 1915 (see Otobo, 1988: 32-34). Back in Britain the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary for the Colonies was in 1926 "stressing the continuing importance of 
compulsory [i.e enlisted, sometimes called political] labour", his argument being the 
voluntary scheme for labour recruitment had "proved a complete failure" (ILR, 1960: 
30). The fact of the matter is that the resort to the use of forced labour was driven by 
"an urgent need to open up the extensive hinterland so as to facilitate commerce and 
achieve the chief objective of occupation - to provide materials for British factories" 
(Ananaba, 1969: 4).
The system of forced labour was established through the military approach of 
conscripting people into labour gangs, army platoons and battalions mainly, as 
indicated earlier, for the construction of roads and railways. Nonetheless this system 
formed the foundation upon which a free labour market was eventually constructed. 
That the colonial administration believed in the success of their approach can be 
inferred from a somewhat triumphal remark by Lugard (1919: 243): "the Government 
rule that every [compulsorily recruited] labourer must be paid up fully in cash ... has 
done more than anything else to popularise the system of labour, and to create a free 
labour market".
In reality the full establishment of a free labour market was far from being 
accomplished at the time that this remark was made. For up to the later pan of the 
1940s forced labour was still being used by the administration; hence the enactment of 
a Forced Labour Ordinance for Nigeria in 1933, following the adoption of the Forced 
Labour Convention by the ELO in 1930, to abolish the system. Yet this legislation did 
not deter the administration from conscripting the indigenes into the armed forces 
during the second world war on behalf of the British government and using forced 
labour to work mines up to 1947 on behalf of the colonial state and the private
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employers. One official indication that the practice of forced labour persisted even 
beyond the 1940s is the amendment to the Labour Code in 1956 which aimed at 
abolishing forced labour "for all but essential communal works of a restricted 
character" (Yesufu, 1984: 17).
Thus between 1862 and 1947 the colonial state in Nigeria forcibly recruited, motivated 
and disciplined labour on a large scale with a view to, among other things, laying the 
foundation for a free or voluntary labour market. The March 1943 edition of the 
Quarterly Review, being the official news bulletin of the Department of Labour at the 
time, was referred to by Yesufu (id) as indicating that between September 1942 and 
March 1943 alone about 30,000 persons were compulsorily recruited to work in the tin 
mines.
Otobo (1988: 62-68) highlights how a share of this forced labour was deployed for the 
service of the private commercial and industrial establishments like the John Holt and 
the United African Company. As in the early Australian white settlement the state in 
Nigeria retained full control over the conditions of employment of this labour. For 
instance, in addition to its arrangement for food supply, the state directed the private 
employers to procure food and firewood for workers at the mines “at official subsidized 
prices'; it also provided blankets, and imposed on the employers a minimum wage (e.g 
four shillings a week by 1944) for the mine workers.
At this juncture it is pertinent to observe that this mode of creating a wage labour 
market in Australia and Nigeria necessarily established a tradition of coercive control 
of labour and of passivity on the part of labour and capital in direct industrial relations. 
In other words a compulsory framework for industrial relations was being set up in 
both countries which kept at bay the basic bargaining initiatives of the two principal 
actors in the system. Further, as it shall be shown shortly, the state in both countries 
never appeared to have departed from this form of intervention before later
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institutionalising the civil version of compulsion in industrial relations through the 
instrumentality of law.
That the state in Australia continued to see it as its responsibility to maintain, in the 
post-convict assignment era, a stable labour market can be observed from its effort to 
offset labour shortages through the means of sponsored immigration which continued 
into the late 1840s. More significantly its coercive control over labour, bond and free 
alike, in the post-convict period was perpetuated through such strategies as the master 
and servants legislation ^  and the compulsory discharge certificate system. Both 
strategies originated in New South Wales, the former beginning with "An Act for the 
Better Regulation of Servants, Labourers and Work People" of 1828 and the latter 
being introduced first, on a limited scale, for the seamen and the whalers in 1840, then 
on a wider scale when it was incorporated into the New South Wales Masters and 
Servants Act 1845
There is a strong case for the suggestion that the sort of control referred to in the
preceding paragraph was borrowed from the convict regulatory system (Quinlan, 1989:
31). For instance on the understanding that the desertion or absconding by the workers
from their employers' works was an indication of bad manners the penal administration
took measures to deal with the malady as the following provision (s.l) in the Penal
Settlement Regulations 1790, enacted by Governor Phillip, shows:
As an aversion to honest industry and labour has been the chief cause of 
most of the convicts incurring the penalties of the law, they shall be 
employed at some species of labour of an uniform kind which they 
cannot evade, and by which they will have an opportunity of becoming 
habituated to regular employment.
Governor Hunter, a successor to Phillip, made an Order in 1797, "directing that 
labouring men offering themselves for hire who refused to accept the regulated wages
* 1 For some detailed reviews of the history and use of this legislation in the state intervention in and 
control of industrial relations, see Merritt (1982); McQueen (1987); and Quinlan (1989).
12 The compulsory discharge certificate system was adopted from the NSW by Tasmania in 1856 and 
lasted till 1882. It was also adopted by Victoria in 1851 where it lasted till the 1890s.
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were to be apprehended immediately and prosecuted as vagrants" (Coghlan, 1969: 56). 
Governor Macquarie who took over from Hunter continued with this policy.
Thus one main concern of the penal administration from the very start was to maintain 
through coercion the supply, stability and control of labour for the development of 
infrastructures and preventing "the formation of a class of idle vagabonds" (ibid: 65). 
But the later colonial and State administrations, the latter extending into the 1890s, 
hardly shifted from this philosophy as the subsequent introduction of the master and 
servants legislation also took the form of a coercive "mechanism of labour control 
which sought to deal with the particular labour market characteristics of the Australian 
colonies" (Quinlan, 1989: 36).
As in Australia there were times in Nigeria when the state considered importing labour 
(the "Kroo labourers", equivalent of the "coolies" in Australia) from India and, at other 
times, did recruit labour from countries in the same region like Ghana (then Gold 
Coast), Liberia, and Sierra Leone as a way of stabilising the labour market. The 
pertinent issue is that, in addition to pursuing this objective, the state also continued 
with its compulsory interventionist approach to the industrial relations system by using 
the master and servants legislation and government wage tribunals, the use of the 
legislation being similar to the Australian situation in the 19th century.
The Nigerian Master and Servants Ordinance 1917 which was enacted to provide a 
legal framework for the conditions and recruitment of labour was later updated with the 
new title of Labour Ordinance 1929. While it may be conceded that this legislation 
provided some 'protection' for the workers (see Yesufu, 1984: 52, 215), the main 
significance lies in its instrumentality for raising and controlling compulsory paid or 
unpaid labour. For an earlier law - i.e the Southern Protectorate Master and Servants 
Proclamations of 1901 and 1903 - after which the 1917 Ordinance was modelled and 
whose provisions the Ordinance incorporated was of a draconian and compulsive
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nature. As Tamuno (1978: 317) noted, people sought to evade this law by escaping to 
places outside its jurisdiction, including the Spanish territory of Fernanda Po.
The wage commission system, being another method of state control, was devised to 
determine and impose wage rates upon the employers and workers. Even though this 
system was designed mainly for the public sector, the decisions of the tribunals became 
the standards for the private sector wage determination. The use of this system was so 
frequent as to effectively set the foundation of the institutional framework for industrial 
relations in Nigeria. Between 1920 and 1960, for instance, there were at least nine of 
such Commissions. For our purpose, though, the greater significance consists in the 
point that the practice reduced the employers and workers to the role of "passive 
actors" in the industrial relations system, a role which they have continued to play 
under the subsequent compulsory arbitration system.
Of the immediate products of the form of state intervention in Australia and Nigeria as 
examined above, two are particularly relevant to the questions being addressed in this 
subsection: one, the dependence of the workers and the employers upon the state was 
institutionalised; and two, the perpetuation of passivity among the workers and the 
employers left these principal actors in industrial relations largely untutored or 
uninterested in the art and practice of consensual collective bargaining
One indication of the first product is that in Australia labour and capital usually turned 
to the state, the former urging for the creation of jobs in times of unemployment or for 
the curtailment of labour supply when labour surplus threatened the wage standards, 
and the latter always urging for the direct pegging of wage rates or the boosting of 
labour supply, through immigration, during labour scarcity to produce wage decline. In 
Nigeria the dependence of labour and capital upon government took the form of
This deduction is truer for the Nigerian situation where the wage tribunal system was introduced 
much early in the process of creating the labour market than for Australia. In the latter country the first 
instance of the state wage tribunal occurred in 1896, i.e over a century after the creation of wage labour 
had begun, by the enactment of the Victorian minimum wage legislation in that year.
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agitation by labour for the curbing of inflation and shortage of consumer goods, and the 
private employers' total surrender, more or less, of their personnel functions to the 
government. An indication of the second product, one which holds good equally for 
both countries, is the frequent resort to strikes or lock-outs in the settlement of 
industrial disputes from the early settlement or administration through to the industrial 
turmoil of 1890-4 for Australia and 1963-4 for Nigeria, the turmoil being held as a 
decisive factor in the adoption of compulsory arbitration systems by the two countries.
In some ways the organisation of labour and capital in Australia and Nigeria can be 
said to have arisen as a mechanism, principally, to place each camp in a strong position 
in which to maintain an effective pressure on the state for their respective interests 
rather than to build "equal" forces for the purpose of consensual collective bargaining. 
Coghlan (1969)^ provides, for Australia, illustrations of the negative reactions of the 
working class to the government's assistance to or renewal of immigration; their 
inclination to form trade unions, like the formation of the Sydney "Trade Protection 
Society" in 1843, to agitate for the provision of employment or relief works by the 
state; the desire of the employers "to see immigration on such a scale as would produce 
a permanent decline in wages"(ibid: 435); frequent strikes by workers for higher wages; 
and the employers' concerted effort to crush workers' unions by the use of "free 
labour".
For Nigeria Ananaba (1969) and Tokunboh (1985) have given detailed descriptions of 
labour's concerted confrontations with government, e.g in the general strikes of 1920 
and 1945 arising from the cost of living allowance (COLA) agitations and the general 
strike of 1963-4 arising from the demand for wage increases^. An analysis of the 
dependence of capital on the state can be found in Otobo (1988: 61-68): in the 1940s 
and 1950s the state authorities assumed many personnel functions for private firms; the 
ports in Nigeria were owned by two main private commercial establishments, the UAC
^  See the chapters on labour, wages and other related matters: Vol I: pp 424459; Vol II: pp 687-782 
and 1018-1087; and Vol III: pp 1425-1590.
^  For the detailed descriptions, see Ananaba (1969: chs. 4, 7 & 20) and Tokunboh (1985: chs. 3 & 4).
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and John Holt, but were constructed by government's forced labour and garrisoned by 
the state military; and the trading operations of the commercial companies were 
supervised and protected by the state officials "from the presumably dangerous 
activities of the employees".
While the dependence of labour and capital on government as demonstrated above may 
in itself be a strong invitation to or justification for state intervention in the industrial 
relations of Australia and Nigeria, of greater significance is the argument that the 
nature of this intervention precluded the entrenchment of voluntary negotiation 
between the employers and employees and laid a foundation for institutionalised 
compulsion in the industrial relations systems of both countries. For instance the first 
example in the history of Australia of the full recognition of collective bargaining as a 
principle and not as an isolated phenomenon occurred only in 1873, more than three- 
quarters of a century after the white settlement began. This was when the Associated 
Colliery Masters and the miners' union of the Hunter River district "entered into a 
formal written agreement" on wages and procedures for settling future industrial 
disputes (see Coghlan, 1969: 1427-8).
What is more, the speeches on the occasion of that agreement were said to have 
indicated that both organisations of the employers and the workers tended "to look to 
the State for compulsory arbitration in labour disputes" (id), a step further than the 
frequent suggestion of arbitration (mainly voluntary) as a means of settlement in the 
previous times. Indeed by 1889 the "legalisation of compulsory courts of arbitration" 
could and did feature as an official agenda item for the sixth congress of the Inter­
colonial Trade Union Congress (see Sutcliffe, 1967: 69).
Such systematic tendency towards arbitration seems to belie Hutson's (1983: 36) claim 
that "[b]y 1890 the trade unions ... had adopted the use of collective bargaining with 
employers to establish wages and conditions, supported sometimes by strikes". The 
method which appears to be the most popular, especially with the employers and the
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workers in the casual employment industries like pastoral, mining and transport 
industries, was unilateral regulation. And when this proved unworkable the parties had 
been open to arbitration. Since these industries constituted the larger proportion of the 
entire economy it is reasonable to suggest that unilateral regulation cum arbitration, 
rather than collective bargaining, was the dominant mode of power relations in the 
industrial relations context at that time. The work of Bray and Rimmer (1989) shows 
that by the time of the 1890-4 strikes collective bargaining which underpins the 
principle of voluntarism had not developed firm roots in Australia.
In Nigeria collective bargaining was more in the imagination of the state policy makers 
than in the practice of the industrial relations. The prolonged reliance on forced labour 
meant that the ideology which represents the workers and their organisations as 
possessing no legitimate rights both in the labour market and workplace had ample 
time to form. One concrete manifestation of this ideology was the practice in which, 
largely during the early period of the colonial administration, the state and private 
employers unilaterally determined the terms of employment (Otobo, 1988: 71).
Akpala (1982: 75-77) wondered why the Trade Union Ordinance 1938 which was 
supposed to be a landmark in the evolution of free industrial relations in Nigeria was 
silent on collective bargaining, and concluded that the ordinance "was not helpful to 
either the development of effective or meaningful collective bargaining or the use of 
voluntary settlement of industrial disputes in the private sectors". He missed the point. 
Collective bargaining or dispute settlement was not even in the consideration that went 
into the making of that law. Rather "the primary object of [the] ... legislation ... was to 
promote the regular organisation of wage labourers under the sympathetic supervision 
and guidance of Government and that this was the reason why compulsory registration 
was considered necessary"^. In plain words the consideration was to control the 
organisation of labour without using naked force. As one letter written by the UAC to
See the Colonial Labour Committee memo 33 in CO 323/1539/1754/5 item 18 from the Public 
Records Office, Richmond, London.
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the Colonial Office on the 25th November 1938 attests, the employers felt that the 
legislation "must necessarily come and that some guidance and control of the present 
tendency towards irregular labour associations is ... necessary ..."* . A more revealing 
piece of evidence is the hand-written comment by O.G.R. William on 8th July 1938 
regarding the demand by the business sector (the UAC, the West African section of the 
London Chamber of Commerce, etc) that certain combinations (especially those 
involving the "masters") be excluded from the jurisdiction of the legislation: "the 
proposed omission may make it difficult to check the activities of combinations of 
African workers which are not bona fide trade unions but have a subversive object"
Also it has been suggested that the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance 
1941, enacted three years after the 1938 trade union legislation, lived up to the 
traditional British standards of collective bargaining and settlement of disputes 
(Yesufu, 1984: 74). The correctness of this suggestion is in grave doubt but, in any 
case, no sooner was it enacted than it was circumscribed by another law, cited as the 
Industrial Arbitration Regulations 1941, which in effect banned direct action and gave 
the Governor power to refer industrial disputes to arbitration with or without the 
consent of the parties^. Of course, being a war time emergency measure, this law (i.e 
the Regulations) was expected to lapse at the end of the war in 1945 even though it 
contained no sunset clause whatsoever. Having lapsed, then, collective bargaining and 
voluntary settlement would be restored under the Ordinance. It did not happen that 
way.
The wider institutional setting within which the Ordinance was to operate was such that
70no effective collective bargaining or voluntary settlement of disputes could develop . 
17 See CO 323/1539/1754/5 item 31. p.2.
See CO 323/1539/1754/5, comments arising from the report of Mr Dale on the discussion between Mr 
Da we and Mr Muir.
19 Some officials in the Colonial Office at the time complained about the sweeping nature of this law 
which presumed that all industries or occupations in Nigeria were essential to Britain's prosecution of 
the second world war - see para. 9, CO 859/58/4
20 Peter Kilby and John Weeks, joined by Robin Cohen, entered into a debate on the failure or non- 
failure of the Anglo-Saxon model of industrial relations in Nigeria prior to the start of the compulsory 
arbitration system in 1968. Although this debate appears largely semantic, it highlights the deficiencies
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The Cowan Inquiry Report which was submitted to the colonial administration in 1948 
suggested that the attitude of many officers of the Government Departments had been 
to destroy trade unions. This suggestion reflects an earlier allegation by N. A. Cole, the 
president of Nigeria's Trade Union Congress, on the occasion of the police shooting of 
the UAC employees at Burutu on June 21, 1947: the "Government was using all means, 
fair and foul, to dwarf the growth of trade unionism in the country" (quoted in 
Ananaba, 1969: 72). Also, the private employers were reluctant to recognise trade 
unions in their establishments, taking advantage of the fact that the 1938 Ordinance did 
not compel recognition of trade unions.
Moreover "Whitleyism" which was introduced in 1948 as a method of negotiation 
(collective bargaining) between government and the employees in the state-owned 
establishments foundered almost as soon as it was introduced. Both in composition and 
orientation the Whitley Councils quickly became anomalous and inhibitive to any 
effective collective bargaining. In Whitley Council B, for instance, the government side 
of the membership was composed of heads of departments who would have disagreed 
with the unions at the departmental level before sitting on the Council as "unbiased 
negotiators". Often the heads used the Councils as a higher authority to legitimise their 
initial rejection of unions’ demands, or at best as consultative bodies.
Mr Fred Carruthers who was sent from London to Nigeria in 1951 to re-establish 
"Whitleyism" observed, among other things, that lack of goodwill, patience, tolerance 
and respect, contributed to the breakdown of the earlier Councils. He also 
recommended that formal recognition of trade unions and the establishment of "a 
standing arbitration court reference to which will be at the option of the either side" 
would be necessary conditions for the survival and effectiveness of "Whitleyism". His 
visit evoked high hopes for Whitleyism, expressed in comments such as: "if we can 
maintain the standards that he has set up here he will have done a really first-class job
in the practice of collective bargaining in Nigeria. See Kilby (1967); Weeks (1968); Kilby (1968); 
Weeks (1971); and Cohen (1971).
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of work for Nigeria"; "I am sure that Carruthers has put us on the right lines''^. But the 
Councils which were reconstituted along the lines of Carruthers' suggestions were 
doomed to failure as the necessary conditions were not created. Further the Councils 
were undermined by the frequent use of wages commissions which essentially 
amounted to unilateral wage determination by the state (Ananaba, 1969: 78-79; 
Fashoyin, 1980: 106; Fashoyin, 1987: 1-5; Otobo, 1988: 77).
It should be clear from the foregoing examination that, as in Australia in the period 
leading to the adoption of compulsory arbitration in 1904, collective bargaining did not 
develop any firm roots in Nigeria prior to the adoption of the compulsory arbitration 
system in 1968. For both countries reference is often made in the literature to the 1890- 
4 (for Australia) and 1963-4 (for Nigeria) industrial turmoil as classic evidence of the 
non-existence of institutionalised consensual collective bargaining or voluntary 
settlement of industrial disputes. I will conclude this sub-section with an overview of 
the images of these classic instances of industrial turmoil. These instances are a 
culmination of the conflicting power relations among labour, capital, and the state 
within a regulatory, nay a coercive, institutional framework of industrial relations.
The significance of the 1890-4 industrial turmoil in Australia to the adoption of 
compulsory arbitration is beyond question. Barely eight years after the turmoil 
occurred, Reeves (1902: 86) expressed the view that "to introduce any account of [the 
Australian and New Zealand] experiments in compulsion it is necessary to say 
something of the strife [the unexampled series of strikes in the years from 1890 to 
1894] amid which they were framed". In contemporary times this view has echoed in 
assertions like the one made by Markey (1989: 156): "all explanations for the 
introduction of compulsory state arbitration [in Australia] place great importance on the 
impact of the great strikes of the 1890s...". To a large extent this assertion is true of the 
major works on the Australian arbitration laws and systems some of which are Coghlan
2* See "Proposals of the re-establishment of Whitleyism throughout the Public service in Nigeria" by 
Carruthers; Memo to Mr Watson, dated 15th December, 1951 by Barlthrop; and a letter from Nigerian 
Secretariat in Lagos to the Colonial Office, dated 12th January, 1952: CO 554/697.
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(1969: Vol IV: 2100); Sykes and Glasbeek (1972: 377); Rawson and Fisher (1984: 14, 
21); Hancock Committee (1985: 19); Macintyre and Mitchell (1989); and Creighton 
and Stewart (1990).
Hutson (1983: 43-46) called the turmoil "the Big Strike Struggle" which went for four 
rounds, namely, the Maritime Strike of 1890, the Queensland Shearers Strike of 1891, 
the Broken Hill Miners Strike of 1892 and the Queensland Shearers Strike of 1894. The 
employers saw the strikes as an opportunity not only to test the relative strength of 
labour and capital but also to break the growing power of the trade union movement. 
The employees equally interpreted the strikes as "capital versus labour" but were 
singularly determined to extract union recognition from the employers, using their 
industrial muscles. The state represented the strikes as an insurrection and confronted 
them with its might (the coercive apparatuses), "ostensibly to keep the ring clear, but in 
reality [it entered on the side of capital] to try to crush Unionism" (Spence, 1909: 57).
Following the Maritime Strike of 1890, the Government of New South Wales
appointed a Royal Commission under the presidency of Dr Andrew Garran
to investigate and report upon the causes of conflicts between Capital 
and Labour, known as 'Strikes', and the best means for preventing or 
mitigating the disastrous consequences of such occurrences; and to 
consider from an economic point of examination the measures that have 
been devised in other countries by the constitution of Boards of 
Conciliation or other similar bodies to obviate extreme steps in trade 
disputes ... (Royal Commission on Strikes, 1891: 25).
Bray and Rimmer (1989: 56) suggest that, given the political context of the middle- 
class voters pressing for state intervention in industrial relations, the terms of reference 
quoted above were deliberately worded by the government to cover its tact "to pre­
empt the Commission's investigation" by deciding to intervene through legislation 
before the report was ready and then, presumably, obtain a report which would 
legitimise such decision.
Although the Commission did not recommend the element of state compulsion in 
industrial relations, it made recommendations which constituted a formal basis for state
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intervention in industrial relations. Moreover the Commission provided a significant 
public forum for Charles Cameron Kingston to explicate his well thought out 
compulsory arbitration scheme outside his home state (South Australia). It was this 
scheme which served as a model for the subsequent compulsory arbitration measures 
which found their ways into the statute books in New Zealand in 1894, Western 
Australia in 1900, New South Wales in 1901 and the Commonwealth of Australia in 
1904. In the words of Coghlan (1969: 1917), his "scheme was the precursor of all 
Australasian legislation of that character"““. This widespread adoption of a compulsory 
arbitration scheme after it had been described as a "repugnant element" and rejected by 
the 1891 NSW Royal Commission (Royal Commission Report, 1891: 35) is 
attributable to the fact that the rounds of strikes subsequent to the Commission's 
recommendations belied the assumed moral force of public opinion as an effective 
voluntary state machinery.
The 1963-4 strikes in Nigeria constituted "a Big Strike Struggle" which, although 
different in character to the 1890-4 Australian "Big Strike Struggle", parallelled the 
latter in relative magnitude and implication insofar as these strikes influenced the 
adoption of compulsory arbitration in Nigeria. The recommendations which emanated 
from the inquiry into these strikes "made an open leaning towards compulsion" and 
"gave the standpoint for the [compulsory] industrial relations legislations(sic) in 
Nigeria since 1968" (Akpala, 1982: 109). Indeed the recommendations constituted the 
first articulation and spelling out of the changes which many people clamoured for after 
the independence (Yesufu, 1984: 223).
Perhaps the recommendations reflect the magnitude or seriousness of these 1963-4 
strikes. When the first round of the strikes began on September 27, 1963, the press 
called it "the Big Strike" (Daily Times September 28, 1963, p.l) and Mr Wahab 
Goodluck, a leading figure in the Joint Action Committee of the trade unions which
22 There is a debate about to whom the legacy of "inventing" the Australasian model of compulsory 
arbitration should belong: Kingston or Reeves (of New Zealand). I rely on Kingston's (1894) Notes and 
the arguments in Mitchell (1989: 93-96) in forming my opinion in favour of Kingston.
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coordinated the strikes, represented the second round which began on June 1, 1964 as 
"the titanic strike that shall engulf the nation" (Daily Times June 1, 1964, p.l). 
Tokunboh (1985: 59-63) referred to both rounds of the strikes as "the Great 
Confrontation" - "the most serious confrontation ever experienced by a Nigerian 
Government". Most commentators on the strikes agree that they completely paralysed 
the administrative, commercial and industrial life of the nation, in addition to causing a 
political embarrassment for the ruling elite coming as the first round did on the eve of 
Nigeria's assumption of the new status of a Federal Republic (Cohen, 1974: 91; Ubeku, 
1983: 86)
About four days into the first round of the strikes the Federal Government agreed to the 
demand of the unions to set up a high-powered commission of inquiry into the wage 
structure. A six-man Commission under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Adeyinka 
Morgan was asked to investigate and make recommendations on "the existing wage 
structure, remuneration and conditions of service in wage-earning employments in the 
country ...". Other areas included in the terms of reference are: suitable new wage 
structure, machinery for wage review on a continuing basis, general upward revision of 
salaries and wages of junior employees in public and private sectors, the abolition of 
the daily-wage system and the introduction of a national minimum wage.
Obviously the subject matter of the inquiry which the Morgan Commission was asked 
to make is different from the subject matter for the 1891 NSW Royal Commission on 
Strikes. So also is the underlying assumption about the power relations which informed 
the handling of the strikes. Unlike in Australia where the state interpreted the strikes as 
a conflicting relationship between labour and capital and saw its own role as regulatory 
(i.e merely setting the rules of the game) in the public interest, the Nigerian state saw 
the strikes as an outcrop of a malfunctioning public system and undertook, 
patemalistically, to fix that system.
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Nonetheless there is an interesting feature of the Nigerian Commission which reflects 
what seems to be an Australian idiosyncrasy. Contrary to the dominant practice of the 
previous wage commissions, the Morgan Commission rejected "the existing pattern of 
family expenditure" (i.e the bare cost of living) as the basis for determining minimum 
wage and, instead, adopted the "principle of living wage" in a manner consistent with 
or having the flavour of the Australian Higgin's Harvester judgment in 1907. The 
Commission (1964: 8-21), in determining the national minimum wage, started building 
a foundation for their position by acknowledging that "a wage-earner, no matter how 
hard he works and is willing and able to work, has no power of himself, to increase his 
wage". This sounds like Higgin's (1922: 3) interpretation of the Act under which he 
was to decide the Harvester case as "designed for the benefit of the employees, and ... 
meant to secure for them something which they could not get by individual bargaining 
with their employers".
Further the Commission argued that the existing system "cannot be regarded as 
equitable or fair"; hence their preference for the principle of the living wage as a basis 
for a minimum wage which would be sufficient to meet the requirements of the 
unskilled labourer and his immediate family, and afford the labourer other items like 
amusement, tobacco, etc. Again Higgin had considered similar items, like amusements 
and holidays, liquor tobacco, charity, etc, before coming to the conclusion that nothing 
less that 42s. per week would be fair and reasonable wages for an unskilled labourer in 
Australia of his time. The Morgan Commission recommended a minimum wage of 12 
pounds sterling (ps), lOps, 8ps and 6.1ps per month (i.e approx.9ps or 45s. average per 
week), respectively, for four zones of cost of living levels.
Thus the foregoing discussion shows major parallels in the industrial relations contexts 
of Australia and Nigeria which could explain the similarities in the arbitration laws of 
both countries. The discussion also indicates that there are differences as well, but they 
do not vitiate the strength of the overall parallelism of the industrial relations contexts 
in explaining the similarities among both laws.
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The differences exist mainly in the character and consequences of the industrial 
turmoil. First unlike in Australia where the struggle was waged directly with capital in 
transport, pastoral, and mining industries - the government only stepping in "to keep 
the ring clear", the struggle in Nigeria was directed at the government, both federal and 
regional. The strategy adopted by the Nigerian labour was to confront the government 
not necessarily as an employer, but
as the authority of State, which not only has direct responsibility to 
protect workers in all sectors of wage-employment ... but also the 
obligation to bring about a more rational economic structure, the first 
steps towards which in our view is a complete overhaul of the existing 
colonial wage structure (Ananaba, 1969: 238).
Adeogun (1980: 5) takes the view that the struggle "was ... an industrial one", 
notwithstanding that the strategy which is indicated in the above citation and other 
utterances of labour gave the struggle a political undertone. However a review of the 
main underlying circumstances suggests that the struggle was an economic class war, 
not merely an industrial one and that the political undertone or the use of the 
government as the target was only a strategy by labour to mount an effective challenge 
to the iniquity of capital in general (see Cohen, 1974: 164-168 and Ubeku, 1983: 67). 
Thus when the Government proposed to bring the association of the private employers 
(Nigerian Employers Consultative Committee) into the negotiations over the Morgan 
Commission Report, the representatives of labour objected on the grounds that they 
would not negotiate with their enemy: "the Government of this country has been 
sacrificing us to the private employers. We do not want to negotiate with them at all" 
(Daily Times, June 13, 1964, p.l). So, although the Nigerian labour movement directed 
their struggle to the government, their real target or enemy, was, as with their 
Australian counterpart, capital. The difference in the strategy has no obvious relevance 
in the social product explanation of the similarities between the laws of Australia and 
Nigeria.
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Another difference between the two struggles has to do with the recommendations 
made by the Commissions which were set up in the wake of the struggles. While both 
Commissions sanctioned the institutionalisation of state intervention in industrial 
relations, the Commissions diverged in the form that this intervention was to take. The 
Commission in Australia was content with the state providing the machinery for the 
voluntary settlement of industrial disputes, the only mild element of compulsion being 
that this machinery could be called into action by either of the parties to a dispute. It 
also counted on public opinion to supply the force for compliance: "public opinion 
would be adverse to those who, except for very good cause shown, refused to avail 
themselves of its good offices" (Royal Commission Report, 1891: 28).
The Government of NSW welcomed the recommendations and immediately introduced 
into its Parliament a Bill to establish the recommended Conciliation and Arbitration 
Boards. The Bill failed to become law following the resignation of the (Parkes) 
Government before it could be passed. However in 1892 George Dibbs's Ministry put 
through the Parliament a diluted version of this Bill, which required both parties to an 
industrial dispute to consent to conciliation or arbitration before the machinery could be 
called into action. The law as passed effectively removed the "degree of compulsion" 
which the Royal Commission had regarded as "clearly expedient" in the public interest 
and was prepared to propose (ibid: 34).
In contradistinction to the Royal Commission in Australia the Morgan Commission in 
Nigeria formally proposed the element of compulsion for the settlement of industrial 
disputes. They recommended, among other things, compulsory arbitration and 
compulsory recognition of registered unions. But the Government welcomed only the 
spirit of these recommendations; it suspended their implementation till further 
"examination" and "consultation" were undertaken (Daily Times, June 4, p.ll). The 
implementation never came to fruition before the military took over the government in 
1966. In spite of these differences in the recommendations of the Commissions and the
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responses of the governments both countries ended up putting in place similar 
compulsory arbitration schemes.
The last difference which will be examined here relates to the politicising effect of the 
outcomes of the struggles on the labour movements in both countries. In Australia 
labour was defeated and was convinced of the need for direct representation in electoral 
politics: labour saw in the constitutional means an opportunity to infiltrate the state 
machines the support of which they considered robbed them of victory in their struggle 
with capital (Coghlan, 1969: 1842-3). Or, as Tanner (1980: 42) suggests, "frustrated by 
defeat ..., the labour movement harked back to the Australian tradition of government 
action and evolved the momentous decision to enter politics". The political organ 
which they started in Balmain in 1891 evolved into a full-fledged party known as the 
Australian Labor Party. By 1893 the Party had won 80 seats in the State Lower Houses 
(Ledger, 1909: 56). It has been alleged that the presence of labour in politics in this 
way greatly facilitated the enactment of the compulsory arbitration laws in Australia, 
including the 1904 Act by the Commonwealth Parliament (see National Industrial 
Conference, 1918: 1). The explanation is that labour saw it to be in its interest to have 
such a law.
In Nigeria labour was successful in their struggle against the government and, perhaps 
for this reason, remained on the sidelines of electoral politics. Interestingly labour had 
articulated their grievances in political terms. Indeed Michael Imoudu, popularly 
known as No. 1 Labour Leader in Nigeria, had announced to a crowded rally at Idi-Oro 
(about 12 kilometres from Lagos) in the course of struggle that a Party which would 
cater exclusively for workers would soon be formed (Daily Times, June 12, 1964, 
p.16). A political strike which the Joint Action Committee organised in December 1964 
was a further indication that labour was set on the road to forming a distinct electoral
party.
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Yet the Nigerian labour failed to mobilise an electoral organ, apart from "occasional 
brushes with party politics" (Ubeku, 1983: 92). Perhaps since labour accepted the 
Morgan Report as a basis for negotiation with the government during the 1963-4 
struggle it can reasonably be speculated that their presence in the National Parliament 
would have facilitated the implementation of the Morgan's recommendations for 
compulsory arbitration and compulsory recognition for unions, as was the case in 
Australia. But since, in Nigeria, a military government brought in the arbitration 
scheme without any obvious urging from the labour movement, it can be argued that 
the presence of labour in politics is not a sufficient factor in the explanation of similar 
compulsory arbitration laws.
Thus, significant as the differences specified in the foregoing examination may be, they 
do not diminish the argument that the overall parallelism between the two countries' 
industrial relations contexts motivated the adoption of similar arbitration laws. The 
influence of the broader political and economic contexts on the adoption of the laws 
will now be discussed.
6.2.3(b) Politico-economic context
The discussion in this sub-section is focused on the similarities or otherwise in the 
interpenetration between the politico-economic configurations (state formations, 
political traditions, and modes of production) and the immediate conditions under 
which the adoption of the similar arbitration laws in Australia and Nigeria occurred. 
The discussion anticipates that the process of state formation in both countries took off 
on a military foundation; and that, being the prime mover of the development of the 
productive forces and relations in addition to being large employers of labour [see 
previous discussion in 6.2.3(a)], the states in Australia and Nigeria had a paternalistic 
role expectation which pervaded all facets of their nations, including the industrial 
relations systems. Further, the states' conceptions of these roles would have been 
affected by the militia traditions which had evolved from the structures within which 
the states began to form. Invariably, therefore, the states in both countries adopted
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interventionist and/or regulatory stances, stances which later conduced to the adoption 
of full compulsory arbitration systems. Some details will now be provided for these 
salient factors.
As indicated earlier, the state in Australia began essentially as a military bureaucracy, 
tailored towards the needs of the penal settlement which it was devised to "govern". 
Although some civil officials were present in the administration of the early settlement, 
the decisive force in the moulding of the political character of the settlement was the 
military power, being "the frame within which everything else happened" (Connell and 
Irving, 1980: 32). The exercise of this power took the form of coercion and 
subsequently entrenched compulsion as a weapon of enforcement of the social order. 
For the duration of the convict system or, at least, until the termination of the purely 
bureaucratic administration, following the setting up of partially elected legislative and 
municipal councils in the 1840s, the direct use of coercion held sway.
In Nigeria the beginning of the colonial state presents a picture similar in critical 
respects to the corresponding Australian picture. The establishment of a centralised 
political authority in Nigeria by Britain took off through imperial and military 
campaigns. At the initial stages Britain enlisted the assistance of the European liability 
companies which had been trading in Nigeria since the 17th century. Thus between 
1862 when Lagos was forcibly occupied and the end of the 19th century Britain laid the 
foundation of the colonial state under the aegis of the United African Company 
(UAC)- a British company formed in 1877 and granted a Royal Charter in 1886 to be a 
British agent for imperialistic expansion into Africa.
The UAC established its own Constabulary with which to administer the conquered 
territories. Friedrick Lugarcf who rose through the ranks to become a Commander of 
this Constabulary was later commissioned by the British Government to organise the 
Royal West African Frontier Force. Together with the Constabulary this Force was 
used for a systematic military subjugation of the areas later named Nigeria. The
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governing bureaucracy that ensued lacked political legitimacy and, invariably became 
authoritarian, governing through violent repression by the coercive apparatuses of the 
state.
Tamuno (1978: 33-63) has presented a vivid account of how coercion became the 
means of consolidating colonial control in Nigeria. Ahire (1990) critiques Tamuno's 
presentation of this account with particular focus on policing, but essentially comes to 
the same conclusion: the British colonial state used its coercive apparatuses - police 
and army - to establish its external and internal boundaries, resolving the inter­
imperialist confrontations in its favour and "coercing the submission of the indigenous 
people" (Ahire, 1990: 53). This coercion may represent a "paradox of Pax Britannica", 
but it was a classical embodiment of the colonial policy of "breaking African 'eggs' in 
order to make a British 'omelette"'. The military campaign which perpetuated this 
coercion as a weapon of enforcement of social order continued well into the 1930s.
Now the need to provide the basic social and economic infrastructures greatly
expanded the role of the states in Australia and Nigeria beyond the law and order
functions. As Head (1983: 4) has observed with regard to Australia,
the state had a special importance in providing the infrastructure 
necessary for economic development: roads railways, harbours, 
telegraphs, town water supplies, irrigation, and so on. There were also 
important forms of subsidy and protection for industry and commerce - 
including cheap land, credit, and tariffs - as well as regulation of the 
workforce, the encouragement of foreign investment and immigration 
and the establishment of public education.
A similar role was played by the state in Nigeria. In addition to building railways and 
roads to link the ports and the raw material producing centres in the hinterland, and 
constructing harbours at the coast for commercial ventures, the state also provided 
credit facilities and tax relief incentives to foreign firms.
It is generally recognised that playing this role rendered the states a potent force in the 
development of the primary industry economies which Australia and Nigeria were at
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the time their compulsory arbitration laws were enacted*^. Moreover this role fortified 
the states' interventionist tendencies in both countries. In Australia the state's 
interventionist role was accentuated by pressures from the local capitalists who came to 
dominate the colonial legislatures, especially the Upper Houses. Most of these 
capitalists were defenders of the economic principles of "squattocracy" and 
"wakefieldism"24 The state in Nigeria also came under strong pressures from the 
representation of the shipping, banking, mining and other commercial interests in the 
Legislative Council to maintain a stable atmosphere and provide facilities for business.
It should be observed that in spite of the extensive scope of the state intervention in the 
Australian and Nigerian economies the capitalist orientation of these economies was 
preserved. Some commentators have argued that the enduring historical connection 
with Britain enhanced the preservation of this orientation. This is probably the case. 
The concern here is to show that the mediation of the state intervention in the structures 
of the productive forces and relations did not diminish the potential of this orientation 
to hold labour and capital in antagonistic or conflictual, rather than "unitary" or 
consensual, relationships in Australia and Nigeria. A typical manifestation of this 
potential were the Australian 1890-4 and Nigerian 1963-4 industrial turmoil, the 
aftermath of which saw the states choosing the way of compulsory arbitration systems.
It becomes pertinent to ask why it was possible for the state in Australia and in Nigeria 
to adopt full compulsory mechanisms in their fight against industrial conflict: what is
23 Up to the 1950s agriculture continued to account for more than 80% of the Australian exports. In 
Nigeria, although crude oil production had begun in the mid-1950s and entered Nigeria's export trade in 
1958, agriculture had continued to contribute about 60% to the GDP up to the 1970s (Iloabochie, 1986: 
101, 106). The claim that the early 1950s witnessed the beginning of large scale industrialisation in 
Nigeria (e.g Uvieghara, 1985: 43) fails to critically appreciate that only import substitution industries, 
designed to benefit the metropolitan imperialist interests following a change in the British colonial policy 
in 1949, were encouraged (see Bonat, 1986: 161; Kalu, 1986: 2).
24 For details on the squatters' economy founded on the principle of discovering and occupying land 
(runs) outside the Limits of Location for the purpose of pastoral farming, starting from the crossing of 
the Blue Mountains in 1813 during the period of Governor Macquarie, see Buckley (1975); Greenwood 
(1978: 46-97); Rosewame (1983); Buckley and Wheelwright (1988). The doctrine of Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield sought to 'manufacture wage-workers' by advocating a shift from the system of land grant to 
land sale at prices out of reach for ordinary independent entrepreneurs (see Coghlan, 1969: 404-423). 
Karl Marx caricatured this wakefieldian doctrine as "the modem theory of colonisation" in chapter xxxiii 
of his Capital vol. 1 (1986: 716-724).
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the most critical contextual factor, common to both countries, that made the adoption of 
compulsion possible at that time? Macintyre and Mitchell (1989: 8) have asked a 
similar question with regard to the peculiarity of Australia and New Zealand; and said: 
"this question calls for specification of relevant economic, social and political factors 
that distinguish Australia and New Zealand ... [and] requires that the distinctive 
features of the two countries be given sufficient historical precision to locate the new 
departure". In the case of Australia and Nigeria, my readings have led me to consider 
coercive social control tradition as the distinctive feature. Other factors, like industrial 
turmoil and fragile "dominion" capitalist economy, do not seem peculiar (where they 
are applicable at all) to the two countries atoe.
When the structures of the convict regulations in Australia and the colonial punitive 
controls in Nigeria were dismantled did the coercive or compulsive (military) social 
control traditions which had evolved within those structures vanish with them? In 
Nigeria where military regimes have continued to dominate the political scene in the 
post-colonial period it is doubtful if the structures have ended at all. Even if the 
argument is that the punitive and autocratic^ structures of the colonial state were no 
longer present as from the 1960s, the dominance of the indigenous military structures 
from 1966 onwards, during which time the compulsory arbitration law was introduced, 
means that the coercive tradition of the colonial administration had continued to find 
nurture in Nigeria. Whether it was the "military democracy" of General Gowon (1967- 
75) or the "military dictatorship" of General Buhari (1983-85) the basic instrument of 
governance, i.e force, remained the same as that of the military-oriented colonial 
Governors of Nigeria. In the circumstances, compulsory arbitration was not out of 
place.
25 Lugard's rule at the critical formative years of the colonial state in Nigeria has been characterised as 
"simple autocratic rule from himself downwards" (Nicolson, 1969: 137). The nature of this autocracy has 
been highlighted by Gann and Duignan (1978: 209) in their description of Lugard as a Governor "whose 
administrative gospel blended muscular Christianity with a military puritanism".
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Australia's situation in this respect is not straightforward. The discovery of gold in 
NSW and Victoria in the early 1850s led to a remarkable transformation of the 
structures of the Australian society, which transformation in turn hastened the 
development of political democracy in the second half of the 19th century (see Gollan, 
1976 for a good account of this social dynamics)"^, in 1856 the parliamentary system 
of responsible government was put in place and has continued ever since. Therefore, it 
can be said quite easily that the structures of convictism and the militarisation of the 
social life were dismantled in the wake of this transformation. What is unclear is 
whether the military or compulsive tradition of the pre-1850s had significantly given 
way to a democratic tradition by the turn of the 20th century when the adoption of 
compulsory arbitration laws was being fostered.
Coghlan (1969: 519) asserts that the period of the gold discoveries completely altered 
the method of government and placed it upon a democratic basis. The period saw "the 
destruction of the last vestiges of convictism". What these 'last vestiges’ are is not 
specified; but Coghlan is careful enough to know that traditions do not necessarily 
disappear with the systems or structures to which they correspond as his reference to 
the Wakefield tradition vis-a-vis the Wakefield system in South Australia shows 
(Coghlan, 1969: 1900).
A study by Tanner (1980) shows that the compulsive tradition of the Australian convict 
age persisted into the early 20th century more than is commonly realised. He sets out to 
explain why "compulsory soldiery" was adopted in Australia in a peace time and, with 
particular attention to the support of Labor for the scheme, concludes that "compulsory 
training seemed to best fit the democratic ideals propounded by many Australians, but 
chiefly by the Labor Party"(ibid: xxiii). He argues that the Labor Party had evolved an 
"unstated theory of 'compulsory democracy’", i.e obliging people to act in an 
equalitarian fashion, in its party organisation and policy. And that, the progression from
26  Greenwood (1978: 98-108) is less convinced about the significance of the gold discoveries. He is of 
the view that their immediate effect and ultimate importance were counted too high.
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apathy to apprehension about territorial defence, together with this theory, "suggest an 
explanation for Australia's adoption of compulsory military training" (ibid: 41). In 
formulating this theory Labor, without doubt, drew upon their prior experience of state 
intervention which was coercive in form.
Another aspect of Tanner's study which is relevant to the concern in this section is his 
analysis of the debates on the Defence Bill 1909. In these debates the Parliamentarians 
exhuberantly acknowledged their tradition of "military instinct by which the great 
dominions of the Crown have been built up" (ibid: 34). This acknowledgement, 
together with the form of democracy which the Labor Party had articulated, sufficiently 
allows for a suggestion that although the military structures of the convict age had been 
dismantled before the end of the 19th century, the tradition upon which the 
Commonwealth Parliamentarians knowingly or unknowingly drew when they passed 
the 1904 Arbitration Act retained a coercive orientation.
It is difficult to tell how far the presence of ex-soldiers in the Parliament can be 
associated with the persistence of this tradition. Rydon's (1986: 104-108) work shows 
that in every federal parliament between 1901 and 1980 there have been ex-soldiers, 
the parliaments up to 1929 having people with experiences in British or colonial forces 
(including several veterans of the Boer and Zulu wars). With the enlargement of the 
parliament in 1949, perhaps to accommodate a greater intake of returned men, "over 45 
per cent of new members and almost 47 per cent of all members were ex-servicemen" 
(p.107). By 1980, the percentage of all the members that are ex-servicemen had 
dropped to 19.1. It is plausible to suggest that these men carried with them into politics 
the identification marks of the military.
The "militarisation thesis" on compulsory arbitration which this research has thrown up 
here has not featured prominently in the existing literature. The closest 
acknowledgement, it would seem, is the statement by Quinlan (1989: 28), quoted 
approvingly by Creighton, et. al. (1992, forthcoming): "the predisposition of both
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legislators and employers to seek statutory solutions to labour problems was reinforced 
by the pattern of regulation that had been established with the convicts. The penal 
background and an associated tradition of coercive measures ... faded only slowly" 
(emphasis, mine). How sharp or faded the tradition was at the time the 1904 Act was 
enacted we may not know; my argument is that this coercive (militaristic) social 
control tradition could well be a major key to the explanation of the presence of a 
similar compulsory arbitration law in political economies that would otherwise be 
different with particular regard to race, geography and political structure.
The coincidence of the coercive social control traditions in both countries raises the 
question what difference it makes that in Australia the adoption of the compulsory 
arbitration law was carried through by a democratic government in peace time, while in 
Nigeria it was by a military regime in a war emergency. In general terms it 
problematises the relative significance of political "traditions" versus political 
"structures" in the relationship between law and society which is not directly addressed 
here. A more profound related question which will be given some attention here is: 
given that both countries had a history of compulsion/coercive tradition, why did they 
not solve their labour problems more drastically by, for example, banning trade unions 
"as some other countries have done, e.g. Indonesia - another military dictatorship" 
(Hopkins, 1991 - per. comm.)?
In the Australian case a democratic social structure had evolved in which labour was by 
1904 strong electorally, reflecting the strength of the working class more generally. The 
Nigerian case appears more intriguing: why was the military regime at the time so 
relatively moderate, deciding to tackle the home-grown problem of industrial disputes 
with a democratically developed (Australian) model which institutionalises rather than 
destroy the trade union movement? There is no simple answer. It is, however, critical 
that the military intervened in Nigerian politics in 1966 under the banner of reformist 
populism. Against the background of bitter ethnic rivalry and political corruption, they 
claimed to provide a corrective government with "a trusteeship relation to the civilian
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body politic" and not motivated by usurpation or tyranny (see Dent, 1978: 101). Thus at 
the time of General Gowon, during which the 1968 and 1969 arbitration Decrees were 
enacted, the regime is said to have adopted a "managerial brokerage" approach - a 
modality which, as described by Decalo (1976: 247), caters "to the satisfaction of group 
demands outside the armed forces".
Gowon was said to have changed over to a "personal dictatorship" approach in 1973 
using active-combative method to maintain a high corporate status for the military - a 
method continued by General Murtala who took over government in 1975. But, by 
1976 when the arbitration laws were being consolidated and expanded, the Obasanjo 
regime is said to have shifted from this potentially repressive method to an "active- 
reconciliationist" approach (see Ojo, 1987: 155-160).
It might be asked why the unions were not banned between 1973 and 1975. The reason 
seems to be that other critical structural factors forced the military regime to adopt a 
relatively benign attitude towards labour. Initially, the small size of the officer corp at 
the time of the intervention made it impossible for the military to govern on its own. 
Having swept away the politicians, their parties and allied organisations, the military 
had to rely on the civil service which was one of the highly unionised segments of the 
labour force at the time. Evidently, to ban unions would have meant leaving a sizeable 
proportion of its "governing partner" highly disaffected. The way Gowon went about 
canvassing the support of the civil bureaucracy, among other things, is, perhaps, the 
ground for regarding his regime as a "military democracy". Another critical factor is 
that the military itself was not spared from the fractionalising forces of the ethnic 
rivalry in the wider society (see Oyediran, 1979: 22-24; Otobo, 1988: 103). Thus it 
lacked the unified internal support to embark upon such drastic measures like banning 
the collective movement of the working class. So, why were the unions not banned? In 
Australia it was the emergent "liberal" democracy in which labour had a strong 
presence; in Nigeria it was the peculiar circumstances of the military regimes.
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Let me return to the explanations of the overwhelming similarities among the labour 
laws of Australia and Nigeria. The discussions in this section have drawn on aspects of 
both autonomy and social product models. As evident from the discussions, 
transplantation did take place but parallel social conditions were necessary in order to 
motivate the transplantation. What about the differences: if, as has been shown before, 
both the Australian and Nigerian laws are overwhelmingly similar and have deviated 
from the natural law principles in similar ways how did the observed differences 
between the two laws arise? It is to this secondary task that I now turn and, as with the 
similarities, I will interrogate both theoretical models for possible explanations.
6.3 Autonomy and social product explanations of the differences among the laws
The autonomy model suggests that the differences between the compulsory arbitration 
laws of Australia and Nigeria may be due to both countries differentially deviating 
from the principles of natural law or to different modes of production. The discussion 
in subsection 6.2.1 above shows that the former cannot be relevant, as both countries 
have been shown to have departed from the natural law. With regard to the latter, on 
the basis of the relative autonomy theory the laws of Australia and Nigeria should be 
similar not different since both countries have a similar (capitalist) mode of production. 
This means that the autonomy model cannot explain the Australian/Nigerian 
differences. So I look to the social product model which suggests an explanation for the 
differences in terms of non-parallel development of social conditions.
In the light of the model I suggest that two of these differences, namely the differences 
in the process of negotiation and in the standing of individuals or organisations as 
parties before the tribunals, are directly explainable by a socially conditioned deviation 
from the natural law principles. The third difference, relating to the constitutional 
limitation is largely jurisdictional in a political sense (with no direct implications for 
the universal rights of the individuals) and will be examined in relation to the political 
context in both countries.
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6.3.1 Socially conditioned deviation from the principles of natural law and the 
differences among the laws
The severe restriction by the Australian law on what issues relating to an industrial 
dispute the parties can voluntarily negotiate suggests a radical departure from the 
principle of voluntarism upon which arbitration as universally recommended by natural 
law is based. Similarly the emphasis of the law on collective, rather than individual, 
representation at arbitration suggests a radical departure from the universal principle of 
rights and liberties of the individual.
Although the Nigerian law deviates from the principles of voluntarism and the 
individual rights of the individuals with regard to these themes, the law did not go as 
far in restricting voluntary negotiation and the individual's right to take disputes for 
arbitration as is the case with the Australian law. This suggests, therefore, that the 
differences which are being considered here have occurred due, among other things, to 
different degrees of deviation from the universal principles by the Australian and 
Nigerian laws. Why did the two laws deviate from the natural law principles in varying 
degrees?
It would be recalled from chapter five of this thesis that the pre-1988 restriction on the 
voluntary bargaining which made the Australian law radically deviate from the natural 
law principles and differ from the Nigerian law was the creation of the High Court. The 
extent to which the language of the provisions in the law on "Industrial Agreements" 
led the Court in this direction is not certain. However, it has been suggested, and 
plausibly so, that the Court redefined the law in this way so as to uphold the social 
expediency which gave rise to the arbitration system in the first place.
One intuitive guess is that the employers might have attempted to manoeuvre the 
voluntary bargaining provisions in a manner that threatened the arbitration system: 
using their superior bargaining power "to conclude industrial agreements with their 
employees in order to remain aloof from the [system]". And in response "the High
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Court chose [a] narrow reading of [the then] Section 73 in order to bolster what was 
then a highly judicialised form of compulsory conciliation and arbitration" (McCallum, 
1986: 303). The Court reaffirmed their aversion to any legislative provision which 
might destabilise the arbitration system, e.g through 'opting out’ mechanisms, when 
they ruled as unconstitutional the provisions for the Conciliation Committees in the 
Australian Railway Union (1930) 44 CLR 319.
This expediency of safeguarding the arbitration system by the highest court of the 
realm has no parallel in Nigeria. Unlike the High Court in Australia the Supreme Court 
in Nigeria has not in any significant way shaped the content and character of the 
arbitration law. This may be due, partly, to the fact that the constitutional right of the 
individuals or organisations to challenge legislation in general, which could have been 
used to litigate the arbitration law in this highest court, was suspended as soon as the 
military took over government and remained so for a long time after the arbitration law 
was enacted. Whether or not the Supreme Court would have been or is disposed, like 
its Australian counterpart, to safeguard the arbitration system cannot therefore be 
known.
With regard to the difference relating to the standing of individuals and organisations 
as parties to industrial disputes, the different degrees of deviation bears on the union- 
related social expediencies which both laws were enacted to deal with. In Australia the 
expediency was how to give legal recognition to workers' organisation and, perhaps, 
make them equal regulators of industry with a view to achieving industrial peace 
through the prohibition of industrial action. In Nigeria the expediency was how to curb 
the alleged excesses of the worker's unions and, by that fact, protect the managerial 
prerogatives of Capital. As will be shown shortly, the circumstances directly associated 
with the adoption of compulsory arbitration laws in both countries highlight these 
respective expediencies.
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The events which constitute the immediate pretext for the introduction of compulsory 
arbitration laws in Australia were the 1890-4 strikes. While it would appear that the 
causa belli of these strikes was the demand for higher wages, it has been argued that 
the fundamental issue was the recognition of trade unions. In other words, the 
substance of the capital-labour conflict during this period was not wages but the 
recognition of unions and their role in industrial regulation. The employers probably 
felt that time was opportune for them to confront the principle of unionism with their 
own principle of 'freedom of contract'. In this situation, whenever the unions demanded 
conferences of employers and employees to settle their differences, employers steadily 
refused on the grounds of no outside public interference between master and servant 
(see Ebbels, 1960: 18; 125-149; Sutcliffe, 1967: 90-106; Coghlan, 1969: 1591-1607).
The refusal to negotiate further encouraged the trade unions to press for the 
introduction of compulsion in government-sponsored arbitration. More importantly, 
this refusal generated a considerable sympathy for trade unions from liberal circles, a 
sympathy which translated into extensive provisions for securing union recognition in 
the Arbitration Acts of the States and, later, that of the Commonwealth (Scherer, 
1983:169). Important as this point might have been, Macintyre and Mitchell (1989: 18) 
appear over-emphatic in their representation when they say: "the statutory schemes of 
arbitration introduced in the period from 1890 to 1914 were a response ... to the need 
for trade union recognition". As I submitted in chapter four the central purpose of these 
schemes could also be interpreted as the prohibition of industrial action. Be that as it 
may, the point remains that in tackling the problem of industrial conflict at that time the 
state in Australia saw union recognition as a social expediency.
The social expediency which informed the Nigerian legislation and whose foundation 
was laid during the colonial period was different. The labour revolts in most of the 
British colonies in the late 1920s and 1930s had put the Colonial Government on a high 
alert about the possible link between the development of trade unionism and 
political/nationalist movements in the colonies. A despatch on September 17, 1930
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from the then Secretary of the State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield (formerly Sidney 
Webb) urged all colonial governments to encourage the existence of trade unions, by 
way of providing "sympathetic supervision and guidance" in the formation of labour 
organisations. This was with a view to ensuring that the unions did not "fall under the 
domination of disaffected persons". Much as this urging reflects a "labourite" ideology 
of the Party in government in London at the time, this was a scheme for a state control 
over trade unions in the colonies against nationalist politics.
The Nigerian Trade Union Ordinance 1938 which legalised the activities of collective 
bodies of workers was a direct product of this urging. Although the ordinance made 
registration compulsory for these bodies, it did not compel the employers to recognise 
them. Such compulsory recognition was to come in the train of the 1973 amendment to 
the law (see Uvieghara, 1976: 102-104; 1987: 34). With the object being to control the 
unions, it is not surprising that much of the emphasis of the ordinance was on duties 
and obligations of the unions and not their rights or benefits (Otobo, 1988: 45). The 
continuation of this tradition or policy of control over unions in post-colonial Nigeria 
explains why the law that introduced compulsory arbitration in Nigeria failed to give 
much importance to organisations as the Australian law has done.
6.3.2 Non-parallel political (constitutional) history and the differences among the 
laws
The difference in the constitutional limitation on the scope and means of industrial 
dispute settlement as demonstrated in chapter four bears on the division of power 
between the state and federal governments in both countries. Thus, the light of political 
history is required to explain why in Australia the industrial power of the federal 
government is restricted and in Nigeria it is not.
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The states in Australia assumed the status of separate British colonies with full powers 
over their respective internal affairs early in their formations. Barely three decades after 
the start of the white settlement in 1788, the original colony, i.e New South Wales, 
began to break up into colonies with different interests. In the words of Clark (1955: 
443),
[t]he political current of the time was running steadily not towards 
union, but towards disunion. Victoria was just receiving her 
independence from New South Wales: Queensland was beginning to 
move in the same direction. Tasmania did not wish to go back on the 
decision of 1823, and South Australia was, as ever, loath to have any 
association with the convict "Sodom and Gomorrah" of the East.
By the 1860s and 1870s, the inter-colonial jealousy and rivalry had intensified. 
However, when circumstances demanded that these colonies form a federation, the 
dominant disposition among the states was to hold back most of the powers over their 
internal affairs from the emergent federal government. This disposition is evident in the 
debates of the Intercolonial Conferences or Conventions^ which were held between 
1883 and 1898.
One of the issues upon which the "State-righters", as opposed to the "Centralisers" 
(Federalists), refused to relinquish the power of the States to make laws was industrial 
relations. In the debates on the Commonwealth of Australia Bill, during the National 
Australasian Convention in 1891, Cameron C. Kingston (from South Australia) 
proposed that the federal government be given power to establish "courts of 
conciliation and arbitration, having jurisdiction throughout the Commonwealth, for the 
settlement of industrial disputes". The proposal failed on a 25 to 13 vote. Another 
attempt in 1897 to give the federal government this power, based on a proposal by 
Higgins and an amendment by Kingston, also failed.
When the proposal was eventually accepted in 1898 by a bare majority of three (a vote 
of 22 to 19) it was purged of all plenary and/or exclusive jurisdiction for the federal
27 See Sawer (1975: 13-23) for some biographical notes on the "behind-the-scenes" leaders of the 
Conventions and a precis of the issues that dominated these Conventions.
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government over industrial relations. S.51(xxxv) of the Constitution embodies the 
industrial power allowed for the federal government, and as Brooks (1986: 156) has 
observed the "nineteen words [in this placitum] have been the subject of more 
argument before the High Court than any other single part of the Australian 
Constitution". The Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 which was enacted by the 
federal Parliament, pursuant to this power has, generally, been read down by the High 
Court to keep it within the intended State-Federal power allocations. Beginning in the 
Engineers case in 1920, but more widely since the Social Welfare Union case in 1983, 
the High Court has continued to give a liberal reading of the Act and the Constitution.
It is noteworthy that most of the efforts of the Commonwealth Governments - 
conservative, liberal or labor - in seeking the people's approval by referenda to enlarge 
the federal powers were, at least up to the 1950s, directed at the industrial power. More 
significantly all these efforts failed, indicating that the desire of the Commonwealth 
Governments to have greater power over industrial relations had not found support 
among a majority of voters in the Commonwealth and a majority of voters in a 
majority of States^ (see Sawer, 1949: 178-180; Portus, 1980: 395; McMillan et al, 
1983: 24-29). Thus the restriction of the Australian (Commonwealth) arbitration law to 
the prevention and settlement of interstate industrial disputes by conciliation and 
arbitration is strongly associated with the political condition under which the power to 
make the law was fashioned.
Although Nigeria began as a colony of Britain as did Australia, the relevant political 
condition which can be associated with the constitutional scope of its arbitration law 
was not parallel to that of Australia. Starting with a forcible occupation and 
proclamation of Lagos as a Crown Colony in 1862 Britain, through imperial and 
colonial military campaigns, fashioned a centralised political entity (which became
28 See s.128 of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution Alterations (Referendums) 1977 (No. 
84 of 1977).
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Nigeria) out of a motley collection of 'nations’. This entity was governed as three 
administrative units^ until 1906 when the units were reduced to two.
The Southern Group of Provinces and the Northern group of Provinces, as the 
administrative units were generally known then, were placed under one Governor - 
Lord Lugard - in 1912 as a step towards a planned unification of the two Groups. 
Several reasons were advanced for this plan, one of which was "the clamour for 
unification from educated Nigerians in Lagos" (Akande, 1985: 1). In 1914 the two 
Groups of Provinces were amalgamated by Lugard. Subsequently the colonial 
constitutional developments, beginning with Arthur Richard's Constitution in 1946, 
introduced the principle of regionalism by which the country was divided into three 
regions. This principle was attacked by the dominant part of the emerging indigenous 
political movement as "a divide-and-rule instrument" of the British administration (see 
Ananaba, 1969: 87).
It is significant that the powers given to the legislative assemblies of these regions were 
limited to the discussion of general legislation and the rights of passing regional 
budgets. In regard of the power over budgets the regions did not even have it all as 
theirs: "the amount of the revenue to be appropriated or assigned to each region was to 
be directed by the Governor who might also 'specify the service and work to be 
included in regional estimates of expenditure’" (Akande, 1985: 2). This limitation on 
the regional administration underlines the point that power was disproportionately 
concentrated at the centre in the Nigerian polity, a concentration which has continued 
after the colonial rule.
29 These are the Colony of Lagos and the Protectorate territories of Yorubaland which were 
administered from Lagos under the auspices of the Colonial Office in London; the Niger Coast 
Protectorate (comprising of the former Bendel State and the former Eastern region), administered by a 
Consul based at Old Calabar under the auspices of the Foreign Office in London; and the Northern 
Protectorates, administered by a British Company, the National African Company, which became the 
Royal Niger Company after it was granted a Royal Charter by the British government in 1886, under the 
supervision of the Foreign Office (Otobo, 1988: 8).
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In contradistinction to Australia where the centre was created by the colonies (states), 
the regions in Nigeria, being the creation of the centre, were not in the position to 
restrict the powers of the federal government to make laws in respect of any matter. 
Under these circumstances, it becomes understandable why the industrial power of the 
federal government is general and provided in the constitution in the widest terms. 
Although labour matters were placed on the concurrent list in the Nigerian 
(Constitution) Order in Council I960, by the time the 1968 arbitration law was 
enacted, the regions were already in the habit of allowing only the federal government 
to legislate on labour/industrial matters.
The foregoing application of the social product model to the differences between the 
Australian and Nigerian arbitration laws has shown that the Australian law, in response 
to certain social expediencies which were different from those in Nigeria, departed 
from the natural law more radically than the Nigerian law. Thus the different ways in 
which both laws incorporated voluntary negotiation and entrenched individual or 
collective rights is explainable by this socially conditioned variance in the deviation. 
On the theme relating to the constitutional limitation on the laws it has been shown that 
the difference in both laws arose from the differences in the evolution of the political 
(constitutional) structures of Australia and Nigeria.
The overall picture which can be derived from the autonomy and social product 
explanations of the similarities and differences in this chapter is this: the Australian and 
Nigerian arbitration laws do not approximate the natural law in so far as they both 
embody compulsion. These laws are so similar because Australia departed from the 
natural ideal and Nigeria copied her "deviant" model. The copying was possible 
because of the remarkable similarities in the social circumstances, particularly the 
social control traditions, of the two countries - remarkable because at first sight 
Australia in 1904 is so different from Nigeria in 1968. Yet the similarities are so great 
that the Australian legislation turned out to be what the Nigerian government needed. 
But it was not a blind transplant; hence the different reflection in both laws of the
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different social expediencies and constitutional development to which the laws were 
responsive.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, FURTHER DISCUSSION AND
CONCUUSION
7.1 Introduction
This thesis has focused on the explanation of the differences and similarities between 
the labour laws of Australia and Nigeria in the light of some theoretical traditions in 
sociology. The comparison of these laws in chapters four and five demonstrates that the 
primary task would be to explain the fundamental similarity in legislation in both 
countries. The explanation of the few differences became a secondary task. Using the 
explanatory frameworks developed in chapters two and three, both the primary and 
secondary tasks have been addressed in chapter six.
In this chapter, I shall tie together through summary and further discussion the core 
issues addressed in all the preceding chapters. The discussions will further underline 
the relative importance of the explanatory models. On the similarities, it will be 
reiterated that although the factor of transplantation sheds some light on the similarities 
between the compulsory arbitration laws, it was the industrial and politico-economic 
contexts of these laws which explain not only why it was necessary for Nigeria to 
borrow from Australia but also why it was possible for both countries to adopt such an 
unusual system of arbitration. And on the differences, it will be stressed that the 
different social expediences and constitutional history in both countries suggest that the 
transplantation of the Australian model to Nigeria could not be total. The chapter 
concludes by noting some limitations of the thesis and identifying for future research 
some questions suggested by the analyses, interpretations and arguments in the thesis.
7.2 Summary and further discussions
The main research problem in this thesis is to explain why the Australian and Nigerian 
arbitration laws show such a striking similarity with each other (in 80% of the themes 
upon which they have been compared in chapters four and five), a similarity which is 
inexplicable simply in terms of the character of labour movement, race, geography or
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political institution. Both laws, in essence, prohibit direct industrial action; they 
embody full compulsory arbitration, applicable to all disputes - interest or right, in 
essential or non-essential services; and their institutional machinery consists of 
permanent public tribunals with powers to intervene and before whom, more clearly in 
Australia than in Nigeria, mainly collective parties can seek redress. The main stages of 
the settlement of industrial disputes which the laws provide are automatic and 
mandatory; the awards (consent and arbitral) made under them are not subject to 
judicial review on the merits; and the enforcement of these awards is backed by 
sanctions which the tribunals have powers to impose through the contempt proceedings 
or the variation of awards.
As pointed out in chapter one, examining both laws in a comparative manner as done in 
this thesis with a view to explaining this fundamental similarity is a pioneering attempt. 
Further, such examination is potentially revealing with regard to the history and 
character not only of both laws but also of the two societies. Such examination is also 
considered well suited for a contribution to the theoretical base of the sociology of law.
The explanation of the overwhelming similarity and, later the relevant differences, in 
chapter six drew upon the theoretical models which have been constructed in chapters 
two and three from some contrasting conceptions on law-society relations. The 
suggestion of the autonomy model that similarities may be due to conformity to natural 
law was seen to be inappropriate as, by embodying compulsion on a comprehensive 
scale, both laws represent a major departure from the voluntaristic principles of the 
natural law. Nevertheless legal transplantation, another factor to which the autonomy 
model has sensitized us, proved to be a significant element in the explanation. The 
pieces of evidence point to Nigeria borrowing the Australian model under specific 
circumstances. In response to the need for a major review of the labour laws, Nigeria 
looked for a model from among the Commonwealth countries. She found the 
Australian law well placed to be borrowed. This law had a form sufficiently abstracted 
from its social origin and was written in a language used officially in Nigeria. It also
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had a reputation of being effective, especially in the 1960s (pre-O’Shea period), and 
was accessible in the form of books and statutes to a Nigerian legal elite obviously 
fascinated by the model.
With regard to the question why it was necessary and possible for Australia to depart 
from the "natural ideal" of voluntarism and for Nigeria to borrow a compulsory model, 
the social product, not autonomy, model provides the explanation. Remarkably, key 
aspects of the Australian and Nigerian political economies which can be associated 
with the adoption of the laws were found to be parallel.
In the industrial relations context the creation of the labour market, the raison d'etre of 
the organisation of labour and capital, and the epoch-making industrial turmoil (of 
1890-4 and 1963-4, respectively) were associated with the adoption of the compulsory 
arbitration system in both countries. More fundamentally, these factors show 
significant similarities in character. In conventional wisdom both countries should have 
developed a system of industrial dispute resolution based on free collective bargaining 
because of their colonial connection with Britain, a country regarded as the bastion of 
voluntarism. However, as argued in chapter six of this thesis, the nature of the state 
intervention in industrial relations of these countries created "passive" actors in the 
system, inhibited the development of voluntary collective bargaining and, ipso facto, 
laid the foundation for their compulsory arbitration systems.
No doubt the volatile and risky nature of the Australian and Nigerian economies in 
their formative years, being predominantly rural (primary), kept both countries 
dependent upon government for infrastructures and security and thrust upon the two 
states a paternalistic role. This role, it is generally argued, explains the intervention in 
these countries. This thesis argues that a coercive social control tradition, not the 
economic configuration, determined the compulsive character of the state intervention 
in both societies. Further it is argued that this tradition arose from the military 
foundation upon which the process of state formation took off in the formative years of
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both countries. On this ground, mainly, the thesis has suggested that the adoption of 
compulsory arbitration in both countries has a strong link with their militarised social 
pedigree, a pedigree which is not necessarily a "mark of Cain".
For, in Australia the dictatorial and military style of social control in the formative 
years was the means to "the goal of reform". This means involved pinning "down 
coercively the nomadic groups [i.e the convicts] ... lashing them into shape until they 
could be confined ... [and] compelling them to work and to marry so that they 
necessarily became sedentary and associated in fixed patterns" (Davidson, 1991: 30- 
34). In colonial Nigeria coercion or, in the words of Joseph Chamberlain - Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 1895-1903 - , "the use of force" was the means of 'breaking the 
African eggs in order to make a British omelette'(see Tamuno, 1978: 48).
With regard to the differences in the laws, the study finds that in response to different 
social expediences and constitutional trajectory, Australia and Nigeria deviated in 
varying degrees from the natural law principles of the priority of individuality over 
collectivity and voluntary arbitration. The differences are few and do not relate to the 
critical elements of the arbitration scheme in both countries. However, their presence 
supports the proposition that the borrowing of the Australian model by Nigeria was not 
a blind legal transplant.
This type of borrowing contrasts, for instance, with the borrowing which Japan 
engaged in after the Meiji Restoration. She borrowed heavily from the major European 
legal systems (e.g the German legal codes; elements of the French and English laws) 
"in an effort to create a modern state that would not only be recognised by the Western 
powers but would be their equal in stature" (Japan's Institute, 1989: v). Now given that 
the Australian arbitration law was quite unique in the international context, it is not 
plausible to argue that a country such as Nigeria would borrow it with a view to gaining 
international recognition. Where the necessity to deal with a home-grown problem is
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the main reason, then the country borrowing would in so doing accommodate its 
peculiar social expediencies or history as the Nigerian experience suggests.
As the foregoing summary shows, the compulsory arbitration laws of Australia and 
Nigeria present profound sociological "problems". The commentary that follows will 
reiterate the interconnection between these laws and their social contexts. It emphasises 
the point that these laws emerged at, and bear the marks of, critical junctures of the 
historical development of the Australian and Nigerian political economies. This will 
underline the relative importance of the social product model.
In Australia, the law emerged barely one decade after, and in the shadow of, the 
antagonistic relationship between capital and labour which had culminated in an 
unprecedented show-down in 1890-4 and in which labour suffered defeat under the 
combined might of capital and the state. Fitzpatrick (1941) portrays the show-down as 
a bout of fierce class conflict triggered by a mounting crisis of capital accumulation in 
which the parliaments, judges, police and the military sided with capital. The hostility 
of the state to which labour attributed its defeat is succinctly expressed by Coghlan 
(1969, vol.IV: 1841):
Against [labour] were arrayed not only the forces of capital, but the 
whole force of the Government, ... Whilst the Government had punished 
the shearers and the seamen, who, in the interest of the cause, had left 
work without notice, it had protected the "blacklegs" on the wharves and 
in the mines, even to the extent of an unnecessary and irritating display 
of its military forces.
Paradoxically, this defeat made labour quite determined to acquire the constitutional 
use of the state power, thus marking their "incursion into politics". By 1904, they had 
mustered enough power to 'bargain' for compulsory arbitration in the federal 
parliament. The explanation in chapter six shows that the adoption of this scheme was 
possible not merely because of the presence of labour in the Parliament, but largely 
because of the tradition of coercive state intervention.
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The corresponding experience of Nigeria involves a confrontation between labour and 
the state-cum-capital in 1963-4, four years before the Nigerian compulsory arbitration 
law was introduced under a military regime. In contrast to the Australian experience, 
labour won in the confrontation in spite of the use of police by the state ^  and remained 
on the sidelines of politics. Given the signals that Nigerian labour was going political 
prior to this confrontation, the lack of 'incursion into politics' cannot be accounted for 
fully by its success in the confrontation. The labour movement in the colonial times had 
taken a nationalist political stance largely as a reaction to the prevailing race relations. 
The movement had also demanded labour representation in the colonial Legislative 
Council, perhaps as a counterweight to the representation of shipping, banking and 
mining interests in the Council at the time.
The arrival of Sir Arthur Richards as Governor in 1943 accentuated the political 
ferment within labour. Richards looked "upon every desire for improvement or reform 
[including labour's request for better conditions of employment] ... as unnecessary 
political agitation, which must be crushed at all costs" (Ananaba, 1969: 44f). In 1944 
he condemned the students' strike over bad food and unhealthy accommodation in 
King's College and ordered the ringleaders to be conscripted into the army and others to 
be prosecuted for offences relating to breach of peace. One of the ringleaders died a 
few days later, triggering an outrage by the indigenous groupings over the general 
approach of the Governor. In the aftermath of this episode, an indigenous political 
party was formed to which the then Nigerian Trade Union Congress applied for formal 
affiliation and was accepted, marking an auspicious start for labour in politics (ibid: SÖ­
ST). And, as shown in chapter six, it looked like labour was being galvanised into 
electoral politics during the 1963-4 industrial turmoil.
So, why did the Nigerian labour stand aloof from direct presence in politics even 
though they had reasons as good in some respects as their Australian counterpart to be
* T. M. Yesufu noted in his minority Report of the Morgan Commission the "mounting dissatisfaction 
with the role of the police during strikes" (quoted in Otobo, 1987: 38).
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involved? The main reasons suggested in the literature are: (1) the colonial government 
opposed the idea as they feared that trade unions might fall under the domination of 
disaffected persons by which their activities may be diverted to improper and 
mischievous ends; (2) the indigenous politicians had not appreciated the immense 
power of organised labour (see Ananaba, 1969: 86); and (3) the ethnic conflict among 
the emergent political parties (the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons formed 
in 1944, the Action Group in 1950, the Northern Peoples Party in 1951, the Northern 
Elements Progressive Union in 1953, etc) threatened the solidarity within the labour 
movement and weakened their capacity to mobilise a virile political organ of their own 
(Tokunboh, 1985: 49).
Added to these domestic reasons is the split of the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions from the World Federation of Trade Unions in January 1949, a 
phenomenon of the cold war. This split polarised the Nigerian labour movement 
ideologically into conservative and radical camps as segments of the movement 
affiliated with either of the two bodies. The differential affiliation led the segments into 
recriminations and political sabotage against each other and kept the movement 
polarised. This polarisation continued into the post-independence period, further 
undermining the already confused and ethnically-divided political mobilisation among 
labour. Otobo (1986) provides an informative expose on the influence of the 
international ideological struggle on the Nigerian labour movement. The Australian 
counterpart has been highlighted by Martin (1963: 152; 1964: 67).
At the time the Nigerian arbitration law was introduced in 1968 by the Gowon military 
regime the rifts within the labour movement had not been mended and, unlike its 
Australian counterpart, labour was not in any stable position to bargain on this law. Yet 
this law is fundamentally similar to the Australian law. This provides an answer to the 
question whether the presence of labour in politics is a necessary factor in explaining 
the adoption of compulsory arbitration law. The answer is no. The explanation
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suggested in chapter six is that, as in Australia, the adoption of this law in Nigeria has a 
strong connection with the coercive tradition upon which the state has evolved.
Another critical juncture which has left an imprint on the laws relates to the 
constitutional trajectory. The Australian law emerged less than half a decade after the 
States had federated into a Commonwealth, allotting specific heads of power to the 
central government and holding back the residual powers. This political arrangement is 
reflected in the constitutional restriction of the federal industrial relations power to the 
prevention and settlement of interstate industrial disputes by means of conciliation and 
arbitration. Plain and carefully worded as this restriction may appear, its meaning has 
been the subject of much litigation in the High Court, resulting in numerous 
amendments to the arbitration law.
Unlike in Australia, the constitutional development in Nigeria ensures that the centre 
has always had more powers than the regions. There was a change from the regional to 
state structure in 1967 which had no effect on the general power of the federal 
government in respect of labour matters. In particular, the arbitration law subsequently 
introduced in 1968 contains no restriction upon the relevant powers of the federal 
government. Again, unlike in Australia, the suspension of the Nigerian Constitution by 
the military at the time meant that the rights of individuals/groups to litigate on 
constitutional matters (including labour relations) were severely restricted. The point is 
that, as shown in chapter four, these differences have been reflected in the arbitration 
laws of both countries. Beside raising the sociological question about the relationship 
between constitutional histories and the scope/character of law, this phenomenon 
suggests that the borrowing of the Australian model by Nigeria was not a blind legal 
transplant.
The alliance of labour with a sector of capital (i.e the manufacturing sector) in the early 
Australian Commonwealth Parliaments over state arbitration, tariff protection for 
locally manufactured goods, etc, illustrates another aspect of the critical junctures to
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which the institutionalisation of compulsion in Australia's industrial relations relates. In 
a Parliament largely of three equal groupings (Labor, protectionists and free-traders), 
the Labor support allowed the manufacturing interest (the protectionists) to govern in 
the first decade of the Commonwealth (Hopkins, 1978b: 18). In return this ruling 
interest initiated the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill which provided for union 
recognition and security. Interestingly, this Bill became law a year later under the Reid- 
M'Lean Ministry - a temporary political coalition between free-traders and the 
protectionists. Evidently, this period witnessed fluid class relationships, so fluid that it 
has, for instance, remained difficult for scholars on the origins of the law to agree on 
who supported or opposed its enactment.
One reaction to this difficulty is Macintyre's (1989) argument that in the politics of the 
establishment of arbitration "neither capital nor labour" took the initiative. Nonetheless 
the temporary alliance between the political wing of the labour movement and the 
manufacturing sector of capital remains an important feature of the environment in 
which the law was enacted. Needless to say, it was a democratic environment in which 
bargains were struck and compromises achieved. The law did not result from a society­
wide consensus as the consensus theory would suggest. But it was obviously a product 
of a compromise between conflicting political claims, fitting neatly into the pluralist 
mould of the conflict theory in my social product model. Why the compromise in such 
a democratic institution tilted in favour of compulsion is part of the crucial sociological 
question raised and addressed by this thesis. A coercive social control tradition has 
been advanced here as the main explanatory factor; but it has been noted in chapter six 
that this tradition did not lead to other drastic measures like banning trade unions 
because Australia became a democratic society in which labour was strong electorally.
Presumably the adoption of compulsory arbitration law by the military regime in 
Nigeria is patently expected. Compulsion is one of the identification marks of the 
military and the regime, not being democratic, need not operate by alliance or coalition 
as in Australia. What is less obvious and has been addressed in chapter six is why the
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military did not act true to type by taking more repressive measures against the union 
movement. This question becomes more significant if it is recalled that the war time 
during which the law was introduced could have been a perfect alibi for such 
repression. The discussion in chapter six suggests that the reformist ideology with 
which the military regime took over the government, its inability to mobilise a unified 
support within the army (i.e a support not infected by the divisive ethnic rivalry of the 
wider society), and its dependence on a unionised civil service to govern explain the 
non-use of outright repression against the trade unions.
The summary and further discussion up to this point bring together the highlights of 
this thesis. In the next (final) sub-section, some concluding remarks will be made. 
Essentially they will critically reflect upon the general thrust of the thesis and the 
limitations of my approach and conclusions. At the end, attention is drawn to some 
questions for further inquiry.
7.3 Conclusion: inferences, limitations of the study and questions for further 
research
In this thesis two levels of explanations have been advanced for understanding the 
overwhelming similarity in the Australian and Nigerian compulsory arbitration laws. 
First, one country deviated from the "natural law" approach to industrial dispute 
resolution at a certain conjucture in the development of its political economy and the 
other copied the resulting "deviant" model. Second, the social conditions which 
motivated the copying by the latter are remarkably similar to the conditions which 
made the deviation by the former possible in the first place. Implied in the second 
statement is that there is an interface between the two levels.
The importance of this interface is not self-evident and should be highlighted. Legal 
transplantation can be shown to account for similar laws in two or more countries 
without considering whether the transplantation was motivated by parallel social 
conditions. This approach typifies positivistic jurisprudence, e.g. of Alan Watson, and
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is insufficient for the explanation of the Australian-Nigerian case. Conversely it can 
merely be shown that countries with parallel conditions have similar laws without due 
attention to the question whether the laws were derived quite independently or by 
borrowing from each other. The sociological jurisprudence, e.g of Otto Kahn-Freund, 
which regards law (especially of collective labour relations) as too closely connected 
with the structure of power relations of its society to be transplanted elsewhere would 
take this path.
The Australia-Nigeria similarity provides an example of how an interface between the 
two levels of explanation could shed greater light upon a patently puzzling sociological 
problem, a light more illuminating than what could possibly be derived from any one of 
the levels. This illumination owes much to the fact that rather than taking an "either-or" 
approach to the application of the two levels, both of them as represented by the 
autonomy and social product models were interrogated for possible explanations of the 
overwhelming similarity and the few differences. In the end the position reached is that 
although the autonomy level/model sheds a significant light on why both laws are so 
similar, it is the social product level/model which explains the more profound question 
why it was necessary and possible for Australia to adopt, and for Nigeria to borrow, a 
comprehensive compulsory arbitration system. Nevertheless both models have 
complemented each other in providing a critical understanding of the main sociological 
problem in this thesis.
It is pertinent to note at this juncture that a study of this nature cannot completely avoid 
some of the strains or pitfalls of interdisciplinary and comparative investigations. 
Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941: 41) once said: "the obstacle [to integrating law-stuff with 
the rest of social disciplines] is the acceptance of the realm of Law as being of a 
different order; for if of a different order, then it sets its own premises and becomes 
impenetrable on any premises except its own". Once this acceptance occurs the 
sociologist who takes law as an object or framework of sociological knowledge runs
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the risk of being pulled away from sociological bearings (Stewart, 1981: 107-8). Did I 
get pulled away?
In this study the arbitration law in Australia and Nigeria has been treated as a social 
phenomenon, embodying action and meaning, which cannot be adequately appreciated 
by jurisprudence alone. Indeed, as pointed out in chapter one, the unprecedented nature 
of its emergence in Australia and its "migration" to Nigeria, both countries supposedly 
nurtured with the Anglo-saxon legal tradition, raise wide-ranging issues which only the 
sociological method can resolve (see Sinzheimer's statement in chapter one). More 
important, the attempt here has been to reach beyond the law to the political economy 
which it indexes, and in so doing I have endeavoured to stay within sociology. Yet it 
must be admitted that the treatment in this study is limited in scope and thus cannot be 
the last word in the sociological investigation of the law.
Gelfand (1989: 188) warns about
'fortnightly wonders' [i.e academics who visit] a country only briefly 
and have reviewed some of the literature on its political or legal 
structures, but they feel qualified to expound upon a whole range of 
issues and to 'explain' how and why institutions in that nation are better 
(or worse) than similar institutions in their own home country.
The explanation in this thesis is not evaluative in the "Gelfandian" sense. It is, however,
pertinent to acknowledge the limitation which the type of educational visit under which
this thesis is written places on the capacity to fully grasp the fundamental politico-legal
questions and issues in the two countries under comparison. The limitation is
potentially more serious in the country foreign to the comparative researcher. Here is
an example of this limitation. This study strongly suggests a "militarisation thesis" to
explain the rejection of voluntary collective bargaining and the adoption of compulsory
arbitration in Australia and Nigeria. It does not thereby explain why the system has
been maintained, for instance, in Australia from 1904 into the 1990s. The study of the
operation of the law and its modification over time may suggest the need to qualify the
"militarisation thesis" but it is unlikely to force its rejection. For my purpose, the
relevance of Gelfand's warning lies in its cautionary value.
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Another pitfall of comparative investigation is to transpose the characteristics of one 
country to the other knowingly or inadvertently. For example, I have suggested that the 
military foundation of the state in Australia gave rise to coercive tradition which is the 
main factor in explaining the adoption of compulsory arbitration. Is this suggestion 
influenced by the brooding presence of the military in a country (Nigeria) with which 
Australia has been compared? Obviously there is a possibility; for, the approach in this 
thesis is that of a double-mirror in which the interpretation of one country is informed 
by the interpretation of the other and vice versa.
However, the acknowledgement of the differences wherever they were met in the 
comparison of the two countries should suggest that any transposition can only be 
inadvertent. As a point of fact, military despotism has had a place in the formative 
years of the state in Australia. Renton and Phillimore (1981: 289) describe the period 
1788 to 1823 in the Australian history as one "of military and despotic government". 
Davidson (1991) states: the "commission" given to Arthur Phillip by the monarch 
implied that "power in the English gaol in the Antipodes would be despotic" (p.21); the 
night-watch which Phillip set up in New South Wales, out of which "eventually grew 
all the other Australian administrative institutions of State", had completely coercive 
and command structure (p.36); and the coercive moral discipline "contemplated not 
only the present "but the future character and enjoyments through endless ages" (p.45). 
Whether the experience of this early period has any connection with a predilection 
which Joan Rydon has suggested bears another research. She says: "the strength of the 
ANZAC tradition, the notion of preference to ex-servicemen and the importance of the 
RSL [i.e Returned Soldiers League] have made war service a qualification for many 
Australian positions, not least those of MPs" (Rydon, 1986: 105).
Finally, there are many questions relating to the Australian and Nigerian labour laws 
and their corresponding political economies which have been left largely unexplored in 
this thesis. Two of these are worth noting here: (1) how do the practices of the law in
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both countries compare and how would their similarities and differences be explained?; 
and (2) Where is the place of "agency" (e.g the roles of the Kingstons, the Higgins, and 
the Wises in Australia; the Okogwus and the Efueyes in Nigeria) in the conception, 
adoption, and development of compulsory arbitration systems? And, how does being 
imbued with the Fabian socialist ideology as Cameron Kingston and Henry Higgins 
were or being a firm believer in the Toynbee Hall school of social philosophy as B.R. 
Wise was influence the actions of such people?
For instance, an examination of the practices could reveal how the arbitration law not 
only indexes but also defines, legitimises and reinforces the social traditions, structures 
and processes in Australia and Nigeria. Further, a focus on individuals or groups with 
certain social doctrines/ideologies may enrich the militarisation explanation. 
Nonetheless, if the investigation undertaken in the thesis has expanded "our universe of 
possibilities" with regard to the theory and practice of legislation, and highlighted 
aspects of the Australian and Nigerian political economies that are usually overlooked, 
I should consider the objective of this study largely accomplished.
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